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Essays in Political Economy and Crisis
Laurence Henry Wilse-Samson
My research has two main themes – the link between political economy and economic
development, and the causes and effects of economic crises and long recessions. In some cases
my interests take me into the field of economic history. This dissertation samples from some
of this ongoing research. I find it most informative to approach these issues which are of
macroeconomic interest using the techniques of applied microeconomics and the papers here
all draw on various of these techniques. I am also very interested in relatively new ways of
sourcing of data – including using geographic information systems, methods of transforming
large corpuses of text into data, and mining court case records. This dissertation includes
the application of some of these methods.
The relationship between economic development and democracy is key in political econ-
omy. Many commentators have suggested that economic growth increases support for democ-
racy. One proposed mechanism is that modernization, by reducing the demand for low-skilled
labor, increases the willingness of elites, particularly in agriculture, to extend the franchise.
In Chapter 1 I use subnational variation in South Africa to test this mechanism. I employ
national shocks to the mining sector’s demand for native black workers and cross-sectional
variation in labor market competition induced by apartheid to estimate the effect of black
labor scarcity on wages, capital intensity, and changes in partisan voting preferences. I
find that reductions in the supply of foreign mine labor following the sudden withdrawal of
workers from Malawi and Mozambique (and the increased demand for native black workers)
increased mechanization on the mines and on farms competing with mines for labor. I then
show that these induced structural changes resulted in differential increases in pro-political
reform vote shares in the open districts relative to closed districts, even as mining districts
became more conservative and voted more to maintain the non-democratic regime.
Chapter 2 also explores issues related to the close relationships between economic and
political instituions. In this chapter, together with my coauthor Sébastien Turban, we show
how sovereign debt spreads are impacted by news about executive term limits. Political
institutions matter for countries’ cost of borrowing. We use an event-study to analyze the
markets’ response to new information about executive term limits over 101 events in seven
emerging markets. Investors respond significantly to news about restrictions on those limits,
lowering risk spreads. The one day abnormal returns following news about a restriction is
2 percentage points. Over ten days, the cumulative abnormal return is 5 percentage points.
News about term limits extensions are not significant in the medium run. The results are
robust to a non-parametric test and are confirmed when looking at the behavior of sovereign
CDS prices.
Chapter 3 starts the second part of this dissertation which is an investigation into the
housing-related aspects of the recent crisis which began as a “subprime crisis” before it be-
came “the Great Recession”. In particular, this chapter focuses on the institutional details
underpinning these markets. It also serves to set up the analysis in the following chapter
which looks at one of the potentially important mechanisms which amplified the severity of
the housing crisis. One important feature emerging from this analysis is that it appears that
protections for home mortgage creditors were strengthened in the period preceding the sub-
prime crisis. This may have both increased lending, but also the difficulty of modifying home
loans ex post. This is more problematic to the extent that there are negative externalities
from foreclosures.
Chapter 4, co-authored work with David Munroe, shows that completed foreclosures
cause neighboring foreclosure filings. We estimate this relationship using administrative data
on home foreclosures and sales in Cook County, IL, instrumenting completed foreclosures
with randomly assigned chancery-court judges. A completed foreclosure causes 0.5 to 0.7
additional foreclosure filings within 0.1 miles, an effect that persists for several years. Con-
tagion is driven by borrowers on the margins of default, not those severely at risk. We find
evidence that borrowers learn about lender behavior from neighboring foreclosures. Finally,
a foreclosure causes an increase in housing sales among relatively low-quality properties.
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The relationship between economic development and political institutions is a long-
standing area of interest in political economy. In particular, scholars going back to Barrington
Moore have stressed the interest of agricultural landowners in non-democratic political insti-
tutions, owing to their dependence on labor-repressive economic institutions that would not
survive democratic decision making (Moore 1966). As agriculture modernizes, agricultural
elites have less need to maintain control over labor, and thus are more willing to extend the
franchise.
Apartheid South Africa provides a good setting in which to examine these issues. It was
non-democratic. Its economy remained dependent on agriculture for a long time.1 And two
sectors of the economy — mining and farming — were dependent on low-skilled labor. In
its economic content, Apartheid was primarily a large set of tools for black labor allocation
and control. As I outline below, the Apartheid state was deeply committed to managing
black labor supply. The constraints on the movement of blacks were strict and, importantly,
varied by location. Jobs were reserved along racial lines, and the 1913 Natives Land Act
denied blacks property rights. In South Africa, therefore, white political preferences were
crucially related to preferences over the control of black labor. Changes over demand for
labor may, thus, have changed political preferences.
In this paper I focus on one component of the apartheid coalition:2 the allocation of black
labor between white farmers and mining companies that was moderated by successive white
governments.3 I describe a shock to this compact brought about by a sudden reduction in
1. Agricultural employment was 40% all employment as late as 1958 (Atkinson 2007).
2. I do not take the view that the 1948 election, which ushered in the National Party’s official policy of
‘Apartheid’, differed in kind from the system that prevailed before. For that reason I will sometimes use
‘segregationist’ and ‘Apartheid’ interchangeably. I do argue, though, that the National Party was relatively
more sensitive to the demands of the (especially smaller) farmers when it came to power than the United
Party had been.
3. I put to one side the role of manufacturing — this is a political economy of rural apartheid.
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the supply of foreign mine labor. Using novel datasets I have collected and digitized, I am
able to provide some of the first evidence on the economic determinants of the stability of
apartheid.
The state was attempting to manage two strategic concerns. On the one hand, there
was an ideological long-run worry about being overpowered by the native majority — and
hence a pull for geographic separation.4 On the other, there were the politically powerful
mining and farm sectors with their competing demands for black labor. Thus, one way of
thinking about Apartheid politics is in terms of the difficulty of marrying the desire for
long-run physical separation with the short-run sectoral needs for labor. The solution was a
system of migrant labor to the mines, which helped to satisfy the mining demand for labor
while accommodating the goal of separation. In addition, the acquisition of mine labor from
beyond South Africa’s borders helped alleviate some of stress caused by the competition for
workers between the mining and agricultural sectors.
A shock to the supply of foreign labor may have contributed to the instability of the
Apartheid regime. Specifically, the sudden withdrawal of workers from Malawi and Mozam-
bique between 1974 and 1976 required an immediate increase of recruiting within South
Africa. By comparing outcomes in South African districts where historically mine recruiting
was permitted to areas where it was not, I show that the increase in mine recruiting gen-
erated spillovers onto the farming sector in the years following the shock, inducing higher
agricultural wages and the greater adoption of combine harvesters. I then show that these
shocks had indirect political consequences by looking at the results of elections — I present
suggestive evidence that these changes raised support for parties favoring some reforms of
the Apartheid system in the regions forced to modernize.
4. A charitable reading would be that there was an ideological belief that in the long-run, political logic
required separate states for separate “nations”.
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The shock may also have helped to speed up important changes in labor organization on
the mines. By examining mine-level outcomes, I show that in the years around the shock,
the mines most dependent on foreign labor experienced relatively more strike action. Nar-
rative evidence drawn from the annual reports of the Chamber of Mines and their recruiting
company arms suggests that it was in response to these developments that the mining com-
panies decided to raise wages, lengthen contractual terms for mineworkers, and increase mine
mechanization. The mining companies took strategic steps to become less reliant on migrant
labor, and lobbied the state for a ‘stabilized’ black labor force that was more permanently
at the mines. When black unions were legalized, the National Union of Mineworkers became
instrumental in the broader labor movement, which itself became a primary internal vector
for the political demands of black citizens.5 I show that in the elections following the shock
that there was increased support for the right wing in the districts where mines were located.
This work informs the literature on democratic transitions. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012) characterize the institutions that prevailed in South Africa throughout most of the
twentieth century as “extractive” and as creating a “dual economy” wherein white elites
initiated policies designed to reduce competition from black Africans and create a “reservoir
of cheap labor”. But white elites were not homogeneous,6 and the study of the effect of
shocks to the Apartheid economy allows us to better understand the political equilibria
which sustained the state. Democratization can be a way for elites to respond to protest
through committing to future redistribution (and thus escape violent revolution). In other
5. Their role was reinforced following the reforms of 1979 which allowed economic protest while still
limiting political organization. Note that, while the Natal strikes of 1973 were very important, it was not
until 1979 — and in some sectors later — that black employees were recognized within the framework of the
Industrial Conciliation Act.
6. The Anglo-Boer war ended in 1902. The four white settler colonies combined into the Union of South
Africa in 1910. Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites — mostly descended from separate Dutch and British
colonizations — were for some time largely divided socially and politically.
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cases, insufficient voice might be met by repression or temporary transfers (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2006). From its apex at the start of the 1970s until the democratic transition
in 1994, Apartheid was in retreat.7 During its decline, the government explored all these
routes.
This research also speaks to an old question around the relationship between factor
endowments and technological adoption and innovation: whether and under what circum-
stances does the scarcity of a particular factor induce the adoption of new technologies?
Acemoglu (2010) shows that labor scarcity promotes technological advance when innova-
tion reduces the marginal product of labor. Indeed, most of the analysis of this issue has
arisen in the context of labor scarcity due to the number and variety of institutions directly
affecting the availability of labor. These include numerous coercive labor systems: feudal
institutions,8 Masters and Servants Laws (Steinfeld 2001), and colonial systems such as the
mine mita in Peru and Bolivia.9 Habakkuk (1962) argues that relative technological advance
in the United States over Great Britain was due to greater relative scarcity of labor in the
former country. Hornbeck and Naidu (2013) argue that having a large amount of low wage
labor available limited development in the US South. And controls on labor remain impor-
7. “Grand Apartheid” was the vision of a multi-state South Africa — solving the problem of accommodat-
ing black (or “tribal”) self-determination — as expressed most forcefully by Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd.
His plan was for a white South Africa, with 10 “bantustan homelands” formed on the basis of the Trust
land. Economic opportunity would be provided through “border” industries, that is white firms located just
outside the border of a bantustan in which blacks could work on a migrant labor basis. Policies to reach
this ultimate goal were implemented with some vigor from the 1960s until the early 1980s when the absur-
dity became entirely unsustainable. Furthermore, the western part of the Cape Province was designated a
“Coloured Labor Preference Area”, providing disincentives for firms hiring black labor in lieu of coloured
labor. (This is apartheid era racial classification — the Apartheid government used 4 main racial classi-
fications: black/African/Bantu; coloured; Indian/Asian; and white. The term “coloured” refers to South
Africans of mixed racial descent).
8. Domar (1970)’s hypothesis is that serfdom arose in Russia in the 16th century to mitigate the scarcity
of labor relative to land abundance
9. Dell (2010) shows that these institutions can have persistent effects on household consumption and
child health.
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tant. There are within country restrictions such as the hukou system in China and internal
passport regimes within Russia and Ukraine. Even more important are the vast and complex
systems governing labor movement across national borders which must shape, in ways we
do not understand, development and democratization today.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 1.1 I present the instruments of labor
control — first in general, then particularly as related to the geography of separation between
mining and farming recruitment. Section 1.2 introduces the data on which the analysis relies,
and outlines the empirical strategy used to identify the effects and mechanism of interest.
Section 1.3 presents results related to economic outcomes and section 1.4 discusses political
effects. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.1 Apartheid labor controls
Apartheid’s controls on labor were very strict. Unlike in some settings where borders are
porous, the description in this section suggests that geographic and sectoral mobility was
relatively difficult. Secondly, the extreme lengths to which the state went in order to se-
cure black labor for various sectors indicates that this was a politically important policy
dimension.
The South African economy, even as late as 1970, was dependent on low-skilled labor
in agriculture and mining. As a share of the economically active black population in 1970,
about 40% of blacks were employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing (2.26m people), while
blacks employed in mining and quarrying comprised 11% (610k people).10
The state used a number of tools to maintain the supply of low wage labor. First, we can
10. There were fewer blacks in manufacturing at about 514k while about 1m blacks were employed in the
service sector (Lombard and Stadler 1980).
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think of tools where the state operates on the extensive margin. These included restricting
land ownership, movement, and alternative employment opportunities for blacks — that
is, lowering the value of their outside option. Second, there are tools where it operates on
the intensive margin (through putting state power behind onerous and unequal contractual
relations such as Masters and Servants Laws). Both were used.11 In addition, policies could
be classified in terms of whether the aim was slowing urban to rural flows of labor, or rural
to rural flows; and whether the controls were at the urban or rural end. The segregationist
regime, again, played on all those levers. The underlying logic was increasing ‘reserve labor’.12
I distinguish between legislation with the general aim of lowering labor costs, and legis-
lation directly targeted at preventing competition between farming and mining. In order to
avoid labor market competition and keep wages low, whites negotiated competing claims on
black labor through lobbying the state, rather than through increasing wages and improving
working conditions (Lacey 1981). Below I first discuss the extensive and intensive margin
before turning to the organization of mine labor recruitment and the specific geography of
separation between the mining and farming sectors.13
1.1.1 The extensive margin of employment
I now sketch the main laws defining the labor framework. These consisted of laws restricting
the lands blacks could own, and laws restricting the places to which, and conditions under
which, blacks could move. Throughout this period, except for a few people in the Cape
11. One might also characterize this as increasing the supply of labor and improving labor productivity.
A framework here is lowering the value of unemployment to the worker to improve worker discipline in the
Shapiro-Stiglitz sense.
12. By “reserve labor” I mean workers that could be idled or used according to demand without shifting
wages.
13. I do not focus here on the regulation of rural-urban flows, but the controls there were also strong.
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province, for a few years, blacks were entirely politically disenfranchised.
The Natives Land Act of 1913 restricted the land that blacks could own to “scheduled
areas”, comprising 7% of the country, whereas blacks were some 68% of the population at
the time. The scheduled lands reflected the historical dispossession following wars of colonial
conquest in the nineteenth century. These areas, also called “native reserves”, would be ruled
by “traditional” chiefs on the basis of customary law.14
The Natives Land Act restricted blacks to owning land (in common) only in the reserves.
It also prohibited whites from owning land in the reserves. Blacks were to have a nominal
source of subsistence land outside of white-owned farms to create a ‘pool’ from which mining
companies could recruit migrant labor.15 The mining companies pushed for the reserves to
be extended while white farmers pushed back. Lacey (1981) for example argues that the
expansion of the reserves was (p.4) “blocked by the farmers”, who were concerned about
labor scarcity. Whereas under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act the area of the reserves
was expanded — the new demarcated territories were called the “released areas” (the total
land now allocated to blacks comprised about 13% of the country) — this reflected mainly
recognizing places where blacks were already settled.
Blacks could not own land in “white South Africa”, but were required to work if living
therein. In terms of the Native Regulation Act of 1911, black men and women aged 16 or over
had to register with a labor bureau. Registered farm workers could not switch to industrial
14. The law also foreshadowed the desire of the state to ensure that blacks either work as wage laborers
on (white) farms or relocate to the reserves, through creating limits on renting land to black tenants and
imposing stricter controls on black sharecropping (Atkinson 2007). Before World War 2, however, these
restrictions were most strongly implemented in the Orange Free State province — elsewhere, systems of
black labor tenancy and sharecropping continued. Appendix A.3 describes the timing of the end of the
system of labor tenancy in South Africa.
15. The system of migrant labor allowed a mining company to recruit a male worker for 6 or 9 months
without having to pay a wage that would also support his family. Women remained subsistence farmers in
the reserves.
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work (Atkinson 2007, p.35).
The foundation of “influx control”, that is, the control of rural-urban migration by blacks,
was the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. The chief effect of this law was to regulate
migration into and residence in towns on the basis of the “pass”, a focal point of opposition
to Apartheid. Blacks who were staying illegally in urban areas were punished.16 Savage
(1986) reports that more than 9m Africans were prosecuted under the pass laws between
1960 and 1980.
1.1.2 The intensive margin of employment
Employers were also aided by regulations on the conditions of employment. While Masters
and Servants (M&S) Laws had been on the books since 1880, in 1926 the Pact Government
passed an amendment which brought oral and written contracts between farmers and labor
tenants under M&S laws.17 Farmers could now bring criminal charges against labor tenants
in breach — a provision that was only repealed in the 1970s with the rest of the M&S laws.
The Pact government also passed the Native Servant Contract Act of 1932. Some of its
provisions included for instance, (i) strengthening the power of black parents to enter into
binding contracts on behalf of their children, and (ii) introducing whipping for contraventions
of M&S laws.18
16. In addition to this battery of laws controlling the land blacks could own and farm, and the places to
which and conditions under which blacks could move, farmers were also able to use foreign migrant labor,
particularly in the border districts. Bradford (1990) describes how the migration of black South Africans from
rural areas into urban areas was partially offset by increased recruitment of foreign labor from neighboring
countries. (Her paper is entitled “Getting away with slavery” which sheds some light on the labor conditions
prevailing on those farms.) Farmers were also in some cases able to employ prison labor. For a time, the
state provided subsidised credit to farmers to fund the construction of rural prisons, the labor from which
would be used on participating farms.
17. The ‘Pact’ government was a coalition between the farmer friendly National Party and the white
worker-backed Labour Party. The law passed covered Transvaal and Natal provinces — 2 of the 4 provinces.
18. Duncan (1995) argues that the egregiousness of the Act, the complexity of administration, and the
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The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, aside from extending the reserves, also sought to
end ‘squatting’. Laborers would qualify as ‘labor tenants’ and not ‘squatters’ only if they
were employed by the white landlord on the farm for 180 days of the year. Blacks could not
live on white rural areas, unless registered as ‘servant of the owner’, a ‘labour tenant’ or a
‘squatter’.
I turn now to the division of the rural (‘unskilled’) labor between competing white in-
terests, in particular farmers and mine owners. Traditionally, the source for mining capital
was English-speaking industrialists, historically in conflict with Afrikaans-speaking farm-
ers. The managed competition over black labor is sometimes referred to in South African
historiography as the story of ‘gold and maize’.19
1.1.3 The organization of mine recruiting
South African economic history is intimately tied to the story of gold mining. In the 20th
century, South Africa was the world’s primary exporter of gold, a commodity central to
global monetary policy. It is the interaction of its geographic endowment of minerals —
primarily diamonds and gold — with the institutions inherited from colonization — Dutch
and British — that shaped the country’s path of economic and political development in the
20th century.
obstruction by Native Affairs Department officials, made it fairly unenforceable. He describes the ambition
of the act as one of “unsurpassed repressive qualities”( p.137). However, notes Atkinson (2007) (p.37) “child
labour practices were integral to the farm economy until they were outlawed by the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act of 1997. It is estimated that there were over 60 000 black child farm labourers in 1990,
many between eight and 14 years of age.”
19. See Morrell (1988) and Crush (1993). It is important, however, to keep in mind the contest within
mining also. As described by Bonner and Shapiro (1987), the coal mining companies in Natal and the
Transvaal had thinner margins than the gold miners and demanded cheaper labor still. They argue that the
desire for lower wage rates resulted in an increased application of coercion — (p.2) “in Northern Natal [...]
workers were encouraged to live on neighbouring farms and were deliberately enmeshed in a system of debt
bondage.”
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A monopsonist mine recruiter
Various supervisory roles on the mines were undertaken by white mine workers who were
unionized (primarily within the Mine Workers Union) and were a powerful lobby. In contrast
the far more numerous black workers — drawn from throughout Southern Africa — were
non-unionized and a comparatively weak political force.
There were six major mining houses,20 but they organized various joint actions within the
industry association, the Chamber of Mines. Notably, nearly all recruiting of black labor by
the mining industry was done by one of the Chamber’s recruiting arms — the Witwatersrand
Native Labour Recruting Agency (Wenela) or the Native Recruting Corporation (NRC). The
former was tasked with recruiting north of the 22 degree south line of latitude (primarily in
Malawi and Mozambique), the latter with recruiting south of it (primarily in South Africa,
Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland).21 Foreign black mine recruiting was important. It
increased both in absolute and relative terms in the 1960s as mining companies substituted
cheaper foreign labor for South Africans. There had been 175,000 black South African mine
workers in 1960, but by 1971 that number had been halved. At 1974 foreign migrant mine
labor as a share of mineworkers on the South African gold mines was 78%.22 At the end of
1977, after the shock to foreign labor supply described below, that number was to 47%.23
20. Anglo American Corporation (AAC), GENCOR, Goldfields, Rand Mines, JCI, and Anglovaal.
21. As Savage (1986) notes, this decade was also the period of the highest rate of arrests for pass law
violations in South African cities. It is possible that former mine workers were trying to find work in the
cities.
22. A total of 296,219 out of 382,448 of the total black labor force was from outside South Africa (Lombard
and Stadler 1980).
23. In 1977, following the changes I describe below, the two recruiting companies were merged into The
Employment Bureau of Africa — which still operates today in Southern Africa as TEBA Ltd. See http:
//www.teba.co.za/
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The geography of recruitment
The Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 allowed the state to exclude private (including
mine) recruiting in magisterial districts in which there were white farms. Under this Act
and the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, the Native Affairs Department could assign to
local authorities the ability to establish local labor bureaus. As described by Jeeves (Crush
and James 1995), the purpose of the Act was to “shelter” the labor supply of important
white farming areas from mine recruitment (and other industries). In his assessment this
institutional structure “could not have survived [...without the] use of foreign mine labour.”
The calls from farmers for even stricter controls on labor movement had increased during
and after the Second World War, a time during which black labor had been widely employed
in manufacturing. The exigencies of war had required faster migration of blacks into cities.
Promising more stronger application of the principles of influx control under their new policy
of apartheid, the National Party secured important farming constituencies to come to power
in 1948.24 After 1948 the Native Affairs Department was transformed; a paternalistic ethos
was supplanted by a more rigid and extensive labor bureau system.25 This new system, part
of the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act, constituted a vast network of labor allocation and
influx control.26 Local labor bureaus had to approve each application of a black individual
to leave a rural district — which would depend on whether local labor supply was deemed
adequate. Blacks would only be able to leave the farm and work in the city if the white
24. They lost the popular vote to the United Party by a considerable margin.
25. The transformation of ‘native’ policy through the extension of the administrative powers of this de-
partment is a topic tackled at book length by Duncan (1995) and Evans (1997).
26. The law required also passing the “Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of documents) Act
of 1952” a wonderfully Orwellian name for a law establishing an expansive Pass system. Influx controls were
only finally abandoned in 1986.
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farmer agreed.27 Atkinson (2007) points to the remarkable ‘success’ of this system in terms
of its aim — maintaining a pool of black agricultural labor; including domestic workers,
there were some 1.85m workers (black and white) on farms in 1958, accounting for 40% of
total workers.
Thus by the start of the 1970s, large parts of the country (containing large numbers of
potential mine workers) were closed to the mines (Crush 1993). Restrictions added under
the Bantu Labor regulations of 1965 meant that private recruiting was closed even in some
districts containing bantustan land.28
Crush (1993) maps the regions which were open and closed to mining recruitment in
1970, just before the shocks to mining I describe below (see figure A.1). I will call the parts
of South Africa open to mining recruitment “open districts” and the parts closed “closed
districts.” Note that the open districts include both areas in the Native Reserves (later
“homelands” or “bantustans”) and areas within “white South Africa”.29 Since I will mainly
be concerned with outcomes obtained by surveying white farmers — such as black farm
wages and investment in combine harvesters — I will primarily be interested in the difference
between the white agricultural land parts of open districts and the white agricultural land
parts of closed districts. Figure A.1 also indicates a set of closed districts marked as ‘high
potential’ for recruiting by the mining industry association in internal documents. This set
of districts will serve as ‘placebos’ against which I compare the effects of the shocks to mining
on open districts.
27. See also Giliomee and Schlemmer (1985) and Greenberg (1980).
28. This applied in particular to the provinces of Natal and Transvaal. By “bantustan” land I mean
“scheduled” and “released” land as set out above.
29. The bantustans, or homelands, were generally open to recruiting. As we have noted, there were also
some closed parts, but this was relatively rare.
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1.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
I first briefly outline the data on mining, agricultural and political outcomes on which my
analysis will rely, before turning to a description of the natural experiment and the empirical
strategy. It is worth spending some time on the data since in a number of places this is the
first time these data have been digitized and/or used in the economics literature.
1.2.1 Data
Mining production. For information about mine output I rely on the annual reports of
the Chamber of Mines. These include at the mine level: annual tons produced, working
costs, working profits, and (from 1973 onwards) capital expenditure.
Mine labor recruitment. Various sources provide annual data on sources of mine labour
by country — I use average number of black workers employed (1920-1989) and black work-
ers received by mines drawn from the appendix to Crush, Jeeves, and Yudelman (1991).
The annual memoranda for the Board of Governors of the Native Recruiting Corporation
(NRC) and the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (WNLA) (tasked respectively with
recruiting south and north of the 22 degree latitude parallel) contain data on number of
recruits by recruiting station. These are available in hardcopy format at the TEBA archive
at the University of Johannesburg. The collection also contains some information on the
country origins of recruits by mine as well as the value of voluntary deferred payments and
remittances by station year. There is incomplete data on the recruits by contract type (i.e.,
recruits for 6 month tours, 9 month tours, etc.).
Agriculture. My primary source for information about agricultural holdings, production,
employment, wages and mechanization is the Census of Agriculture prepared by the Cen-
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tral Statistical Services (CSS) of South Africa (later called Statistics South Africa).30 The
geographic unit I employ in the construction of the panel is the magisterial district of which
there were about 300 (the number for which agricultural data was reported was around
250). The agricultural censuses group magisterial districts into 67 economic regions which
are contained within (the 4) provinces. (This classification was done by CSS, and does not
correspond to administrative units). I use the classification as at 1972, before the shock,
throughout. The main variables of interest include: black wages per worker, total black
regular employees, number of tractors, number of combine harvesters, and average farm size.
The empirical analysis focuses on a panel of magisterial districts and the years between 1963
and 1983 for which data are available.31
Voting. I draw on Schoeman (1977) for electoral division (plurality election) results to
1974. Schoeman’s detailed work contains returns for all elections from 1910-1976 as well
as commentary on the results. There were between 121 (at Union) and 164 (at 1974) con-
stituencies over this period.32 The remaining election results (1977, 1981 and 1987) I digitize
directly from the relevant government gazettes.
There is considerable difficulty in measuring political consequences given the quality of
available data, the chief challenge being mapping electoral divisions to magisterial districts.33
Fortunately, the 1981 election results published in the government gazette include the home
30. This publication was also known at various times as theReport on Agricultural and Pastoral Production
and the Agricultural Survey.
31. I do not account for district border changes.
32. Another useful source is Nohlen (1999) which explains for example how the military and state security
council governance structure was formed in 1978, and how the Westminster system changed with the 1983
tricameral parliament.
33. Maps linking electoral divisions to magisterial districts exist but are extremely difficult to use. They
are not complete, located in various national archives all around the country, and are so large that they are
impossible to scan with nearly all scanners.
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address of each of the constituency winners. I georeference these, assign them to magisterial
districts, and (i) drop the urban areas (politicians in cities don’t necessarily live in their
constituency) and (ii) drop the magisterial districts not containing a politician. Thus the
analysis of voting outcomes is for those magisterial districts which we can match to an
electoral division.
Strikes. I will discuss also how the shock described in the following section was associated
with increased strike action. For mine level outcomes on number of strikes, and number
injured or killed, I use Horner and Kooy (1980) who report statistics between 1972 and
1979 and also provide details on changes in living and working conditions on the mines.34
Following this shock, policy on the mines changed towards higher wages, longer stays at
the mines, and more mechanization. I summarize the data used in the main empirical
specifications below in Appendix Table A.9.
1.2.2 A shock to the native labor demand to mining
I focus here on the rapid and dramatic reduction in the foreign supply of labor starting
in 1974. Foreign black mine workers declined from around 336,000 in December 1973 to
208,000 at the end of 1977. Over this period, the number of South African black mine
workers increased from around 86,000 to 214,000.
The heterogeneous geographic incidence of this shock within South Africa provides the
main source of identification in the analysis of the effects on South African agriculture
that follows in section 1.3. Additionally, the large increase in the price of gold over the
1970s generally increased the demand for labor. The constraints on geographic sourcing
34. They also provide their own figures for total numbers of Malawians employed on the mines — 110 000
in 1973, but only 163 in April 1977 (this was also the period in which disturbances on the mines were most
concentrated).
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within South Africa — a result of the institutional structure given by the historical political
agreement on labor allocation between gold and maize — meant that different parts of South
Africa were affected differently by these shocks.
It is important that this change was exogenous to other conditions on the mines and
unplanned by industry. There were two components of the shock. First, following the crash
of a plane transporting Malawian miners, President Banda of Malawi decided to entirely stop
Wenela’s recruiting operations in Malawi. Second, the coup in Portugal in 1974 would lead
to the dramatic scaling back of recruiting operations in Mozambique, a former Portuguese
colony. (There was a slight lag — while the coup was in April 1974, the reduction would
only occur from 1976).35 Whereas 175,468 new recruits were from Malawi or Mozambique
in 1974, by 1977 that number was 40,417 — a change of 135,051.
After the US abandoned the gold standard in 1971, the price of gold increased from a
level of $36 at the start of the decade in 1970, to about $300 in 1979 (it would rise still
further to $600 in 1980 before the dramatic collapse of commodity prices in the early 1980s).
The rate of price increase was not constant. It increased from $36 in 1970 to $59 in 1972,
and then $98 in 1973, and $159 in 1974. This increase was important, raising the demand for
mine labor throughout Southern Africa. Nonetheless, the increase in total number of recruits
in the 1970s was only 28,811.36 My focus is on the compositional shift, with more recruits
from within South Africa (including the Bantustans), and far fewer from Mozambique and
35. As Crush (1996, p. 167) describes, “neither of the major withdrawals of foreign labour in the 1970s were
policy measures directed by the mining industry. When Malawi unilaterally withdrew its mineworkers in
1974 and the Chamber of Mines’ conciliatory overtures were repudiated by President Banda, the industry was
forced to scramble for labour throughout the region [...].” Furthermore, “the dramatic fall-off in Mozambican
labour in 1976 (after a jump of 27,000 between 1974 and 1975) coincided with FRELIMO’s equivocal attitude
to migrancy and its reorganization of the WNLA recruiting apparatus in that country.” For a discussion
of the relationship between the South African labor recruiters and the Malawian government, see Chirwa
(1996).
36. From 370,312 in 1970 to 399,123 in 1979.
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Malawi. There were also important increases in recruiting from some of the other neighboring
countries (especially Lesotho, but also Zimbabwe and Swaziland), but these were from a far
lower base.
The significance of these events was recognized by the industry’s recruiting arm, TEBA.
Its five-year plan, circulated to the Board of Directors in December 1977, begins by recog-
nizing these events as turning points for the industry:
April, 1974, was a significant date for South Africa and for its primary industry, mining.
The tragic Francistown accident and Spinola’s action in Europe heralded a [...] re-adjustment
for the mining industry as a major employer of foreign labour [...]
The immediate effect of these shocks was to increase emphasis on recruiting within South
Africa rather than from foreign sources. Figure A.2 shows annual recruiting figures by
country. The sharp reductions in Malawian recruits from 1974 and Mozambican recruits
from 1976 are clear as is the ramping up of recruits from South Africa. While the mines
were located in the interior — around Johannesburg and in the Orange Free State province,
the recruiting districts were considerable distances away. The Native Recruiting Corporation
(NRC) was organized into recruiting stations in the recruiting districts, regional offices (each
managing groups of 4 or 5 stations), and receiving depots near the mines at Johannesburg
and Welkom. The data presented in Figure A.3 illustrates the median number of recruits
across regional recruiting offices within South Africa and was collected from the TEBA
archive at the University of Johannesburg. The scaling up of domestic recruiting after the
shocks is clear.
As detailed later, the mining industry did not just switch to greater domestic sourcing of
labor. It also raised wages, changed contractual terms to incentivize workers to stay longer
on a mine during a tour, and provided incentives to return to the same mine on future tours.
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There was also a push towards greater mine mechanization.
1.2.3 Empirical Strategy
The discussion in the previous section suggests that the effect of increased mine recruitment
within South Africa would be most felt in those districts in which, for historical reasons fixed
primarily by the politics of the early Union, mine recruiting was permitted. While mining
companies tried to widen the net for recruiting, their political overtures to government
to expand geographic labor sourcing were ultimately unsuccessful in the wake of vigorous
opposition from the farm lobby (Crush 1993). This informs the basic empirical approach
which is to compare outcomes in districts open to mine recruiting to those closed. In terms of
economic outcomes this means comparing wages, employment and the adoption of combine
harvesters. In terms of political variables this means comparing voting outcomes for parties
favoring some loosening of the labor controls underpinning Apartheid with the outcomes of
more conservative parties opposed to any loosening. I add controls and sample restrictions
to test the robustness of this basic analysis, and repeat the analysis on a set of “placebo
districts” that the mining companies identified as suitable for recruiting (and unsuccessfully
lobbied to open). I supplement this analysis with a study of mine level outcomes on output
and political activity (strikes), as a function of exposure to this shock to labor supply.
The logic of this paper is to examine how economic shocks are filtered through political in-
stitutions to produce structural changes in the economy, which then changes the institutions
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themselves.37 This can be illustrated as
shock| institutions0 ⇒ technology choice⇒ institutions1
(labor supply|open)⇒ (combines)⇒ (voting)
The Apartheid institutions of labor control shaped the response to the external shock which
then fed back into differential support for institutions (proxied by voting outcomes).
Conceptual Framework
Consider a farmer in a district d in year t producing agricultural goods at a fixed price
according to technology AdF (Kdt, Ldt). Capital is mobile across districts and labor is sup-
plied inelastically. In this setting capital (combine harvesters) and labor are taken to be
substitutes.
In open districts blacks can earn an outside wage wm from working on the mines so that
wo = wm . For farm workers in closed districts there is an added cost of possible punishment,
p, should they attempt to work on the mines outside their designated occupation and district,
so that wc = wm − p.
The cost of punishment is determined as a function of the political equilibrium. Farmers
lobby their representatives over many dimensions: the provision of credit for capital invest-
ment, agricultural extension services, as well as (in the closed districts) the strength of the
punishment for labor mobility. Capital choice and labor input are fixed in the usual way but
in closed districts there is also a parameter, p, for the level of punishment (exerted through
37. Note also that in important senses, structural change can be an endogenous response to the static
political equilibrium — there is evidence that in some cases, innovation and mechanization within South
African industry was a response to the strong controls on the labor market. This was self-undermining, in
the sense of Greif and Laitin (2004).
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the political system, for example via representations by the Agricultural Union). In the
closed districts this means:
AcFK(K,L) = r (1.1)
AcFL(K,L) = wm − p (1.2)
whereas in the open districts the p is dropped from the final equation given that the insti-
tutional structure inherited from 1911 does not permit them to exclude mine recruiting.
Following an increase in the mining wage wm the equilibrium wage in both districts
rises, but relatively less in closed districts since they optimally also substitute an increase
in political pressure (which raises the equilibrium p) through threats to leave the National
Party for the far right which will be realized variably across districts. Hence I expect the
observed wage and optimal capital labor mix to rise relatively more in open districts. The
increase in punishment p corresponds to an increase in vote share for the right-wing parties
in closed districts. Hence I also expect to see relatively higher (lower) support for the right
in closed (open) districts.
Comparing open and closed districts
Baseline differences. I first compare the baseline characteristics of districts ‘open’ and
‘closed’ to mining recruitment in 1972, before the shocks to the supply of labor from the
changes in Malawi and Mozambique. While these types of districts were different on aver-
age, when comparing open and closed districts in the same economic regions they are not
statistically distinguishable. The location of open and closed districts is illustrated in Fig-
ure A.1. The figure shows the districts open to mine recruiting in 1970 with a dark shade.
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In the other districts recruiting was entirely prohibited.38 The grey shaded regions are those
districts closed to recruiting, but identified by the mining companies as having ‘high po-
tential’ for recruiting in the future (provided government could be convinced to open those
districts). I thus examine baseline differences by regressing district outcomes in 1972 on
open status. I then repeat this regression but include economic region fixed effects. The
estimated coefficients are the within-region differences for open districts.
yd = βOpend + αr + εd (1.3)
It is clear from Table A.1 Panel A that our “treatment” districts (open) are different
on average from the “control” districts (closed). Open districts have smaller average farm
size, lower wages, more employees, fewer combine tractors and lower white incomes in 1970.
However, conditional on economic region, the districts are indistinguishable — see Table A.1
Panel B — aside from white agricultural incomes in 1970, which are 14 percent lower in the
open districts.
Difference in differences. My baseline specification pools over the years 1976-79, of
greatest exposure to the shock. I create a single dummy, Post, which takes on the value of
1 for those years and I estimate differences between open and closed districts, relative to the
excluded base year of 1972. Outcome y in district d and year t is regressed on economic region
cross year fixed effects, district fixed effects and open status. My identifying assumption is
that open districts would have changed in a way similar to closed districts (in the same
economic region), in the absence of the foreign mine labor supply shock which differentially
exposed districts open to mine recruiting.
38. There was some leakage. Crush (1993) reports that at 1970, 12% of the 90, 322 black mineworkers
recruited from white South Africa and the bantustans were recruited from ‘closed’ districts.
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ydt = βPostt ×Opend + γtXdαt + αrt + αd + εdt (1.4)
In practice I control for other characteristics (Xd) of the district that might explain dif-
ferent changes. In particular, I control for the percent of maize production in 1963 interacted
with the outcome year. The specification allows the effect of maize suitability (proxied by
1963 output) to change over time (for example there might be particular price shocks or
technology changes affecting maize). I also weight the regression by the share of the popu-
lation that is black and rural in 1960.39 Standard errors are clustered at the district level to
account for district level heteroskedasticity and within-district time correlation.
To examine dynamics, I also estimate year-specific differences between open and closed
districts, relative to the excluded base year of 1972.
ydt = βtOpend + αrt + αd + γtXdαt + εdt (1.5)
Coefficient βt can vary by year, so its interpretation is the average difference between our
open districts and closed districts in that year, relative to 1972.
In terms of agricultural outcomes I am interested both in the effects of the shock on
factor prices (does the cost of farm labor increase on farms competing with mines for labor?),
and also in whether higher wages induced the adoption of labor-substituting technology (in
particular the combine-harvester). This I define as “agricultural modernization”.
For voting outcomes the basic specification I run is similar to the agricultural outcomes;
I regress electoral division-year level outcomes (relative to the 1970 elections) on economic
region by year fixed effects, year by maize production in 1963 interactions, and a dummy
for the 1977 and 1981 elections interacted with open status. Similarly to our baseline spec-
39. This is the last year for which urbanization status is available.
24
ification above, I weight by the proportion of the black population in that district which is
rural. Standard errors are clustered at the electoral division level to account for division
level heteroskedasticity and within-division time correlation.
Comparing Mines
The basic specification for information about mine output and political activity is
ymt = βPostt ×MMSharem + αm + αt + εmt (1.6)
where MMSharem is the share of Mozambican and Malawian miners of all miners at mine
m in 1967, ymt is the outcome (output or political action) on mine m in year t, αm is a mine
fixed effect and αt is a year fixed effect. Post takes on the value 1 after 1976 and is otherwise
0. Standard errors are clustered at the mine level to account for mine level heteroskedasticity
and within-mine time correlation.
1.3 Evidence on Economic Outcomes
I now illustrate how the changes in mine recruiting spilled over onto agriculture particularly
in those areas directly competing with mining for labor. I show how in the open districts,
agricultural wages increased significantly more between 1976 and 1979 relative to the closed
districts. Furthermore, the adoption of combine harvesters similarly increased in the open
districts relative to the closed, suggesting substitutability between workers and combines.
These findings are robust to various controls, including the status of tenancy ‘reform’ in that
district, the level of white agricultural incomes, and the inclusion or exclusion of the four
‘independent’ homelands (Transkei, Bophutatswana, Ciskei, and Venda). I also perform a
placebo regression on the set of closed districts identified by the mining recruiter as ‘high
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potential’ for recruitment. There was no similar response in those districts to the mining
sector shock.40
1.3.1 Effects on farms
Baseline results
Wages. My results show wages rise differentially in the open districts. When I collapse the
year by open interactions into a single variable for open status for 1976 to 1979, consistent
with the main identification assumption, the results in Panel A of Table A.2 show that
over this time period the wages in open districts were significantly higher by 0.152 log
points relative to closed, conditional on economic region. Column (1) of Table A.3 reports
estimated differences in black wages for regular farm workers in open districts relative to
closed in various years, following estimating equation 1.5. We see the largest difference
by magnitude in 1976, where the difference (conditional on economic region by year fixed
effects, and district fixed effects) is 0.217 log points. Though the difference is not statistically
significant in 1976, it is significant at the 10% level in 1978. These dynamics are shown in
Figure A.4. Thus while agricultural wages across the country rose over this time period, the
increase was even greater in those areas exposed to competition from mining following the
shock to the supply of Malawian and Mozambican labor.
40. The effects of the shock to foreign labor supply on the South African countryside may have been
somewhat attenuated by contemporaneous changes in agricultural organization in South Africa and by the
ramping up of recruiting operations elsewhere in Southern Africa (in Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana).
I detail the changes brought about by the ending of the system of labor tenancy in appendix A.3. These
changes, including evictions of blacks from white farms to the Bantustans resulted in an increased number
of unemployed blacks willing to work on the mines by the 1970s. Later I show that my findings are robust
to these changes.
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Employees. The relative number of regular black employees falls in the open districts. In
columns (2) and (3) of Panel A of Table A.2 I report the coefficients from the regression
with a single open status interaction over 1976–1979. Conditional on economic region the
number of regular black employees on farms was 0.087 log points lower in open districts than
closed, and this result is significant at the 10% level. The wage bill was also higher but this
was not statistically significant. Columns (2) and (3) of Table A.3 similarly report estimated
differences in the number of black regular employees on farms, and the total black regular
employee wage bill, in open districts relative to closed. As expected, the former decreases
from 1976 (and is significantly lower by 0.100 log points in 1978) while the latter increases
(0.190 log points in 1979).
Mechanization. Farmers in open districts add more combine harvesters. Columns (1),
(2) and (3) of Panel B of Tables A.2 and A.4 report year by open status differences for
combines, power combines and all tractors. While combines and power combines increased
in open districts relative to closed, the differential impact is not visible when one aggregates
over all tractor types. But the difference between tractor types is important — as has
been outlined by historians using survey evidence of individual magisterial districts. De
Klerk (1984) sets out the important distinction between ‘hand harvesting’ — by which is
meant reaping by hand and threshing using a tractor — and ‘combine-harvesting’ which
means doing both reaping and threshing with the same machine, a ‘combine’ harvester.41
De Klerk’s work is based on a survey of 6 (closed) districts in a particular economic region
41. As De Klerk (1984) (p.87) describes, “harvesting maize involves both reaping - that is, picking the
‘head’ or blaarkop from the stalk - and threshing, or removing the grain from the cob. Both can be done by
hand or mechanically but it is many years since maize was last threshed by hand in the Western Transvaal.
The basic alternatives are therefore: reaping by hand and threshing mechanically - called ‘hand-harvesting’
- or reaping and threshing with the same machine, i.e. ‘combine-harvesting’. In both cases a number of
variations are possible.”
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of South Africa. He finds for those districts an increase between 1968 and 1981 from 25% of
combine-harvested maize to 95%, with a particular increase between 1973 and 1977. What
Panel B of Tables A.2 shows is that this increase was relatively larger in open districts. De
Klerk argues that in the period between 1945 and 1970, the adoption of tractors permitted
more land to be cultivated and hence increased farmer demands for labor for harvesting,
but that in contrast combines and people were substitutes. Schirmer (2004) makes similar
points, and suggests also the importance of the increase in agricultural wages (driven by
mine wage increases), relative to the increase in the cost of combines. This is consistent with
the results for employees and combines just outlined.
De Klerk (1984) also finds (p.91) important changes in the sizes of farms over the time
period covered by his sample of 6 districts with the average gross surface area increasing to
1155 ha. in 1981 from 664 ha. in 1968 (with 2/3rds of this increase concentrated between
1973 and 1977). I have insufficient data to analyze average farm sizes over the country as
a whole, but it would be surprising if increases in mechanization were not associated with
increases in average acreage.
Threats to validity
An important concern is that it may be that inherent differences between open and closed
districts resulted in differences between 1976 and 1979, unrelated to the shock from mining.
While it is clearly not possible to control for all other potential channels, I can reject a few
competing stories.
The open and closed districts were fixed by historical political negotiation and differ
on some dimensions which may begin to be important from 1976. I perform a number
of robustness checks to explore the importance of inherent differences between open and
closed districts. I add controls for whether or not tenancy ‘reform’ has been completed in
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that district, the level of white agricultural incomes in 1970 (and year interactions) and the
inclusion or exclusion of the “independent” Bantustans — Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda
and Ciskei (TBVC).
Column (1) of Table A.5 Panel A presents the baseline results for the log differences in
black regular wages between open and closed districts as a basis for comparison. Column
(2) controls for whether or not the district has undergone tenancy ‘reform’ (that is, whether
or not the institution of tenancy has been restricted in that district) and year interactions.
If tenancy reform happened disproportionately in open districts in this time period that
might translate into wage increases, but I find that the results are robust to the inclusion of
these interactions also.42 Column (3) includes white farmer incomes in the 1970 census and
year interactions. This crudely proxies for political power — we might think that farmers
might influence recruiting behavior differentially across districts over this time period. I also
run the baseline specification excluding all of the districts intersecting the “independent”
TBVC homelands.43 During this time period these regions gained nominal independence
from South Africa, a process which involved some adjustments of borders. In fact Column
(4) indicates that doing this does not change our estimates — simply reflecting that there
was very limited white agriculture in these districts.
Panels B and C of Table A.5 report similar robustness checks for my results on employees
and combines. Again, the results are in line with the baseline specification.
Placebo districts
In September 1974, the Research Department of the Native Recruiting Corporation released
a memo in which they identified closed districts from which more labor might be recruited
42. For a discussion of the changes brought about under the label ‘tenancy reform’ see Appendix A.3.
43. I use the shapefile of the TBVC homelands from the Municipal Demarcation Boards.
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— they labeled these ‘high potential’ districts and noted that “[r]epresentations are being
made to Government to relax regulations wherever possible to enable us to recruit from all
areas, including urban areas and farming areas.”44 I repeat the baseline specifications where
I replace the open districts with these high potential districts. The results are reported in Ta-
ble A.6, Panels A and B. It is clear that there was no significant response in similar districts
which were closed to mine recruiting. There was very limited “opening” of closed districts
in response to the shock. As reported in Crush (1993), 4 farming districts were opened to
mine recruiting on an “experimental” basis in late 1976. The total number recruited from
those districts in 1976 and 1977, however, was only 1, 053 people.45
1.3.2 Effects on the mines
I first confirm that there were mines that in the short term were forced to reduce output as
a function of the shock. Output drops from 1976 differentially in the mines dependent on
these workers after the shock. This confirms the impression conveyed by Figures A.2 and
A.3 that 1976 was the year in which the effects of the labor supply shock began to be felt
acutely. In Table A.7 Column (1), I present a mine-level regression of mining output on mine
fixed effects, and an interaction between the share of Mozambican and Malawian workers at
that mine in 1967 and a dummy for the years 1976 to 1979.46 Output was 1.3% lower in
44. The memo is titled “Recruitment in South Africa”.
45. Crush (1993) also indicates that there may have been a few thousand recruits from closed districts
in those years also. While it is likely that there were leakages across districts, it is also apparent that the
recruiting intensity within open districts was far greater.
46. WNLA referred to mine workers from Mozambique and Malawi as ‘East Coast’ and ‘Tropical’ respec-
tively. The latest year for country × mine recruiting data I was able to locate in the TEBA archive at the
University of Johannesburg was 1967. This is problematic because the share of East Coast and Tropical
workers rose further between 1967 and 1974. There is thus likely some attenuation bias.
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those most exposed mines.
There were a number of changes in policy on the mines, and in terms of mine recruiting,
resulting from this shock: Most directly, and as discussed above, the sourcing of black mine
labor shifted towards South Africa. But also, wages were increased and working conditions
improved. Less directly, there was the implementation of a policy of labor force “stabiliza-
tion” (keeping mine workers at mines longer, with more returning workers), and greater mine
mechanization.
Changes in labor policy
TEBA’s five year plan set out the broad pillars of a new recruiting strategy: greater domestic
sourcing, wage increases, and improved incentives for longer duration stays on the mines.
Higher Wages. The average annual pay rate for blacks in mining and quarrying increased
in real terms from R235 in 1972 to R606 in 1976 (a real increase of 158%. It would rise to
R651 by 1979. The nominal increase over the same time was 604%) (Lombard and Stadler
1980). Over the same time period, the increase in real wages for blacks in manufacturing
was from R643 in 1972 to R859 in 1976 (a real increase of 34%, and R897 by 1979). As
reported by Lombard and Stadler (1980), this sharp increase in black mine wages meant that
the ratio of white to black pay on mines fell from 19.8 times in 1970, to 6.7 times by 1979.
Nominal wages per ton milled increased from R3.77 in 1971 to R9.79 in 1976, in real terms
an increase of 53%. The 1977 five year-plan recommended that wages be increased further
still, though from then, “in the order of 10% per annum should be sufficient”. Furthermore,
it recommended improved financial services for remittances and savings.
Stabilization. The effect of the compositional change of labor was important with respect
to turnover, since the preference of South African workers was for shorter contracts in com-
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parison to workers recruited from Malawi and Mozambique. The five year plan notes that
“clearly this situation is unsatisfactory and we should plan for greater stability through both
incentives to stay and disincentives to go [...]”. It also expresses a desire for more selectivity,
and recommends building systems which would reward ‘good service’ and create incentives
for workers to return to particular mines. The mining companies and TEBA introduced
various contractual changes towards these ends, including Voluntary Re-engagement Certifi-
cates which rewarded workers through bonuses for renewing employment at the same mine.
In addition, there were other developments such as improved retirement benefits for ‘long
service’.47 Cobbe (1986) compiles data for mine mine workers from Lesotho showing average
contract length increasing from 11 months (the average between 1967 and 1977) to 16 in
1979.
There is evidence that these measures were to a some extent successful in stabilizing the
labor supply. As described in Giliomee and Schlemmer (1985), by the early 1980s TEBA
was no longer employing its network of labour agents and runners to source workers from
remote areas. They argue that while in the past poor conditions for agricultural production
in the homelands increased labor supply, seasonal fluctuations by then were less relevant.48
Mine Mechanization
A further response of the industry to the combination of increased price of gold and reduced
foreign labour supply was to emphasize the importance of capital investment. It is notable
47. The 1976 Annual report of the Chamber describes (p.29), ‘The formulation of an improved retirement
benefit scheme for Asiatic, Black and Coloured employees referred to in the 1974 and 1975 annual reports
was completed during the year with the introduction [...] of a new long service award scheme.”
48. They write (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1985, p.72)“in the past [...] bad rains brought increased interest
in wage work on the mines. But in 1982, the widespread drought brought almost no increase in the labour
available to the mines [...] a TEBA official observes ‘the question of seasonal rains and droughts has much
less effect than it did 10 years ago.’ ”
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that Capital Expenditure only began to be reported in the annual report of the Chamber
from 1973. Capex rose rapidly in the years following.
1.4 Evidence on Political Outcomes
I now look at political consequences from the changes in economic structure identified in
the preceding sections. I first consider differences in voting outcomes across open and closed
districts. The voting outcomes are more infrequent than the agricultural surveys, and the as-
signment of electoral divisions to magisterial districts is with some error, so results presented
here should be handled with care.
I then present some suggestive evidence that the labor supply shock was associated
with greater political activity by black workers on the mines. I discuss how this may have
influenced and been reflected in structural changes in labor organization on the mines.
Giliomee (1995) classifies the different potential interpretations of the halting apartheid
reforms started in the late 1970s and early 1980s into ‘elite initiative’, motivated by the skills
shortage which had developed; and ‘elite response’ to black labor protest. Each of these
stories likely has some merit. It is clear that this period saw the start of the appearance
of opposition to NP rule, noticeably from within the party. During the 1980s, there were
important shifts to the (new) rightwing parties, increasing their share from 14% in 1981 to
30% in 1987 (a pickup of 22 electoral seats) (Rooyen 1994). In the election in 1987 the
Conservative Party (CP) became official opposition in parliament, in addition to displacing
the HNP as the primary far right party. Rooyen (1994) notes that their support was mainly
in the Transvaal and Free State, and in particular in agricultural and mining towns. The
NP shed further seats to the right in the general election of 1989, but in addition lost votes
on the left. I will provide evidence in this section that it was precisely in agricultural and
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mining towns in closed districts which abandoned the NP to the right.
1.4.1 Comparing open and closed districts
Column (1) of Table A.8 (Panel A) reports estimated differences in the cumulative vote
share for parties to the right of the National Party, while Column (2) of Panel A reports
the differences in the sum of the vote share for the ruling National Party and parties to its
left. The results suggest that following the shock to mining, and the structural changes in
agriculture, the 1977 and 1981 may have seen increased support for some of the reforms the
National Party was introducing. Charney (1984) gives an essentially class-based, analysis
for the loss of some agricultural seats in this period, arguing that the government became
perceived as too much in favor of big farmers, “its relaxation of labour and racial policies
is regarded as threatening black labour supplies and the whole labour-repressive system on
which small farmers, particularly, depend. There has been a big swing to the right, mostly
to the CP, among [...] the maize men, who depend heavily on government decisions on the
price of inputs and produce.”
One might think that instead it could have been the case that the shock to labor avail-
ability for farmers in open districts would have prompted them to reject the NP for a party
on the right which would have perhaps been more amenable to closing more districts (or oth-
erwise protecting labor supply). I argue that the strong countervailing pressure of mining
companies towards reduced constraints on recruiting labor rendered this infeasible. As an
internal memo from Chamber of Mines’s Native Recruiting Corporation noted in September
1974, “Representations are being made to Government to relax regulations wherever possible
to enable us to recruit from all areas, including urban areas and farming areas.”49
49. This would remain the policy of the miners. Giliomee and Schlemmer (1985), a collection of essays
strongly critical of the labor recruitment architecture of Apartheid South Africa, includes articles by 3 then
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Charney (1984) also argues that the increase in far right support during the 1980s em-
anated from white working class opposition to National Party policies. In addition to small
farmers, he also notes the strong opposition to any reforms (and an increase in the militant
right) among white mine workers for example, who opposed the ending of job reservation,
while government sided with mine management. We have seen that important changes had
occurred in mining recruitment, capital intensity, and labor organization by the start of the
1980s.
1.4.2 Developments on the mines
Throughout the 20th century white mineworkers jealously guarded their relatively privileged
positions, primarily through the Mine Workers’ Union (MWU). Their political strength was
first felt during the strikes in 1922 (the “Rand Revolt”) against the threat of mine owners
using more black labor and in more skilled positions. It required the use of the army by
Prime Minister Smuts to suppress the rebellion. There was no serious challenge to the
white mineworkers (or the fixed 8:1 black:white labor input ratio) until the 1960s.50 And,
in fact, it would only be with the structural changes of the 1970s that the old institutional
arrangements would begin to change.
Table A.7 (Columns (2) and (3)) investigates whether the shock to the supply of foreign
executives of Anglo-American, as well as an article from then head of Barlow-Rand. Robert Goodsell,
an executive from Anglo American, argued “oscillating migration obstructs the development of a mature
employment relationship, and frustrates career-type aspirations on the part of management and workers”
Giliomee and Schlemmer (1985) (p.306).
50. But, even then, the changes that were instituted under the new agreement in 1967 were (Wilson 1972)
“a triumph for the trade unions . . . the lion’s share of any increases in productivity due to the elimination
of some restrictive practices [i.e. restricting blacks from certain occupations] would go to white worker”.
Whites would work less, for more pay (the total white wage bill rose by 11%). (White) management and
(white) labor could only agree to Pareto-improving bargains over the extra surplus generated by the greater
application of black labor.
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labor was associated with an increase of strikes and other workplace interruptions (Lemon
1984). Indeed, there is suggestive evidence that the mines most exposed to the shock also
had an increase in strikers injured or killed. Horner and Kooy (1980) (p.10) classify the
majority of “disturbances” as relating to ethnic differences. In particular, they argue that
(p.23) “the sources of conflict are to be found in such factors as differential treatment of
workers, different lengths of contract, and differential access to jobs [...] it is in the interests
of management to suppress forms of class consciousness in the work force and rather to
encourage forms of national or tribal consciousness”.51 The analysis here suggests that the
compositional changes in the work force helped to make the strike activity so acute.
The series of strikes is important for helping to understand some of the changes in strategy
on the mines. Following the shock there were renewed demands by the mining industry
leaders first for a “stabilized” black labor force around the mines, and second, for deregulation
of the racial controls on semi-skilled and skilled work. The moment of the entirely transitory,
low wage, migrant laborer had passed.52
Two commissions. In 1977, A.C. Peterson, member of the council of the Chamber of
Mines would argue, “the industry’s long-term aim must [...] be to eliminate work restrictions
and job reservation and convince our White employees that this, by raising of the whole
51. In his 1975 address, the President of the Chamber of Mines would state, “the strikes and disturbances
on the mines resulted in a number of deaths during the year [...] the great majority arose from inter-tribal
clashes”.
52. Chairman of Anglo American Corporation and De Beers Consolidated Mines, Harry Oppenheimer,
argued at a meeting of the Chamber of Mines in 1975, “[t]he time has clearly gone by, never to return,
when we sought to control the level of costs in the industry by keeping wages down. We have got to control
costs in future, not by low wages, but by high productivity [...] We are not going to be able to count [...]
on solving our problems by a great influx of totally unskilled workers, a great many of them foreign [...we
should] increase the percentage of Black workers who are South Africans, and we should increase the time
they spend in the industry, so that the skills they acquire when working with us are not allowed to go
to waste [...] you have got to house them with their families, and there we need the co-operation of the
Government[...]” Chamber of Mines South Africa, 85th Annual Report.
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South African economy, can only be to their advantage as well as the advantage of the
Blacks.” In the same year the government launched two major reviews of aspects of labor
legislation in South Africa, the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions.53 Part 6 of the final
Wiehahn Commission report concerning Labour Legislation and the mining industry was
published 30 September 1981. The changes emanating from the Wiehahn Commission were
to open up a number of new semi-skilled jobs to blacks on the mines. Black mine workers
were now working in a more capital intensive setting, and for longer stays. Various other
important regulatory changes happened around this time the effect of which was to improve
the bargaining position of black employees. Importantly, the establishment of black trade
unions was made possible in 1981.54
Resistance to these changes by the unionised white artisans on the mines was fierce.
Positions such as “blaster” in mining were some of the last to be removed from the “colour
bar”. The series of labor reforms following the Wiehahn commission reached mining last
(indeed government withheld the mining report until the end). In Table A.8 Panel B I
report results from the regression of electoral division outcomes (right share and NP or
left) on year by mining district interactions and year by National Party vote share in 1970
interactions. minedistrict is simply a dummy for whether the electoral division contained
a mine. As is clear from Column (1), the share of the conservative white right increases
dramatically in mining districts during the 1980s.
53. The Chamber expressed support for reduced discrimination against blacks on the mines. The Chamber’s
President, in his annual address of 1978 would report, “[t]he Chamber submitted detailed evidence [...the
Chamber] welcomes these urgent enquiries aimed at the removal of discrimination in the workplace [...]
non-White workers must be absorbed into the skilled labour pool.”
54. This was an outcome of the Labour Relations Amendment Act (No 57 of 1981. We discuss in more
detail in appendix A.4 the history of white labor protection and the slow liberalization of these controls.
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Black Labor is organized. Ultimately, the employers’ association (the Chamber of
Mines) and the largest black trade union (the National Union of Mineworkers — NUM)
found themselves arguing on the same side for the end of the color bar. NUM was formed in
1982 and quickly became the most important union on the mines.55 Its membership was 40
percent of the black workforce on the gold mines and collieries, and in the Chamber’s words
it came to “[dominate] the industrial relations scene, both nationally, through its influence
in COSATU, and in the industry.”
1.5 Conclusion
This paper reveals some of the fault lines of the Apartheid South African state. The links
between extractive political and economic institutions in the stark South African context
sheds light on fundamental features of the interplay between economic and political develop-
ment and, in particular, the role of labor controls. I have collected and digitized important
novel datasets and provided some of the first evidence on the economic determinants of the
stability of the apartheid regime.
Specifically, the paper has shown how the geography of recruitment between mining
capital and white farmers — managed by the use of external unskilled labor in mining —
was changed by the shocks to foreign labor supply in the first half of the 1970s. Using the
variation in geographic incidence of the shock I show how it changed economic structures
and interests, and perhaps influenced political preferences.
Future work will explore the long-run effects emanating from these changes — in terms
of persistent economic outcomes and political consequences. In ongoing work, I and collab-
55. After being recognised by the Chamber of Mines in June 1983 it had 6000 employees. This grew to
40,000 by December 1984, and 187,000 by mid-1987.
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orators examine in more depth the important role of labor conflict and labor unions during
the late 1970s and 1980s. In particular, Naidu, Turban, and Wilse-Samson (2014) study
the economic incidence of politically and economically motivated strikes in this period. The
powerful National Union of Mineworkers would have an important role in the transition to
democracy. As described in the 1987 Annual Report of the Chamber of Mines, “NUM initi-
ated a costly three-week strike [...] the industry sought to view and handle the strike as an
industrial dispute, but the evident underlying aim with the strike was to demonstrate wide
worker support for an agenda ranging from sanctions to seizure of control of the national
economy.”56 What is clear from the analysis in this paper is that the strength of the labor
movement in general was aided by the changes on the mines in the mid- to late 1970s.
Much more historical data remains untapped, and many important questions about South
Africa’s economic and political development remain understudied. South Africa is an impor-
tant case study for the relatively peaceful transition out of non-democracy. This analysis has
suggested that one potential mechanism was the reduced reliance on labor controls resulting
from technology substituting for labor on the farm. But, the country’s unemployment rate
has remained trapped at extraordinarily high levels for decades following transition, perhaps
reflecting in part a historically “too” capital intensive growth path.57 Mechanized mining
and agricultural jobs have never been replaced. Understanding why and where development
went wrong is the sine qua non for effective growth strategies today. This paper suggests
that part of the answer might lie in the important changes of the 1970s.
56. NUM was headed by Cyril Ramaphosa —who would later become the chief negotiator for the ANC
during the constitutional negotiations around the end of Apartheid. Today Ramaphosa is ANC deputy
president.
57. As noted in Spandau (1980), the Minister of Economic Affairs reported to Parliament in February 1977
concerns about the economy’s increasing capital-intensity.
Chapter 2
Valuing Institutions: A Measure of
the Bond Market’s Views of Term
Limits in Developing Countries
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2.1 Introduction
On 26 February 2010, the Constitutional Court of Colombia rejected a referendum on a
constitutional reform that would have allowed Alvaro Uribe to run for a third term in the
Colombian presidency. In the following days, Colombia’s sovereign bond spread over US
Treasuries narrowed. Five years earlier, when the same Court upheld an amendment to
the constitution allowing the re-election of Uribe, the bond market did not respond. We
look across 101 events related to seven developing countries’ executive term limits — 73 of
which loosened the constraints on the executive, 28 of which tightened them — and find
these responses to be more general. Term limit restrictions lead to a significant reduction in
the measured riskiness of dollar-denominated sovereign debt while the effect of extensions
is weaker and insignificant. To quantify this riskiness, we use stripped spreads of sovereign
debt over Treasuries. Prices of insurance on government bonds from Credit Default Swaps
confirm these results, although these markets are less liquid and less data is available. The
results are also robust to a non-parametric test where we compare the response on event
days to randomly chosen days. We further analyse these events by examining the variation
in the response of spreads as a function of the the government branch initiating the action,
as well as the level of institutional development of the relevant country.
In the modern literature on economic development, institutions are held to be central
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). In this paper we ask whether, and in what
way, investors care about institutions: do sovereign debt spreads respond to news about
institutional changes? This paper is a contribution to the still relatively new literature
analyzing the impact of institutional changes on high-frequency data. Term limit changes
are generally part of a larger sequence of events, which can make approaches — using annual
panel data for example — less well identified due to the presence of unobserved confounders.
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In this paper we consider the immediate response of financial markets, which gives us an
idea of the effect of institutional changes on expectations rather than final outcomes1 —
the direct impact on growth, for instance, remains unobserved. However, these outcomes
should be correlated. For example, a lower borrowing cost makes borrowing cheaper for the
country of interest which makes “positive” outcomes more likely. In the setting of rational
expectations this is a distinction without a difference.
We test whether, and how, term limits changes are instantaneously reflected in debt
spreads. This analysis thus measures the impact on country-risk as perceived by investors,
where fluctuations reflect changes in beliefs about a country’s probability of default. A direct
effect of an institutional change on borrowing costs would matter for long-run outcomes. Fur-
thermore, by measuring investors’ response to potential changes, we infer investors’ beliefs
about the value of term limits in various countries. Since this response should be antici-
pated by forward-looking leaders and legislators, we also learn something about the political
calculus of institutional reform within these countries.
The fall in spreads after restrictions suggests that those events reduce the perceived
probability of default. The asymmetry with the non-effect of extensions suggests that some
emerging countries live under a form of institutional drag: the interest rate on sovereign
debt is high because investors believe that weak institutions are permanent (and that, for
example, term limit extensions are likely).
The impact of institutions is further validated by the differing effects we observe when
considering the institutional source of the term limits move. A move by the executive branch
has a stronger effect than actions taken by the legislative or the judicial branch. However, it
appears that restrictions instigated by the judiciary, where it is more likely that the judiciary
is then in conflict with the executive’s will, have a significant and permanent impact leading
1. Moser (2007), Moser and Dreher (2010) show two recent applications of a similar idea.
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to a cumulative abnormal (negative) return of 5% on stripped spreads after 10 days. We
analyze further the potential link between the market reactions and a country’s level of insti-
tutional development by comparing the abnormal returns to various governance indicators,
and find some tentative evidence that investors react more strongly in weakly institution-
alized countries. The asymmetric absolute response between restrictions and extensions is
somewhat reduced when we drop the two countries with the highest quality institutions at
the time of their events.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of term limits on both beliefs
about and actual economic outcomes. As we have noted, a “shock” to term limits, e.g. a
change in the constitutional rule defining their length or their number, may change investors’
perceptions of the country’s ability-to-pay because of the growth implications of the institu-
tional change, or as signal of possible future further institutional changes. But, there are no
clear theoretical or empirical implications of term limits on fiscal outcomes emerging from
the literature.
Empirical work related to this topic has mostly focused on the link between term lim-
its and Political Business Cycles (PBCs) — incentives for re-election affect the choice of
fiscal and monetary policies.2 The PBC literature notably links political institutions with
fiscal outcomes, which might subsequently affect “sovereign risk”, and thus a country’s bond
spreads3. Block and Vaaler (2004) suggest that investors and credit rating agencies are
election-averse: bond yields rise and downgrades happen more often before an election. Our
focus on emerging markets relates to findings that PBCs are more significant in these coun-
tries (Brender and Drazen 2005). Besley and Case (1995) show that in US States, incumbent
2. See Persson and Tabellini (2000), ch.16 for a review.
3. The literature is vast. See, for examples, Nordhaus (1975), Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997), and
Persson and Tabellini (2000).
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governors subject to term limits increase taxes and spending and minimum wages fall in the
corresponding term but Besley and Case (2003), with more recent data, find no effect on
taxes or GDP growth. Johnson and Crain (2004) extend the analysis to 48 democracies and
also find that government spending increases when term limits are binding but Dalle Nogare
and Ricciuti (2011) consider 52 countries and find no impact on government spending or
deficits, except in presidential systems where a lame duck is correlated with reduced public
spending.
These inconsistent empirical results on term limits’ impacts may relate to the contradic-
tory incentive effects term limits have and thus some inherent contingency in the empirics.
On the one hand, term limits may restrict the possibility of re-electing a competent politician
(Smart and Sturm 2006) or reduce the time to build power and network capital, and higher
turnover might generate policy instability and reduce the provision of public goods (Tabarrok
1994). They might also create an incentive to shirk (Reed et al. 1998). On the other hand,
term limits reduce reputational incentives which might lead a politician to misrepresent her
preferences in a first term, and make the screening process for voters more difficult (List
and Sturm 2006, Morris 2001). Term limits reduce a politician’s time available to acquire
the ability to reform institutions to block outsiders, or to benefit from an incumbency ad-
vantage, and thus benefit risk-averse ideological voters (Glaeser 1997). They also reduce the
time available to become influential and thus generate more logrolling, and reduce the time
available to be influenced by lobbies in favor of spending programs (Dick and Lott 1993).
Finally, they might also shorten the time and money spent on re-election (Hayek 1979). Ini-
tial arguments in favor of term limits focused on US institutions where legislators’ ability to
direct spending towards their own district generates negative externalities: a district is the
only beneficiary of its legislator’s ability to increase, say, targeted earmarks, but all districts
incur the cost of an increase in spending. Term limits might solve this coordination problem
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(Buchanan and Congleton 1994).
More broadly, our paper falls within the literature on institutions and growth. Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) argue that extractive political institutions retard growth by
narrowing power to a small interest group which then fosters the persistence of extractive
economic institutions. Term limits can be thought of within this framework, since political
office can be used by insiders to prevent potential reformers from competing for office (Glaeser
1997). Longer terms could also be used to create connections with private interests through,
say, lobbying, encouraging extraction (Lopez 2003). We note also that the impact of term
limits themselves should depend on the wider set of institutions present — both particular
complementary institutions, as well as the overall level of institutional quality within a
country. For example, List and Sturm (2006) provide evidence that the impact of term limits
on environmental policies depends on a state’s density of environmental organizations, and
on the strength of political competition. In the case of US governors as in Besley and Case
(1995) and Besley and Case (2003), the impact of term limits on fiscal policies must interact
with the institutional constraint imposed by different state balanced budget rules. Finally,
Querubin (2011) considers the case of the Philippines and finds that the imposition of term
limits for all elected offices did not break the power of dynasties since members of the same
families were able to alternate between different political offices.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe how we select
relevant events and model the determination of bond spreads. Section 2.3 reports our main
results, and their robustness to a non-parametric test and the substitution of CDS prices
for sovereign spreads. Section 2.4 provides potential interpretations of our headline finding
discussing heterogeneity with respect to event characteristics and the level of institutional
development. Section 2.5 concludes.
45
2.2 Methodology
We use an event study to analyze the impact of a ‘shock’ to executive constitutional term
limits on a high-frequency series. In this section, we first describe the selection of what
constitutes a “term limit event”. We then describe the dependent variables we use to analyze
the impact of these events. Next, we consider the literature on the determinants of country
spreads to build the counterfactual necessary for the event study. We conclude this section
by specifying the econometric technique we use for the final results.
2.2.1 Selecting term limit events
The events we are interested in are announcements made or actions taken by a branch of
government which impact the institution of executive term limits. Examples of such events
include a legislative vote on extending executive term limits, judiciary decisions on the con-
stitutionality of those limits or their extensions, or executive statements of intentions. We
select our events by surveying mostly English language newspapers covered by the LexisNexis
and Factiva databases by looking for all articles mentioning “term limits” or its derivatives.
In parallel, we closely inspected the timelines of news presented on the website of the Inter-
national Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Once we find an event, we run a more
specific search to determine its exact timing and to properly understand the political con-
text. Events are identified by a country and a specific date. We distinguish the events by
whether they restrict or extend executive terms, and code which branch of the government
has instigated the move4.
4. We recognize however that presidents who want to eliminate term limits may ask their allies in the
legislature to pretend it is their own initiative. Furthermore, the powers of each institution are different
— the judiciary can very rarely take initiative in expanding term limits, but they may have discretion in


















Table 2.2: Number of events by type and term
limit impact
The final selection consists of 101 events from 7 countries for which we provide summary
counts in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. About one third of our events are restriction events, while two
thirds are extensions. We classify events into four different categories of initiators, including
the three traditional branches of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary). The
fourth branch features events that we could not classify in those branches, including impor-
tant polls and referenda. We are left with 12 events initiated by the judiciary branch (mostly,
Constitutional Courts), 28 by the executive branch itself, and 43 from the legislature5.
2.2.2 Outcomes
Our main outcome of interest is based on JP Morgan’s country-level Emerging Market Bond
Indices Global (EMBI henceforth) variables. The EMBI is a daily index of emerging market
bonds produced by JP Morgan dating back to December 31st 19936. The instruments
included in the index have to have a face-value in excess of US$500mn, and a maturity of at
least 2.5 years.
JP Morgan provides several variables linked to the EMBI. We focus on the stripped spread
5. The list of events, along with a detailed description of them, are available in an online appendix.
6. It aggregates “U.S.-dollar-denominated Brady bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans, and local market debt
instruments issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities”(Borri and Verdelhan 2011).
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— the traditional measure of sovereign credit risk. This spread corresponds to the difference
between a representative bond’s yield over that of US Treasuries, stripped of any collateral
effects and other potential enhancements. The stripping process means that the level of the
stripped spreads reflects directly the change in the value of the bond, while the non-stripped
spread would also reflect changes in the value of the collateral, for instance a Treasury bill.
The stripping is aimed at measuring specifically the issuer’s risk7.
Second, as a check of robustness, we consider the price of a country’s Credit Default
Swap (CDS) on sovereign debt, for different maturities. CDS are, by construction, a price
on default: the buyer of a sovereign CDS effectively buys insurance against sovereign default
by paying a regular premium while the instrument repays in case of a ‘credit event’ (e.g.
default) related to the underlying asset. CDS prices are only available since December 2002,
and not for all countries. We settle on the CDS prices at three different maturities for Brazil,
Colombia, Kazakhstan and Venezuela: 1-year, 5-year and 10-year instruments.
The EMBI and the CDS prices are directly linked to the perceived country-risk, and in
particular the country’s perceived default probability, and a rich literature has been devel-
oped on the relationship between Sovereign – and US corporate bonds — and corresponding
CDS markets (Longstaff et al. 2007).We use the EMBI for our main analysis for several
reasons: the EMBIs are available for a larger set of countries and for a longer time period,
whereas CDS data for our countries is available only starting in January 2004. In particular,
we report the starting dates of the EMBI spread data in Table 2.3 and of the CDS data later
in Table 2.5. While Longstaff et al. (2007) argue that in general CDS are more liquid than
sovereign debt for institutional reasons, our use of the EMBI alleviates that concern some-
what, since JP Morgan has minimum liquidity requirements for including instruments in the
7. Consider the price p of an asset yielding certain cashflows over some period of time. The stripped spread






The blended spread is Rt + SSt. See Kim (2004).
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EMBI. Furthermore, Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) find that default probabilities explain a
large variation of the index and Ammer and Cai (2011) establish that the long-run behavior
of bond yields and CDS premia are similar. Our results are also robust to the alternative
use of CDS prices.
Table 2.3: Starting date for sovereign stripped spread data in sample countries
Country EMBIG stripped spread
Argentina December 31st 1993
Brazil April 29th 1994
Colombia February 28th 1997
Kazakhstan June, 29th 2007
Nigeria December 31st 1993
Sri Lanka November 30th 2007
Venezuela December 31st 1993
We consider only dollar-denominated outcomes to exclude exchange rate variation (Broner,
Lorenzoni, and Schmukler 2007). Hund and Lesmond (2008) note that $6.5tn of emerging
market debt was traded in 2006, and half of it was denominated in non-local currency.
As usual with financial data, these dependent variables exhibit a high degree of autocor-
relation, hence we use their daily growth rates. This is important for the interpretation of
our results since we mainly present effects on the estimation of daily abnormal returns on
the growth of stripped spreads and the growth of sovereign CDS prices.
2.2.3 A model of bond spreads
There is no standard model for the determination of bond spreads like the factor models
for stock market returns. We therefore construct a model which will provide the benchmark
against which the country’s bond spread (or the CDS price) is compared, around the event.
There are two important criteria we use to select the independent variables that model the
spreads. First, they must have explanatory power. Second, they should not be impacted by
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the country-specific shock to term limits. Fortunately, the international finance literature
has found that a small set of global variables can explain a large share of the variation in
bond yields. In the absence of strong theoretical structure, we use standard tools of model
selection to choose the independent variables in the estimation window.
A standard result on international capital flows is that inflows in emerging markets are
driven by the (international) lenders’ behavior more than borrowers’ conditions8. This is
important because it allows us to use variables exogenous to the political environment in the
relatively small emerging countries we consider while still accounting for substantial part of
the variation in our dependent variables.
Understanding why this is the case also helps in choosing which variables to include in
the estimation. Four channels emerge from the literature.
First, several authors have underlined the link between the US monetary policy and
investment flows to emerging markets (Eichengreen and Mody 1998). More generally, US
interest rates and others will matter due to arbitrage (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin
2001). But, the effect of US rates on bond spreads is not clearly understood, with different
authors reporting different effects (e.g. Cline and Barnes (1997) or Diazweigel and Gemmill
(2006)).9 Others contend that one should instead use swap rates since better proxies for
the ‘risk-free rate’10 (e.g. Blanco and Brennan (2005), Zhu (2006)). We also consider the
LIBOR, which measures the cost of interbank borrowing (Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton
8. See among many others Fernandez-Arias (1996), Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2002), and Diazweigel
and Gemmill (2006), for the bond market and Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1998) for determinants of
equity flows.
9. A tentative reconciliation of these results is offered by Uribe and Yue (2006) who find that innovations
in the short-term US interest rate can explain 20% of the variation in emerging market spreads at quarterly
frequencies. After a positive shock to the US short rate, emerging market spreads initially fall (the interest
rate increases less than the US interest rate) and then overshoot.
10. The swap rate is the fixed rate paid in an interest rate swap.
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2001).
Second, a more recent literature has put great focus on variables proxying for the risk-
aversion of international investors. Typically we proxy volatility with the Chicago Board
Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX). The VIX measures market volatility by
considering the price of options. Greater volatility is associated with higher spreads (Re-
molona, Scatigna, and Wu 2007). Some authors have used US corporate bond indices to
measure risk-aversion with the same findings11. Others use the difference between Trea-
suries and swap rates, and AAA-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries (Favero, Pagano, and
Thadden 2009). Finally, Borri and Verdelhan (2011) use the TED spread, which is the differ-
ence between the interest rate on interbank loans and Treasury bills. Various authors have
built their own indices of risk and also found a significant positive impact of risk aversion
on bond spreads (Baek, Bandopadhyaya, and Du 2005).
Third, the economic health of lenders matters. Higher international interest rates can
suggest a period of global growth and a steeper US yield curve suggests expectations of
higher future short term interest rates and reveals expectations of growth. The yield curve
has been found to have a negative impact on emerging market spreads (Martell 2007). Global
conditions have also be proxied by the S&P500 index and other global market aggregates
with the same effect12.
Finally, we follow Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) among others by adding the Commodity
Research Bureau commodity index (CRB-CI) which aggregates the prices of future deliveries
of a (variable) set of commodities. An indicator of commodity prices is important given that
11. See McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) or Borri and Verdelhan (2011) who use US BBB-rated corporate
debt; or Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz (2006) or Wooldridge and Domanski (2003) who use the high-yield spread
over treasuries or spreads in bond yields of corporations with different ratings.
12. Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz (2006) find that US growth has a negative, although insignificant impact on
spreads. Diazweigel and Gemmill (2006) use the S&P500; Westphalen (2001) the MSCI world index; and
McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) the S&P500, Nasdaq, and FTSE.
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most of the emerging markets we are interested in are important players in global commodity
markets.
Thus, the number of factors that one could use in the estimation window of our event
study is large. We employ standard methods of model selection to include the most rele-
vant variables in our estimation. We regress the EMBI Global Composite (EMBI-GC), an
aggregation of all the EMBI indices for all emerging countries, on the set of variables men-
tioned above over a period of 3000 days. Following Groemping (2006), we computed various
importance metrics for each variable (for instance the R2 contribution averaged over the
different regressors orderings, the contribution when a variable is included first or last, the
product of the standardized coefficient and the correlation between the EMBI-GC and the
variable). Finally, we compute bootstrap confidence intervals for these measures of relative
importance13.
The various selection methods yield similar results, and we ultimately include in our
model the following: the yield curve for growth, the high yield spread (High yield corporate
bonds minus 10-year treasuries), the VIX, the BBB-AAA spread and the TED spread for
global volatility, the long term US rate, the swap rate, and the S&P futures for arbitrage
variables, and the New York Fed commodity index. The results are not overly sensitive to
this specification.
Since our outcome variables are the rate of growth of stripped spreads and CDS price
growth, we use the growth rates of the variables above in our regression.
13. The program is available from the authors upon request.
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2.2.4 Event Study
Following Corrado (2011) we use estimation windows of 250 days prior to our events to
develop a counterfactual. We close the estimation window 10 business days prior to our
events. Because events often appear in a cluster (e.g. different government branches take
actions for an extension from one to two possible terms), we use the same estimation window
for events taking place in the same cluster. Formally, an event occurs in cluster C if it
happens less than a year after another event in the same country. Thus, our estimation
windows correspond to a year before the first event in a cluster of events C. Finally, to
measure the event’s impact, the “event windows” consist of 10 days before and after each
event.
Denote C as an indicator for a “cluster of events”, and denote EC = {events ∈ C}
as the set of events in that cluster. For each C, We regress the variable of interest, e.g.
the stripped spread’s growth rate, on the dependent variables listed above, and a dummy
variable to capture the impact of the event(s) in EC
14. Hence, if st is the stripped spread on
date t, the dependent variable we consider at date t is yt =
st−st−1
st−1
. For k ∈ {−X, . . . , X}
defined below, we run the regression for each cluster of events C:
yCt = αC + βXCt +
∑
i∈EC
γC,i(k)1(t ∈ I(k)) + εCt
where XCt is the set of independent variables, and k corresponds to the number of days before
or after the event. I(k) is the set of dates on which we compute the abnormal stripped spread
growth, i.e. the events’ impact. Namely, if an event is dated at t = 015.
14. Sandler and Sandler (2012) use simulations to show that “Allowing multiple event-time dummies to be
turned on at once generally produces unbiased estimates.”
15. Note the abuse of notation given that we have multiple events in a row.
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 if k ≥ 0, 1(t ∈ I(k)) = 1 iff t ∈ {0, . . . , k}
 if k < 0, 1(t ∈ I(k)) = 1 iff t ∈ {k, . . . ,−1}
Finally, to test our hypothesis on restrictions versus extension events, the dummies are
preceded by a minus in case of restrictions. This means that our hypothesis is that the γ’s
should be positive in the case that the dependent variable is the stripped spread: a restriction
event should decrease the idiosyncratic risk and thus the stripped spread, while an extension
should have the opposite effect.
The coefficients of interest are the γ(k)’s for all k, and represent the cumulative abnormal
return over |k| days. When k ≥ 0, the coefficient represents the daily abnormal return on
the variable of interest after the event. If k < 0, the coefficient represents the same quantity
before the event. We exclude the event day from the negative k’s since we want to use those
quantities as “placebos” against the post-event abnormal returns.
To assess the significance of this daily abnormal return, we estimate γC,i(k) and obtain
the abnormal return for a specific event γ̂i,C(k). We compute the robust standard error for




i∈EC γ̂i,C(k). Finally, to
aggregate at a higher level (e.g. over all event clusters), we assume that the γC coefficients
are independent across clusters of events.
2.3 Results
We find that investors respond to news about term limits. Our results suggest that investors
view ‘tightenings’ more favorably than ‘extensions’ since bond spreads fall significantly after
term limit restrictions while they increase after extensions. However, we uncover an interest-
ing asymmetry by showing that the impact of extensions, while positive, is insignificant. It
may be that while restrictions on an executive’s term generally improve investor confidence
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through signalling de facto separation of powers, a loosening of term limits may already be
priced into expectations. These low expectations, therefore, act as an economic drag for the
country since making borrowing permanently more costly.
2.3.1 Effect on country spreads
Figure 2.1 shows the daily abnormal growth of the stripped spread over a given event window
around an event, when the abnormal returns coefficients are aggregated over all events. In
the figure, the event takes place at time 0; on the right, the values are the daily abnormal
returns when the event window is between 0 and x > 0 days after the event, while on the
left of the event, the daily abnormal return is computed over a window excluding the event,
between −x > 0 and the day before the event. The numbers are daily abnormal returns, so
that the overall impact of the level variable (here, the stripped spread) is a compounding of
these numbers.
Figure 2.1: Daily abnormal return for different event windows
. The figure shows the daily abnormal slope of the stripped spread between the day of the event and x days
after the event (if x > 0), or between x and the day before the event (if x < 0). The 95% confidence interval
under the assumption of normality is displayed.
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In the regression, the dummy was signed negatively for restriction events and positively
for extension events. Given this specification, we expect a positive and significant abnor-
mal return around and after the event, since greater confidence of investors, following a
restriction, should be reflected in an abnormally negative stripped spread growth, and thus
abnormally lower costs of borrowing. Extension events should be associated with higher
growth in spreads if viewed negatively. Figure 2.1 suggests that a change in term limits
has the expected impact on stripped spreads on the day of the event, but that the effect
dies down, although becoming nearly statistically significant at the 5% level when the event
window is extended to 10 days after the event. Specifically, the abnormal return is significant
the day before the event, and at the day of the event or a two-day window including the
event day and the following business day. The first result tells us that there might be some
anticipation by the market, and that the anticipation is correct in the sense that the direction
of the abnormality is the same as the post-event abnormality. The second result shows that
on the event day, a term limit event leads to an abnormal return of half a percentage point
(the daily abnormal return on the day of the event is .65 percentage points, it is .58 the
day before, and .42 over a two day window including the day of the event and the following
day16).
Restrictions vs Extensions.
We consider separately restrictions and extensions in Figures 2.2a and 2.2b respectively.
Restrictions of term limits are associated with a significantly higher response of stripped
spreads compared to extensions. As shown in Figure 2.2a and in Table B.1, the impact is
six times greater on the day of the event: the shock generates abnormal returns on stripped
spreads of 2 percentage points. For comparison, the standard deviation of the country EMBI
16. The exact numbers for all window sizes are reported in Table B.1.
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indices is 3 percentage points. Although the daily abnormal return is insignificant at the
5% level when the event window is extended to 5 days after the event, the extension of the
event window further out shows a significant, persistent impact of half a percentage point.
In contrast, the daily abnormal return after extension events has the hypothesized sign but
is insignificant at the 5% level irrespective of the length of the event window. It is also
insignificant at the 10% level except for the day before and after the event.
We cannot rule out entirely that extensions are simply better anticipated, but several
factors suggest to us this is not the cause. First, the insignificant abnormal returns as
many as 10 business days before the event would imply that the event has been anticipated
long before. Second, results are similar when restricting the sample to the first events in the
independent cluster of events (recall that we use the same estimation window for events which
happen in quick succession). A related consideration is that extensions typically require a
large number of procedural steps, so one might think that an individual “extension event”
may not contain much new information. Again, our analysis on the initial observation of
each cluster of events — which are presumably the most newsworthy — which yields similar
results suggests this is not what’s driving the results.
One interpretation and consequence of these results is that emerging economies live un-
der a permanent institutional drag on growth and policy flexibility: borrowing costs are
persistently higher than they would be not only if the constraints on the executive were
stricter, but higher than they would be if the expectations on those constraints were that the
status-quo would be preserved as opposed to weakened. The potential impact on GDP and
investment from the positive shock to spreads and thus the higher cost of borrowing is the
imputed price of this institutional drag, which we might call a ‘curse of low expectations’.
To have a better grasp of the potential implications of this result, we run a hypothetical
investment exercise. Consider someone investing $100 in an asset which returns the EMBI
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(a) Restrictions (b) Extensions
Figure 2.2: Daily abnormal return for different event windows for restrictions (left) and extension (right)
events.
Restrictions are coded negatively, extensions positively
stripped spread of a country experiencing the event, the day before a term limit event17.
Using the value of the daily abnormal return found in the estimation for a given window
of size k, a compounding over these k days yields the final return at the end of the event
window. We display the results, along with confidence intervals generated via the Delta
Method, in Figures 2.3a and 2.3b, and the exact numbers are shown in Table B.2 in the
appendix. Such an investment generates a significant return of investment of 5 percentage
points after restrictions: 10 days after the event, that investment would be worth $105.
After an extension, the value of the investment over any given window after the event is
statistically indistinguishable from the value of the original investment. The values of such an
investment looking backwards and using the pre-event abnormal returns are also insignificant
17. Note that we consider, in the case of restrictions, an investor who sells short the asset yielding the
stripped spread – the spread actually falls.
58
independently of the type of event.
We showed that the costs of borrowing were significantly impacted after restrictions on
executive term limits. What effect can this have on macroeconomic variables like growth
and investment? Uribe and Yue (2006) find that the impact of a temporary 1 percentage
point (pp) shock to a developing country’s spreads leads to at least five quarters of output
and investment significantly below trend, with a short-term (one-quarter) multiplier of re-
spectively .2 and .6. The 5 pp shock after restriction events is over 10 business days, and
Uribe and Yue (2006) uses quarterly data, but the persistence of the increase suggests to us
that the events plausibly may be a significant shock on country spreads. If this short-term
shock translates into 1 pp shock at the quarterly level, this would imply two years with
investment .5 pp below trend and output .1 pp below trend. Restriction events could thus
have substantial, positive impacts on a country’s economy relative to its previous potential.
2.3.2 Robustness of effects
Non-parametric test
Event studies are joint tests of whether the abnormal returns are zero and whether the
assumed model of normal returns is correct. For this reason, we develop a non-parametric
placebo test of our events which confirms our headline findings and their significance.
We compute, for each dyad country · event, a random date, and substitute this date for
the actual, original event date. We then perform exactly the same analysis as described
in Section 2.2, on this virtual list of events. We repeat this exercise 100 times. For all
b ∈ [1, 100], we estimate the daily abnormal return γ̂bi,C(k). We then look at the share of
estimates from those simulations that are below our estimate on the actual set of events. This
share can then be interpreted as 1− p where p is the p-value of our initial null hypothesis.
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(a) Restrictions (b) Extensions
Figure 2.3: Value of a $100 investment made the day before the event x ≥ 0 days after the event, or of a
$100 investment made the day of the event looking backwards to x < 0 days before the event.
The calculation uses the abnormal returns estimates. Confidence intervals are computed via the Delta
Method.
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The results of this test are presented in Table 2.4. The first column shows the share of
estimates below the value we find in the analysis of the true events when we aggregate all
events. The next two columns divide extension and restrictions. The daily abnormal return
appears insignificant in extension events irrespectively of the length and direction of the
event window. By contrast, the restriction events are significant at the 2% level starting at
the day of the event. The daily abnormal returns are significant at the 10% level only when
considering a period of 5 days after the event, and at the 5% level again thereafter. When
considering the aggregate set of events, the effect of the event is significant at standard levels
only one day before to one day after the event.
Importantly, this test also shows that the abnormal returns before the events are statis-
tically insignificant. As in the parametric estimation, the events are not ‘anticipated’ prior
to the event — the behavior of investors is indistinguishable from their usual behavior two
weeks before the shock to executive term limits.
Table 2.4: Share of daily AR estimates from 100 simulations below the estimate on the actual table of event.
Event window limit All Events Extensions Restrictions Event window limit All Events Extensions Restrictions
-10 0.723 0.465 0.673 0 0.921* 0.772 0.98**
-9 0.842 0.485 0.713 1 0.98** 0.713 0.98**
-8 0.822 0.564 0.782 2 0.703 0.376 0.941
-7 0.822 0.723 0.653 3 0.505 0.396 0.901
-6 0.782 0.663 0.693 4 0.673 0.436 0.941*
-5 0.842 0.683 0.752 5 0.525 0.406 0.921*
-4 0.861 0.733 0.792 6 0.752 0.495 0.98**
-3 0.842 0.693 0.673 7 0.743 0.426 0.97**
-2 0.683 0.574 0.634 8 0.871 0.515 0.98**
-1 0.921* 0.891 0.782 9 0.891 0.614 0.98**
10 0.941* 0.693 0.98**
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
The robustness of the parametric result to this non-parametric exercise confirms the
main implications of our findings. First, there is a significant difference in market response
to extension and restriction of executive term limits. More precisely restriction events have
a significant, long-lived and negative impact on spreads: it lowers the country-specific risk
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priced by investors. On the contrary, extensions do not move markets in the long-run.
Effect on CDS prices
The study of the behavior of sovereign CDS prices provides another robustness check of the
headline results on stripped bond spreads. As explained in Section 2.2, CDS prices and
stripped spreads, two measures of countries’ default risk, are closely related. The primary
reason for not using CDS prices in the main analysis is limited data. However, we would
expect, at least, an effect of term limit events in the same direction when using CDS prices.
We thus perform the same analysis as described in Section 2.2, using the CDS price growth
instead as dependent variable.
Table 2.5 first shows the countries and dates for which CDS data is available. The CDS
data is more limited than the EMBI spreads — the table below covers 54 events, of which 8
are restrictions. 35 events are from Colombia.
Table 2.5: Starting date for sovereign CDS data in sample countries
Country CDS 5-year CDS 1-year CDS 10-year
Brazil January 1st 2004 May 3rd 2004 May 3rd 2004
Colombia January 5th 2004 June 1st 2004 June 1st 2004
Kazakhstan August 18th 2005 October 3rd 2005 October 3rd 2005
Venezuela May, 10th 2004 June 1st 2004 June 1st 2004
After estimating the event-study regression, we find that sovereign CDS prices behave
similarly to stripped spreads around the events. The cost of insuring against default on a
representative country’s bonds falls sharply following restriction events. The response of
CDS prices to our events are displayed in Table 2.6. The short-term CDS price responds
significantly at the time of the event, with a daily abnormal return of 3 percentage points in
the price of 1-year CDS and 2 percentage points for the 5-year CDS18. There is no significant
18. It is important to note that the 5-year CDS is the most commonly traded CDS contract. Dividing
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impact on the price change for the 10-year CDS. This suggests that investors believe that
the change in the term limit legislation is going to have an impact in the medium term, but
that long-run country-risk is not significantly altered.
Again, the impacts are stronger for restriction events with a drop of 6 percentage points
in CDS price growth in a window of 2 days around the event for the 1-year CDS — more
than three times the change generated by extension events. In the longer run, the restrictions
appear to have a persistent effect on short-term CDS, although the significance is only at
the 10% level 10 days after the event – we attribute this difference to our headline result
with the smaller set of events for which we have CDS data. In the long term, the restriction
events decrease the price of insurance against default by a percentage point every day; a
cumulative abnormal return of 10% for this instrument.
When one looks at the 5-year CDS market, the effect of term-limit restrictions differs
somewhat; the short-term impact is larger while the long-term impact is muted. We attribute
the stronger short-run response to the fact that the 5-year CDS is the most liquid of CDS
maturities, while the longer-term response is weaker because investors appear to believe that
the effect of the event on long-term country risk is more uncertain than in the short-term.
Restriction events yield an event-day impact of 14 percentage points and a 2-day abnormal
return of 7 percentage points. However, the effect appears to be short-lived compared to
the 1-year CDS, which could, again, be linked to a difference in liquidity. In the long run,
the abnormal returns on long-term CDS instruments are insignificant, although they appear
higher than in the period before the event19. Finally, the effect of extension events is also
insignificant, either in the short or long-run for both the 5-year and 10-year CDS.
the contracts by maturities means that we do not control for the heterogeneity in the liquidity at different
maturities.
19. We do not report the results of the 10-year CDS which are insignificant in both cases.
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This, importantly, confirms the result we found for sovereign stripped spreads in that
there is a clear asymmetry between restriction and extension events. Moreover, the dis-
tinction by CDS maturity also suggests that the reaction of investors is more muted when
looking at the impact of events further out.
2.4 Discussion
We saw in the previous section that restriction on executive term limits led to a negative
revision on the perception of a country’s default risk, as described by its borrowing costs.
Extension on those term limits, instead, had no significant impact. Why is that the case?
In order to get a better understanding of these striking results, we analyze the directions
and sizes of the events’ impacts further by disaggregating the events in different categories.
Section 2.4.1 distinguishes events by the governmental branch initiating them, Section 2.4.2
analyzes the importance of the variation in the institutional contexts in which they occur.
2.4.1 Event initiators
An important question is whether the reaction is linked to the term limit institution itself
or new information about the type of the leader in charge. To answer this question, one
possibility is to distinguish between events initiated by the leader to whom the shock is
applied – here, the executive power – and events instigated by the other branches, the
legislature or the judiciary. In cases where the president announces a desire for an extended
term s/he is revealing something about his or her type, whereas if the parliament or a
court moves to extend or limit executive terms, the information concerns the strength of the
constitutional separation of powers.
We repeat the analysis described in Section 2.2, separating the estimated effect by the
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Table 2.6: CDS Daily abnormal returns, in percentage points, by event window size – A negative number
x correspond to a window between −x days and -1 day before the event, a positive number x is a window
between the event day and x day after the event.
Event window 1-year CDS 5-year CDS 10-year CDS
limit Extensions Restrictions All Extensions Restrictions All Extensions Restrictions All
-10 -.06 .04 -.09 .05 -.41 .04 .13 -.38 .1
(.46) (.71) (.43) (.47) (1.36) (.35) (.21) (.4) (.19)
-9 .21 -.1 .15 .03 -.02 .07 .17 -.37 .12
(.48) (.76) (.45) (.33) (1.15) (.27) (.22) (.43) (.2)
-8 -.11 .33 -.11 .21 -.86 .17 .21 -.06 .18
(.48) (.86) (.46) (.44) (1.41) (.35) (.28) (.58) (.24)
-7 -.31 -.03 -.33 .27 -.44 .26 .17 .11 .16
(.51) (.94) (.49) (.64) (1.75) (.49) (.27) (.57) (.25)
-6 -.47 .26 -.45 .63 -.49 .54 .09 .23 .11
(.56) (.96) (.54) (.83) (2.27) (.59) (.26) (.55) (.25)
-5 .39 -.59 .29 -.1 -.15 -.02 .26 .63 .3
(.53) (1.01) (.49) (.9) (2.38) (.66) (.28) (.63) (.26)
-4 .09 .34 .11 .26 .35 .31 .4 .13 .37
(.53) (1.04) (.52) (.39) (1.33) (.37) (.33) (1) (.34)
-3 .05 -.6 -.08 .35 .76 .42 .31 .56 .28
(.7) (1.18) (.63) (.39) (1.22) (.35) (.34) (.64) (.32)
-2 -.81 .79 -.77 .42 2.71** .85** .6* -.11 .56*
(.81) (1.13) (.79) (.43) (1.47) (.38) (.42) (.84) (.4)
-1 -1.69*** .07 -1.67*** .64** -.38 .46* .06 .34 .14
(.41) (1.16) (.39) (.28) (1.31) (.3) (.19) (.74) (.21)
0 2.59*** 8.05*** 3.07*** .38 13.57*** 2.01*** -.05 7.77*** .58***
(.46) (1.48) (.41) (.35) (1.92) (.29) (.22) (.77) (.21)
1 1.23* 6.27*** 1.64** -.05 6.51*** .72** .08 5.29*** .5
(.92) (1.33) (.9) (.41) (2.44) (.39) (.44) (1.75) (.43)
2 -.61 .36 -.59 .01 2.79* .27 -.13 2.55* .08
(.74) (1.7) (.71) (.37) (2.06) (.35) (.36) (1.63) (.35)
3 .33 .58 .41 -.49* 1.75 -.29 -.18 2.13* 0
(.74) (1.42) (.73) (.35) (1.76) (.33) (.35) (1.47) (.33)
4 -.49 2.35** -.15 -.69** 1.97** -.43* -.27 1.8** -.09
(.71) (1.13) (.7) (.35) (1.1) (.32) (.29) (.88) (.27)
5 -.31 .91 -.17 -.73** 1.66** -.48* -.41* .05 -.35
(.7) (1.18) (.68) (.34) (.97) (.31) (.31) (1.72) (.32)
6 -.05 1.09 .07 -.17 .73 -.06 .04 .43 .07
(.62) (1.03) (.6) (.32) (.91) (.27) (.3) (1.66) (.3)
7 -.15 1.25* 0 -.17 .39 -.06 .02 .55 .07
(.56) (.92) (.53) (.35) (.91) (.3) (.33) (1.57) (.31)
8 .11 1.45** .28 .13 .24 .2 .13 .79 .2
(.52) (.77) (.49) (.34) (.85) (.29) (.26) (1.37) (.26)
9 .15 1.15* .29 -.25 1.11 -.05 0 .89 .1
(.47) (.72) (.45) (.4) (.99) (.32) (.25) (1.25) (.25)
10 .31 1* .43 .13 .31 .24 .22 .5 .27
(.42) (.68) (.4) (.3) (.77) (.26) (.24) (1.17) (.24)
Coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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event’s instigating branch. Figures 2.4a to 2.4c, display the estimated abnormal returns by
branch20.
(a) Executive (b) Legislative (c) Judiciary
Figure 2.4: Daily abnormal return, in blue, for different event windows by instigating branch
. 95% confidence intervals are displayed
The results suggest that overall, actions taken by the executive branch have a stronger,
more permanent impact than actions taken by the other two branches. The judiciary actions
show evidence of an impact in line with our hypothesis although power limits its significance
(there are only 12 events in this subcategory), while legislative actions show no evidence of
having a significant impact on stripped spreads. Quantitatively, an event initiated by the
executive generates a one percentage point abnormal return immediately and stabilizes at
half a percentage point thereafter. A similar trend can be seen when considering the judi-
ciary, although the abnormal return fails to be persistently significant at the 5% level This
variation in the results suggest that, indeed, investors do take some view on the leader cur-
rently in power when reacting to the specific change of institutions. However, distinguishing
restrictions and extensions lead us to nuance that assertion.
20. The exact numbers for the estimated effects are available in the appendix, Table B.3.
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Extensions and restrictions. We divide again the events between restrictions and ex-
tensions. When we consider the judicial events in particular, we observe a stark difference
between the two. Figures 2.5a and 2.5b show the daily abnormal return in restriction versus
extension events respectively. When the judiciary takes an action linked to an extension
of executive term limits, the movement of the stripped spreads is insignificant. However,
an action restricting executive term limits has a strong, permanent impact on the cost of
borrowing of around 2 percentage points per day initially, weakening to half a percentage
point per day permanently over 10 days. We interpret this result as evidence that investors
respond strongly to evidence of de facto separation of powers, unrelated to the idiosyncratic
characteristics of the executive leader. The importance of judiciary decisions is reflected in
one particular example, when it came as a surprise that the Colombian Constitutional Court
struck down Uribe’s path to a third term on February 27th, 2010. More generally, the data
provides evidence that the decision of the judiciary has an impact when it is more likely to
be in disagreement with the executive branch. On the other hand, investors do not seem to
react when the separation of powers is not tested.
(a) Restrictions (b) Extensions
Figure 2.5: Daily abnormal return for different event windows judiciary-initiated events
Events linked to the executive branch itself also reveal an interesting contrast, as shown in
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Figures 2.6a and 2.6b21. We observe that restrictions have a significant, large, and immediate
impact of 3 percentage points on stripped spread growth. This effect dies down over time but
remains around one percentage point daily 10 days after the event. The effect of extension
events appear to be three to four times smaller and barely significant. The shock generated
by restriction events launched by the executive also appears to be two to three times as
large as when started by the other branches. This suggests that investors tend to see those
changes as potentially more credible. The difference at the event day suggests, on the other
hand, the fact that investors are more surprised by an executive action than by a legislative
or judiciary action. This is intuitive since the executive generally initiates the sequence of
procedural steps required to permit him or her to serve another term. Hence the executive
events tend to contain more information.
Finally, we do not report the figures for the legislative branch because the abnormal
returns are insignificant at the 5% level. However, for the sake of completeness, restriction
events yield daily abnormal returns of half a percentage point over an event window of 10
days after the event, and those returns are significant at the 10% level only.
In conclusion, we derive from this analysis that institutions do matter, as evidenced by the
difference between restrictions and extensions when looking at actions led by the judiciary:
only when the judiciary takes a decision that goes counter to the executive (assuming the
executive normally wants to extend his term) is there a strong impact.
21. It may appear puzzling that the abnormal return is significant 10 days before the event in the case
of restriction events, but we view this as simply an effect of the sample size. The abnormal return is also
insignificant the week before the event.
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(a) Restrictions (b) Extensions
Figure 2.6: Daily abnormal return for different event windows executive-initiated events
2.4.2 Institutional quality
As we have noted above, the effects of term limit changes likely depend in important ways
on the broader institutional context as well as the overall level of institutional quality in the
country. Acemoglu et al. (2008) discussing the “seesaw effect” note that reforms may not be
effective in very weakly institutionalized settings since reforms on one dimension often do
not do anything to change the underlying political economy and end up being undone along
another dimension. They consider Central Bank reforms (looking at effects on inflation) and
find that reforms are most effective where constraints are intermediate. Reform has instead
modest effects where institutions are already strong or very weak. One might think that this
is a reason, for example, for the insignificant effects of term limit extensions — the countries
where these occur may be weakly institutionalized at the time of the events. In order to
analyze the link between institutions and the investors’ response to the events, we consider
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) )
provided by the World Bank. The WGI are a set of six indicators aggregating 30 data sources
and providing information on dimensions such as “Voice and Accountability”, “Government
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Effectiveness” or “Political Stability”. We compute an aggregate of those 6 dimensions
using the first dimension of a principal component analysis, given that those indicators are
highly correlated. This yields a rough measure of the institutional quality for each different
country · year that we considered for our estimation windows22. We then consider the value
of this first component against the average absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return
over all events corresponding to an estimation window, and against the average actual values
when dividing by restrictions and extensions.
The results are fairly striking, as displayed in Figure 2.7. In the graphs, each dot repre-
sents one independent event window, labelled with the 3-letter country code for the relevant
country, and the last two digits of the relevant year at which we consider the institutional
quality of this country.
In contrast to Acemoglu et al. (2008), the short-run percentage change is larger in the
more weakly institutionalized settings.23 When we separate restrictions against extensions,
as shown in Figures 2.8a and 2.8b, the result appears again: restrictions have a stronger
negative impact on spreads when the institutions are weaker. On the other hand extensions
have a stronger positive impact on spreads under weak institutions. Although these results
are only tentative for want of power, they underline how important conditioning the effect
on institutional strength can be.
We test the significance of the relation between the world governance indices and the
country · year average abnormal return at the day of the event. For this purpose, we regress
the average abnormal return on the value of one of the six components of the WGI separately
22. Given that we used the same estimation window for some events in different years, in the same country,
the country · year considered here are not event-specific but window-specific.
23. Though, we recognize that in order to even have traded EMBI country indices, it must be the case that
the country is already somewhat well institutionalized. The implication then would be that the effects may
well be non-monotonic in institutional quality.
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Figure 2.7: Average event-day absolute abnormal return after events by country*year, against institutional-
ization measured by an aggregate of 6 World Governance Indicators, with linear fit.
(a) Extensions (b) Restrictions
Figure 2.8: Average event-day abnormal return after events by country*year, against institutionalization
measured by an aggregate of 6 World Governance Indicators, with linear fit.
for extensions and restrictions and the results are displayed in Table 2.7. While we do not
find significant effects for our restriction events, extensions do differ significantly at the 5%
level according to 4 out of 6 of the institutional quality measures when we bootstrap the
standard errors with 1000 replications or use robust standard errors, while only the coefficient
on “Voice and Accountability”(V&A) remains significant at this level when we cluster by
country. Overall, it appears that the magnitude of the responses is bigger the weaker the
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country’s institutional quality. To give some sense of the magnitude of this effect, consider
that in 2010, Brazil scored at .5 in the V&A measure while Nigeria and Venezuela scored
around -.8. The correlation found here would imply a difference of 5 percentage points in
the event-day abnormal return between these countries, which is more than 1.5 standard
deviations of the EMBI indices. Interestingly, we can link the significance of the V&A
variable to the importance of patronage and clientelism at the electoral level 24. Extending
term limits where accountability is high, the vote is fair, and the franchise is extensive is less
likely to have a strong impact on the perpetuation of power and the potential for extraction
by a single leader.
Table 2.7: Regression coefficient between WGIs and event-day abnormal return
Extensions Restrictions
Governance index Correlation Std. err. Correlation Std. err.
Political Stability and -0.011 0.008 0.008 0.0091
Absence of Violence
Government Effectiveness -0.032 0.014∗∗ 0.0134 0.0221
Regulatory Quality -0.019 0.009∗∗ 0.0155 0.0161
Rule of law -0.023 0.01∗∗ 0.0211 0.017
Control of Corruption -0.03 0.015∗ 0.0217 0.0355
Voice and Accountability -0.025 0.011∗∗ 0.0329 0.022
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
Part of the reason why extension events appear insignificant is driven by the cases of
Argentina (under Menem) and Brazil (under Cardoso). In both cases, the countries have
relatively high WGI scores in the event years, in addition to high Unified Democracy Scores
(Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton (2010)). Moreover, the two presidents were, at the time,
viewed in fairly favorable light by financial market participants. Thus, we can surmise that
the reasons for the extensions were understood by investors and perceived as credible and
in the continuation of past policies. Hence extension events were associated with slightly
reduced country risk and tighter spreads. In contrast, the problem for weakly institution-
24. Shefter (1977), Carey and Shugart (1995) or Baland and Robinson (2008) among many others.
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alized countries is a lack of credibility: when the executive leader in Venezuela or Nigeria
suggests a term extension, it reflects more information about his intentions to manipulate
the country’s institutions in his favor. For the same reason, a move towards a tightening of
term limits re-assures those same investors.
When we drop Argentina and Brazil from our set of events25, we indeed observe a stronger
impact of the events on the stripped spreads compared to the study on all events, although
we still have a stronger impact for restrictions compared to extensions. Interestingly, when
we looked at longer windows after the event, it appears that the effects of both sets of events
are significant and persistent when dropping these two countries.
Finally, our findings also relate to those of Frot and Santiso (2010) who find that a
decrease in the quality of democracy lowers equity flows, but do not find improvements with
democratic transitions; we find that investors reward a “reform” involving new restrictions
on executive stay. We do not find a response to a “deterioration” in the sense of more
power for the executive. However, depending on the circumstances of the country, extension
events might be perceived as institutional continuity (e.g. Brazilian or Argentine cases)
or institutional deterioration, in their terminology. Our results can therefore be partially
reconciled with their findings, that are admittedly based on a more general indicator of
institution at a lower frequency.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper has shown that markets respond to news about term limits, and in particular
markets react with a lower default premium on dollar-denominated sovereign debt when
that country introduces restrictions on executive term limits. On the other hand, exten-
25. The exact results are available upon request
73
sions of term limits only have a temporary impact on a country’s borrowing costs, and are
insignificant in the long-run. The findings discussed here offer various further avenues for
research.
First, we suggest that in order to understand the impact of a change in a country’s
political institutions, one might want to consider the status quo ante: the effect differs
depending on the institutional quality of that country when that change occurs.
Second, the heterogeneous effects of term limits events in particular are helpful in under-
standing the contradictory results found in the political business cycle literature concerning
the impact of term limits on fiscal policies. In addition, we showed that two indirect channels
have consequences for the link between term limits and government’s budgets. Term limits
do not only affect fiscal policies directly via the various theoretical incentive effects described
in previous literature, but also indirectly through financial markets. First, weak term limits
might burden a country’s spending capabilities through permanently higher costs of borrow-
ing, which we described as an “institutional drag”. Second, the move towards stricter term
limits lowers these borrowing costs persistently. Therefore, the context in which investors
view term limits will affect how the limits interact with fiscal policies.
Third, we argue that such institutional shocks as executive term limits changes are im-
portant for the macroeconomic performance of emerging markets through country spreads.
As we have discussed, Uribe and Yue (2006) find a substantial multiplier of country spreads
on GDP and investment after two quarters. We provide here tentative evidence that insti-
tutional shocks such as restrictions of term limits have a fairly persistent impact on stripped
spreads, with a decrease of five percentage points in the stripped spread after 10 days.
Better identification of institutional shocks, and further analyses of the links between bor-
rowing costs and countries’ growth, could lead to better estimates of the institutional drag
experienced by countries with political institutions which investors consider risky.
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Finally, we argued in this paper that event-studies with high-frequency data are a le-
gitimate, and important, complement to the more developed literature studying the link
between institutions and growth using standard economic and political variables at lower
frequencies. The use of an event-study methodology cannot yield a precise description of the
long-run consequence of an institutional change, but can identify neatly the perception of
this change by financial markets. Not only this impact should be correlated with the actual,
realized long-term effect, but it might be self-fulfilling: higher borrowing costs, in our case,
are likely to hamper growth and vice-versa.
The use of high-frequency data, however, requires a more thorough and precise method
to identify events which can be described, for instance, as institutional change (or as discrete
movements in the probabilities of institutional changes). To identify such events in a bet-
ter way, we need to develop new and systematic measures of investor anticipation. Earlier
drafts of this paper included measures of expectations using textual analysis, but the results
were noisy.26 In addition, the sentiment analysis literature has found that “surprise” is the
hardest sentiment to detect among sentiments such as anger, disgust, fear, joy or sadness
(Strapparava and Mihalcea (2010)) . We continue to believe, however, that a promising line
of research in understanding the impact of institutional changes is in having some measure
for market “surprise” from text, e.g. financial news. Once better solutions to this problem
emerge from computational linguistics, the study of the political economy of debt markets
will become even richer still.
26. We counted the number of news articles about ‘term limits’ for each country-event, where an article
was measured as ‘about term limits’ if “close enough” in word space to a reference document.
Chapter 3






This chapter reviews some of the literature on the subprime mortgage crisis. I focus on two
aspects of the debate around securitization. First, I consider securitization as a possible
mechanism for a decline in underwriting standards. Second, I review evidence about its role
in inhibiting the modification of loans. These aspects are related, since creating a more rigid
debt structure can facilitate better risk management and permit the greater extension of
credit. However, it can also result in inefficiencies, through externalities on non-contracting
parties. This might justify intervention ex post (Bolton and Rosenthal 2002). I then consider
some of the government modification programs and their problems. A concluding section
tentatively suggests topics for research.
First I outline the shape of the non-prime mortgage market, tracing its expansion from
the mid-1990s and in particular its rapid development since the turn of the century. The
first part addresses some of the still unresolved literature on the causes of the crisis in the
subprime market. I restrict attention to housing market specific explanations — leaving out
broader macroeconomic issues — in order to focus attention on the institutional detail of
the mortgage industry.
The first section considers some contending (though not mutually exclusive) explanations
for the crisis in subprime. I identify three main strands of the debate. First, the hypoth-
esis that the products themselves were confusing — the allegation that consumers did not
understand that rates were going to explode, and hence were ‘duped’ into loans they could
not afford. Next I look at the discussion of securitization and underwriting standards in
particular examining the relative importance of securitization as contributor to declining
underwriting standards. The innovation of securitization is also linked to powerful institu-
tional and technological changes, such as the automation of underwriting. This can result
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in a decline in standards, though on dimensions not measured. Finally, we must recognise
that underwriting standards are connected to expectations about house price changes. This
is just to say that ‘the social contagion in bubble thinking’, as discussed in various places
by Shiller (2008), may have been important. Notice, the fundamental implication of each of
these explanations is the same — houses were sold to individuals who could not afford them.
The second section provides some background on structure of the mortgage finance in-
dustry. There appear to be two general and countervailing forces at work: the accounting
and regulatory arbitrage incentives for disintermediation; second, the benefits from vertical
integration in overcoming agency and transactional costs. The ultimate industry structure
results from a firm-specific balance of these two competing forces. I present some basic
information on this topic, mainly for context to the discussion around loan modifications
which follows in section three. The industrial organization of finance, in particular in terms
of understanding the financial crisis, appears to be an area where more research is needed.
The third section is a consideration of the various limitations on performing loan modifi-
cations. Following the outline of the Congressional Oversight Panel (2009) report, I consider
four different types of constraint. The first two are directly related to securitization. First,
is the idea advanced by authors such as Gelpern and Levitin (2009), that the securitization
pooling and servicing agreements introduce contracting rigidities and adverse incentives for
renegotiation. Linked to this, but a little more general, is the idea that securitization has
resulted in various incentive problems and inappropriate fee structures for servicers. Other
authors, such as Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) have argued that in fact the constraints
are more prosaic — that concerns about redefault and self-cure (particularly in a setting of
rapidly declining house prices) make it unprofitable for servicers to modify loans. Finally,
it has been widely observed that loan servicers are capacity-constrained. This is an indi-
rect result of securitization, in that the role of the servicers had altered from one of careful
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screening and monitoring, to essentially automated collection and disbursement. The debate
here around securitization and modification ties back into the debate around securitization
and underwriting in the first part.
Section four turns to an assessment of the various government programs aimed at mod-
erating the speed and extent of foreclosures. I explain some of the criticisms that have been
made about these programs, and outline some alternative suggestions. One prominent ar-
gument that has been advanced is that the federal government should permit bankruptcy
mortgage modifications for single-family principal residence mortgages in Chapter 13. An
amendment to this effect was defeated in the House, and the Senate. This illuminates the
discussion of the political economy of financial regulation, another under-researched area.
Finally, I conclude with some questions arising out of this survey and some suggestions
for research which introduces the analysis of foreclosure contagion in Chapter 4.
3.1.1 Bubble
While in the past 50 years, national nominal housing price growth has never been negative,
real price growth often has.1 It is somewhat surprising therefore, in a low inflation, low
interest rate environment, that market participants and regulators do not appear to have
anticipated any possibility of future nominal house price declines.
Two features have been identified as underpinning the price dynamics of the US housing
market — momentum and reversion (Wilcox 2008). The literature explains momentum as a
result of supply frictions and/or informational dynamics. First-time buyers may be unable
to purchase based on this momentum effect, which may eventually trigger a reversal (Wilcox
2008, p.8). Case and Shiller (2003) argue that once buyers perceive that prices can no
1. For example, in the 1980s. See (Shiller (2008), fig 2.2 p. 33) for a national real house price index for
the US constructed for the period 1890-2008.
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longer rise, this belief becomes self-fulfilling and prices may revert to ‘fundamentals’. While
Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), writing in 2005, argued that fundamentals justified
then higher prices2; recent experience suggests this was mistaken. In fact, the real economy
many have been propped up by a strong real estate market, rather than the reverse.
Between 1997 and 2007 average annual nominal house price growth was 6.5%. Assessing
whether or not this formed a ‘bubble’ requires some notion of fundamental determinants of
housing prices. Demand side drivers could include incomes, access to credit, population and
preferences; on the supply side we might consider construction costs and zoning restrictions
(Wilcox 2008, p.17). However, the empirical basis for such long-run relationships is thin.
Alternatively, we might assess house prices by comparison to interest rates and the rental
market. Prices might then be viewed as ‘overvalued’ if high relative to carrying costs,
appropriately measured. Shiller (2008, p.34) considers ratios of home prices to building costs,
rent and personal income and finds that home prices at 2004 were looking ‘very anomalous’
(emphasis in the original).
Shiller (2008) (p.4) argues instead that the boom was driven by ‘an epidemic of irrational
public enthusiasm for housing investments’, what he describes as a ‘social contagion of boom
thinking, mediated by the common observation of rapidly rising prices’ (p.41). This feeds
into a narrative of a ‘new era’. Shiller argues that this was primarily a difference in opinion
over time (a ‘changing zeitgeist’), as opposed to say across regions. He cites work on median
expected price increases in various regions at 2005 which among a third of respondents he
found to be ‘truly extravagant’.
2. As did Ben Bernanke in Congressional testimony in 2005. See Henderson (2005), ‘these increases,
[Bernanke] said, ‘largely reflect strong economic fundamentals,’ such as strong growth in jobs, incomes and
the number of new households.’
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3.1.2 Nonprime mortgages
By nonprime loans we mean those commonly referred to as ‘subprime’ and ‘Alt-A’. The use of
these terms by industry participants is not consistent. Ashcraft and Schuerman (2008) refer
to the 2001 Interagency Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs to define these
terms3. In Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006), subprime loans are those which
carry a ‘premium above the prevailing prime market rate that a borrower must pay’. As noted
also by Demyanyk (2008), the denotation of ‘subprime’, is not solely based on the poor credit
characteristics of the borrower (typically a borrower having a FICO score below 620 would
result in the loan being designated ‘subprime’). A loan could also be classed as ‘subprime’ if
it was originated by a high-cost lender, or if it had certain features (for example if it were a
2/28 hybrid). Furthermore, the process of securitization itself fed into this assignment; the
riskiest of the securitized loans would be labelled as ‘subprime’. Frame, Lenhert, and Prescott
(2008) note that First American LoanPerformance data provides information on loans sold
into private label MBS securitization including information on securities marketed as Alt-A,
subprime and jumbo. ‘Alt-A’ loans generally refer to those given to individuals possessing
3. According to these guidelines (Ashcraft and Schuerman 2008),
‘the subprime borrower [is] one who generally displays a range of credit risk characteristics, including one or
more of the following:
 Two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months, or one or more 60-day delinquencies in the last
24 months;
 Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24 months;
 Bankruptcy in the last 5 years;
 Relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a credit bureau risk score (FICO) of
660 or below (depending on product/collateral), or other bureau or proprietary scores with an equivalent
default probability likelihood; and/or,
 Debt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or greater; or,
 otherwise limited ability to cover family living expenses after deducting total debt-service requirements
from monthly income’
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higher credit scores, but with incomplete or no documentation4. These also may be loans
made where the recipient intends to buy a second home or to purchase for investment.5
Bhardwaj and Sengupta (2009), for example, define ‘subprime’ and ‘Alt-A’ relative to
the First American LoanPerformance database they use in their analysis — ‘subprime pools
include loans to borrowers with incomplete or impaired credit histories while Alt-A pools
include loans to borrowers who generally have high credit scores but who are unable or
unwilling to document a stable income history or are buying second home or investment
properties’ (fn 12, p.10).
3.1.3 Growth in nonprime
In Frame, Lenhert, and Prescott (2008), the first lien subprime loan total at March 2008, was
estimated to be 6.7m loans, a total value of $1.2tn. This is in the context of a $10.1tn first
lien mortgage loan market. According to Gramlich (2007), subprime mortgage originations
totalled $625bn in 2005. The industry publication, Inside B&C lending reported subprime
origination as growing from $65bn in 1995, to a total of $332bn in 2003 but declining in
share of all loans outstanding from 10.2% to 8.8% over the same period.6 During this time,
in line with conventional mortgages, an increasing proportion of subprime mortgages were
4. These ‘stated income’ loans are also sometimes called ‘liar’s loans’. An amusing, but perhaps slightly
apocryphal story is that WaMu made a second-mortgage loan to O.J. Simpson after a civil court judgment
found against him on Simpson’s assurance in a letter to the lender that ’the judgment is no good, because
I didn’t do it’ (DeSilver (2009)). Florida state law providing for unlimited homestead exemption is likely to
have been more of a factor. Credit Slips, 2 November 2009,
5. When using First American LoanPerformance data, to get a sense of ‘Alt-A’, one usually considers the
adjustable-rate prime category. For more details on the available data sources on loan performance, see COP
(2009)
6. Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006)
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securitized (reaching 58.7% in 2003, up from 28.4% in 1995). 7
The reasons Gramlich (2007) identifies for the rapid increase in subprime lending after
1993 (a time at which essentially no loans were ‘subprime’) include: the 1980 Depository
Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act of 1980, securitization and automatic
underwriting8, and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). To this Chomsisengphet and
Pennington-Cross (2006) add the 1982 Alternative Mortgage Parity Act, which allowed bal-
loon payments and interest rate flexibility, and the 1986 Tax Reform Act, prohibiting the
tax deductibility of interest on consumer loans.
Gramlich (2007) breaks out shares of origination. While 20% of subprime loans were
originated from federally supervised banks and thrifts, and 30% from affiliates of bank hold-
ing companies, fully one half of subprime loans originated from unregulated lenders, many of
whom had ‘no skin in the game’ (Gramlich 2007). These were mainly state-chartered banks.
According to Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) (p.31), key dimensions asso-
ciated with the cost of credit are the down payment, and the borrower’s credit history. Pre-
vailing practice before the explosion of subprime was ‘nonprice credit rationing’ — ‘minimum
lending standards were based on a borrower’s income, prepayment history, down payment
and the local underwriter’s knowledge of the borrower’ (p. 32). In contrast, the growth in
the subprime market introduced differential tiers and product types, ‘[moving] the mortgage
market closer to price rationing or risk-based pricing’. They examined Countrywide Home
7. One important feature of this period was the brief collapse in subprime loan securitization in 1998-99,
which also coincided with a drop in originations, before the market underwent a period of consolidation and
began to recover. Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) (p.40), ascribe this to an under-pricing of
these products in the mid-to late 1990s and reduced levels of liquidity in all markets following the East Asian
crisis.
8. On automatic underwriting see Browning (2007). On this account, it was this technological development
which permitted the variety in subprime mortgages to develop — ‘spawned an array of subprime mortgages’.
It also reportedly made loans less costly to close (by $916). We consider automatic underwriting in more
detail the below, drawing in particular on the work of Poon (2008), although this topic is also considered by
Bubb and Kaufman (2009).
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loans underwriting matrices and found these to have five categories under which a loan is
grouped into one of six loan grades, namely: mortgage delinquency days, foreclosures, chap-
ter 7 or 13 bankruptcy, and debt ratio. This is what these authors characterise as ‘[active]
price discrimination’ and ‘risk-based pricing’.
They thus identify two periods in the evolution of the subprime market between the mid
1990s and 2004: the first period, until 1998-99 when growth was primarily in the riskiest
grades of subprime, and the period from 2000-2004 where subprime volume was increasing,
but mainly in the A- grade. Kregel (2008) (p.14) though, citing data from Freddie Mac,
finds that the period 2001-2007 was characterised by a rising share in ARM loans as well
as loans with low- or no-documentation. In fact, many borrowers were struggling to meet
repayments, even before the initial resets.
3.1.4 Crisis
Increasing mortgage rates and slowing house prices from mid 2005 led to a reversal in the
growth of subprime and Alt-A originations.9 The Federal Reserve had begun its tightening
cycle in 2004 which brought with it interest rate increases on new mortgage loans and
loans with LIBOR-indexed floating rates. Notice though, that since between 2004 and 2006
housing prices were still appreciating, subprime borrowers could still refinance into lower
monthly payments (Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund 2009). Once prices stopped rising, defaults
began, initially on a regional basis, in places such as Ohio, Michigan and Indiana where the
macroeconomic environment was weaker (Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund 2009; for an excellent
contemporaneous account of the situation in Ohio, see Katz (2006)).
Subprime and Alt-A mortgages had experienced rapid growth in the first half of the
9. The slowdown was picked up in some parts of the press, e.g. Krugman (2005).
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decade (Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009)). The character of this growth was different
across the subprime and Alt-A categories — with subprime growth predominantly in the form
of short-term hybrid loans (with a yearly share of originations between 68% and 81%) and
Alt-A growth more evenly distributed across fixed- and floating-rate and short- and long-term
hybrid loans (Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009)). Coupled with the reversal in originations
was an explosion in delinquencies. By the second quarter of 2008, seriously delinquent loans
— namely those either in foreclosure or on which the borrower is more than 90 days in
arrears — were up to 4.5%, from an historical average of 1.7% between 1979 and 2006.
Defaults and delinquencies were initially concentrated in the nonprime segment, although
as the crisis, recession and unemployment worsened, increasing numbers of prime loans also
became ‘seriously delinquent’. The factors identified by Bernanke (2008) for an increase in
foreclosures include weak underwriting (little documentation, low downpayments), increased
inability to refinance, and tighter lending standards as secondary markets softened.
We consider three possible types of explanation for the foreclosure spike commonly called
the ‘subprime crisis’, namely:
 consumers misunderstanding product features such as ‘teaser rates’ and prepayment
penalties, leading to a spike in foreclosures when these ARMs reset;
 a declining standard of underwriting over this period — underwriting standard declines
may manifest in a variety of ways: through lower downpayment requirements; inflated
appraisals on properties in refinancing transactions; less rigorous documentation re-
quirements (e.g. allowing consumers to state their own income); or through altering
credit score eligibility thresholds; and
 a general malaise of bubble psychology related to ‘animal spirits’ which lead to antici-
pations of continued appreciation in house prices. Notice, this is related to the second
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explanation above since underwriting standards may be allowed to fall because of this
‘national mood’, and increased access to credit for the purchase of assets may then
result in self-confirming asset price increases.
3.2 Causes of the Crisis
3.2.1 Product Complexity, Mortgage Resets, Prepayment Penal-
ties
Smith, Perwien, and Ratcliffe (2009) present survey evidence that borrowers most often cite
rate resets as the primary mortgage characteristic leading them to default. For example they
quote one foreclosure counsellor as stating simply ‘people [. . . ] got hooked into loans they
didn’t understand’. By contrast, in that same survey, the most commonly cited reason for
default for individuals with fixed rate mortgages was loss of income or employment (p.8).
Bucks and Pence (2008) compare consumer reports of loan terms in the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances with how these terms are distributed in the administrative records of the
Residential Finance Survey and the LoanPerformance data. They also consider direct reports
in the survey of a lack of awareness of mortgage terms. They find among ARM borrowers no
knowledge of, or an underestimation of, the magnitude by which their interest rates could
change. Lender reported potential ARM interest rate increases were double or triple those
reported by consumers while a third were unaware of the extent of their mortgage interest
rate caps. They argue that this is best accounted for by a model of rational inattention.10
On this account, features which may have contributed to the foreclosure spike include:
teaser rates, prepayment penalty clauses, and too little principal down (or even negatively
10. Ben Bernanke revealed that he had to refinance his mortgage because ‘we had an adjustable rate
mortgage and it exploded, so we had to’. Time Magazine, ‘Person of the Year 2009’,
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amortizing loans). These were typical features of non-prime loans whose prevalence expanded
over this period. However, Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009) argue that these features do
not explain the massive increase in delinquencies. Teaser rates were still quite high; and
the spike in foreclosures does not neatly coincide with the reset event. Smith, Perwien, and
Ratcliffe (2009) from the same interviews cited, find that households might come before or
after the rate reset for counselling on foreclosure mitigation.
Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009) also address a few other issues thought to be relevant
to the subprime crisis. They describe as ‘relatively uncommon’ the situation that prepayment
penalties would still be applicable at the time of reset. They also note that by 2006 and
2007 an increasing proportion of subprime and Alt-A loans had payment schedules beyond 30
years and/or interest only or negatively amortizing payment profiles. The implied low equity
position meant that default incentives under falling house prices were raised. Households
anticipating the recast of Option-ARM payments may choose simply to walk away. However,
in the view of these authors, the particular characteristics of these mortgages were less
important than factors such as the high loan-to-value ratio of the loan, and the corresponding
very thin layer of equity for the borrower.
3.2.2 Declining Underwriting Standards
Dimensions of underwriting standards
The two prime delinquency risk measures that Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009) identify
are the ‘combined loan-to-value ratio [combining both the primary and secondary lien] and
the FICO credit score’. Furthermore, they find that the mere presence of a secondary lien
increases delinquency probability, even conditioning on combined LTV.11
11. This may relate to common agency problems such as is identified by (Segal (1999)). Mayer, Pence, and
Sherlund (2009) notes anecdotal evidence that loans ‘in [which] the borrower takes out a second lien without
87
Using data on subprime mortgages originated in the US between 2003 and 2007 Mayer,
Pence, and Sherlund (2009) determine that while median FICO scores were constant over
the relevant time period, that underwriting standards had deteriorated in the following
senses: there was more origination to no/low documentation borrowers and borrowers with
low downpayments (higher loan-to-value ratios). They also find that during this period
there was an increasing share of subprime and Alt-A originated loans with second liens
attached. Combined loan-to-value loans on subprime mortgages for housing purchases were
rising between 2003 and 2007. While refinancing loan-to-value ratios were constant, this
latter measure is biased downwards if housing appraisals were biased up over this period
(in a refinancing, the house price is based on an appraisal and not an actual sale). They
document also an increase in the share of originations for low documentation subprime and,
particularly Alt-A, loans and conclude from the fact that default rates are greater for this
type of loan that this likely contributed to the increase in foreclosure rates.
Frame, Lenhert, and Prescott (2008) document declining underwriting standards over
this period in the following senses: increased subprime mortgage combined loan-to-value
ratios (particularly for 2/28s); declining share of fully documented 2/28 subprime mortgages
and falling average FICO scores for fixed rate subprime mortgages.
Furthermore, some of the decline in underwriting standards is likely to have been in terms
of factors which aren’t easily measurable. An important debate has been around the (lack
of) incentives for originators and lenders to properly screen borrowers due to the fragmented
structure of mortgage bonding under securitization and the fact that originators and lenders
no longer needed to necessarily hold these loans on their balance sheets for very long.
notifying the original lender [. . . ] may have become more prevalent over this period’.
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The securitization screening incentive (originator moral hazard) debate
An important debate centred on the issue of securitization and the role it played (if any) in
the decline of underwriting standards. On the accounts of Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven
(2008), Keys et al. (2010), and Mian and Sufi (1999), securitization introduces an important
friction in agency between the investors and the servicers of loans.
Keys et al. (2010) use a regression discontinuity design, exploiting the fact that a FICO
score just greater than 620 results in a higher probability of being ‘treated’ (in this case,
this means the loan is securitized), than a FICO score of the borrower being just below 620.
They find that loans made to borrowers with credit scores just above 620 perform worse
than loans made to individuals with FICO scores just below 620, which they argue provides
evidence that securitization reduces incentives for originators to undertake proper screening.
A problem with the identification strategy, argue Bubb and Kaufman (2009), is that while
there appears to be a jump in mortgages at a score of 620, there do not find a corresponding
jump in the securitization rate. Hence, while there is a discontinuity in origination, there is
no corresponding discontinuity in securitization.
Bubb and Kaufman (2009) model credit score cut-offs as a response by lenders to the
fixed cost of screening rather than being chosen exogenously by investors (and hence they are
inappropriate as an instrument).12 In the symmetric information case, incentives to screen
are retained through threats of later punishment (Bubb and Kaufman (2009), p.4). Where
information is asymmetric, rational securitizers purchase fewer loans below the cut-off to
force lenders to undertake screening (since they hold more loans).13
12. They argue that lenders were following guidance set out by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, who were
’essentially providing a public good by analyzing their data on the relationship between FICO scores and
mortgage performance to determine the optimal cutoff rule’ (p.14).
13. Bubb and Kaufman do, however, find a discontinuity in the securitization rate for the ’jumbo’ sample
in which the vast majority of loans is done by private securitizers (p.23). They interpret this as a rational
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An important point Bubb and Kaufman need to deal with is the nature of the indivis-
ible cost. They pinpoint this as the decision about whether or not to rely on automated
underwriting systems (AUSs), or to perform manual underwriting (p. 15). Automatic un-
derwriting began in the mid 1990s. A key feature of the causes of the crisis may well include
things such as technologies like automatic underwriting, with soft knowledge about the bor-
rower being ceded to homogenization. This gives us a reinterpretation of the Keys et al
(2008) results which found that loans with FICO scores just above 620 performed better
than otherwise identical loans with FICO scores just below 620. On this reinterpretation it
is automatic underwriting and the lender cut-off rule which results in less screening being
performed on the loan applicant.14 Thus an important feature of securitization is that it
lowers the cost of entry into the underwriting (mortgage origination) market; as Bubb and
Kaufman state ‘instead of 15 minutes, manual underwriting may occupy days of loan officer’s
time’. We consider this topic in more detail in the next section. A paper making similar
points is Bhardwaj and Sengupta (2009).
Demyanyk and Hemert (2008) find that quality degradation of securitized subprime loans
did not experience a structural break between 2001 and 2007; they had instead declined
throughout that period, but that this was masked by the housing bubble. As noted in
Demyanyk (2008, p. 12) ‘default rates have risen for all categories of FICO scores [. . . ]’. Her
response by securitizers to induce lenders to hold more loans on their own books, so as to do more screening
(although it is unclear how much screening lenders such as New Century Financial did at all). For conforming
loans, the GSEs employed various punishment mechanisms not available to private securitizers (hence the
jump in securitization probability around the cutoff for jumbo). However, the authors do not separately
break out the default probability around the 620 cutoff for jumbo loans — in any event the crucial aspect is
whether you think the 620 rule is an exogenous (securitizer) rule, or an endogenous response to the agency
problem between servicers/investors. Furthermore, the analysis does not address the bigger question of
the inefficiencies resulting from securitization — or even the question of whether it lowered underwriting
standards through other mechanisms.
14. See Browning (2007) ‘speed became something of an arms race, as software makers and subprime
lenders boasted of how fast they could process and generate a loan’.
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research indicates that credit score is a poor predictor of default likelihood — for each of 5
different FICO score baskets, in the period 2005-2007, mortgages originated later had higher
rates of serious delinquency than those originated earlier.
Elul (2009) examines prime loans over the period 2003-2007 and finds a significantly
higher delinquency rate for securitized loans of various classes in comparison to non-securitized
loans of the same type, for example, ‘for loans originated in 2006, the two-year default rate is
at least 15 percent higher, on average’ for private securitized prime mortgages than loans held
in portfolio. Again, Elul finds no differentially higher rate for subprime securitized loans.
Elul ascribes this to either: closer inspection by investors of subprime loans, or, simply the
fact that so few subprime loans were held in portfolio at all means that there should be little
fear from investors that lenders were engaging in ‘cream-skimming’. Elul also argues that
the incentives for originators to maintain a good reputation worsened as the outlook for the
housing market worsened. The level of subprime securitization was 90% in this period. And,
as noted above, on important dimensions, underwriting standards on nonprime loans were
falling. This suggests at least a strong correlation between securitization and underwriting.
Thus, fundamentally some writers debate the role of securitization per se and argue
instead that the reason for lack of proper screening was not so much that the risk could
rapidly be offloaded to investors, but rather that it was expected that house prices would
continue rising. Notice also, that consistent with this view of the world, most subprime
originators are now bankrupt or have been sold to another financial institution.
Automatic underwriting and the ‘sociology of knowledge’
Poon (2008) has detailed how the adoption by the GSEs in the 1990s of the consumer
risk score FICOR became ‘hardwired’ into a ‘distributed and collective ‘market device”,
accompanied by the growth into mortgage finance of high-yield seeking investment capital.
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On Poon’s account, such ‘technical apparatuses’ are more important for explanation than
stories about collective irrationality15.
Freddie Mac adopted the FICOR consumer risk assessment tool in 1995 with the aim
of standardising prime mortgage underwriting. This development, as well as the subsequent
implementation of this methodology by ratings agencies had the effect of stifling ‘calcula-
tive diversity’ and provided the impetus for a shift from ‘credit control-by-screening [. . . ]
towards credit control-by-risk’. On Poon’s account, FICOR scores are ‘manufactured eco-
nomic information’, a market device that co-ordinates lender decision-making. The result,
she argues, for consumer credit is a ‘risk segmented and saturated U.S. market’ (p. 13),
and for mortgage finance, a ‘bipartite organization [. . . ] into the conventional prime and
high-risk subprime’.
It was Freddie Mac initially that shifted to statistical underwriting, using systems that
incorporated consumer credit data in the form of FICOR scores with the aim of preventing
broker manipulation of loan eligibility (earlier attempts to develop a Residential Mortgage
Credit Report were found to be open to manipulation). A 1995 Freddie letter stipulated that
‘a FICOR score of 660 was the eyeball threshold for their definition of loans eligible for the
prime investments’) (Poon 2008, p.21). Following this was the diffusion of underwriting soft-
ware incorporating these standards. Through this means the ‘FICOR 660 rapidly became a
free standing benchmark of prime investment grade status recognizable among underwriters,
securitizing bodies, investors, regulators [. . . ]’
Importantly, this was accompanied by the incorporation of FICOR scores by the ratings
agencies in the development of automatic statistical ratings for securitizations. This way
private label securitizations became linked to the GSE segment — through the FICOR score
15. President Bush reportedly described the subprime crisis in the following terms, ‘There’s no question
about it. Wall Street got drunk [. . . ] and now it’s got a hangover. The question is, how long will it sober
up and not try to do all these fancy financial instruments?’ Reuters, 23 July 2008
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as a means to measure consumer credit risk. Poon goes on to argue that the ‘sliding scale
[. . . ] of risk as measured in the credit score allowed / spurred the proliferation of financial
goods’ through a shift from screening to risk management. In other words, the credit score
permitted the standardization of products. Hence, the growth of private label subprime
alongside GSE-guaranteed and owned mortgages. This puts the GSEs in a paradoxical
position — the institutions created to provide liquidity for affordable housing were providing
liquidity in the ‘good risk’ segment of the mortgage market.
In summary, Poon (2008) argues that the adoption of GSEs of consumer credit scoring
systems in its underwriting guidelines (shifting away from a rules-based underwriting sys-
tem), and its incorporation in the systems of ratings agencies, led to the development of
a risk-based pricing market of subprime finance by private label automated underwriters
alongside the GSE-based prime finance market.16
MacKenzie (2009) looks more broadly at the sociology of ABS, CDOs and ABS CDOs.
He points out that trading requires a commonality of knowledge — in the sense that wide
variance in valuation (or ‘wild discrepancy’) is likely to be unsettling.17
16. Writers in the financial press have noted that these underwriting systems may also have been poorly
adapted for no or low documentation loans (particularly ‘borrower-directed’ loans), and jumbo loans. See
Dungey (2007) ‘FICOs and AUS: We Will Add Your Distinctiveness to Our Collective’, Calculated Risk, 19
March 2007 at http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2007/03/ficos-and-aus-we-will-add-your.html Dungey, a
former mortgage banker, has an analysis similar to that of Poon, when she wrote, ‘a large distortion may
have entered the market during the boom because FICO (a kind of derivative or simplification of a complex
credit analysis) drove a lot of pricing decisions [. . . ] it made people willing to price [Alt-A] at tiny risk
premiums over prime [. . . ] maybe we should give this tech fetish another thought?’
17. Sorkin (2009) recounts that in November 2007 AIG reported its dispute with Goldman Sachs over
the value of collateral under various swaps contracts. This disagreement was a broader manifestation of the
resensitization of informationally-insensitive debt, the mechanism of the liquidity breakdown, and marked the
beginning of the run on wholesale finance (one could also characterize this as a loss in trust). As recounted
in Gorton (2009), money market funds ‘depositing’ at the broker-dealers required increasing haircuts on
repo agreements resulting in ‘massive deleveraging’. Sorkin (2009, p. 159) provides a relevant anecdote: ‘a
longtime insurance analyst for Credit Suisse asked pointedly what it meant that ‘your assessment of certain
super-senior credit default swaps and related collateral . . . differs significantly from your counterparties”.
Later, and still in the context of collateral valuation, Sorkin quotes Joseph Cassano, head of AIG’s Financial
Products Group as saying ‘Just because Goldman says this is the right valuation you shouldn’t assume it’s
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MacKenzie argues that there exist ‘evaluation cultures’ — by which he means ‘pockets of
local consensus on how financial instruments should be valued’, comprised of ideas, but also
‘artefacts and technical systems.’ Following Callan, economic models can be performative
since shaping market processes, or counterperformative, by which MacKenzie means that
using the model makes its predicted outcome less likely (p. 5). The underlying logic is clear:
the employment of these models, Mackenzie argues (for example, by the ratings agencies)
may result in some change in the ceteris paribus conditions underlying the data generating
process, hence causing parameter instability. In this way, the very use of a historical model
by agents makes it less likely to be true.18
MacKenzie sketches a disjunction between the ABS and CDO evaluation cultures. ABS as
originally designed had AAA contingencies modelled based on simulations where the stresses
considered were the conditions prevailing during the Great Depression (MacKenzie, 2009, p.
22). CDOs arose out of lumpier pools of corporate loans or bonds and were initially employed
in the junk bond boom, but later spread more widely following the innovative example of
the JPMorgan Bistro deal.19 Importantly, added to this mix was the credit default swap,
which allowed the ‘synthetic’ transfer of risk — one could build ABS CDO without having
to go out and assemble the underlying ABS pool.
The evaluation cultures of ABS and CDOs diverged in focus (prepayment risk versus
the correlation of credit risk), a natural divergence given their respective origins — ABS
correct [. . . ] My brother works at Goldman, and he’s an idiot’.
18. While this is an interesting and plausible idea, more work needs to be done to determine whether
anything general can be said about when using a model is likely to make it less accurate. One important
factor might be how widespread its use becomes. This is more or less another restatement of the Lucas
critique.
19. The most comprehensive account is Tett (2009). Interestingly, she recounts that J.P. Morgan, who had
pioneered some of these structures, were themselves reluctant to do CDS deals with mortgage debt, since
‘mortgage risk was just too uncharted’ — data on defaults were too thin, and correlation structures as a
result were not well understood (see pp 76-80)
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for residential mortgages, CDOs for lumpier corporate loans and bonds. As also detailed
in Ashcraft and Schuerman (2008), differences between ABS as opposed to corporate bond
modelling include: more important role for systematic risks over firm-specific; greater reliance
on quantitative models over judgement; and an explicit role for forecasting macroeconomic
conditions etc.
CDOs of ABS increased greatly from 2001 (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 39), but tradable ABS
indices for residential mortgages (the ABX indices) only started in 2006. In the interim, their
evaluation was based on the distinct cultures around ABS and CDOs employed by banks’
structuring specialists and the ratings agencies, respectively. Correlation was particularly
difficult to get a handle on — there was no instrument like share price; defaults were rare
(so historical data limited); and the traded ABX index (TABX), was introduced only in
February 2007, so correlations could not be inferred from observed prices.
The correlations employed by the ratings agencies and structurers were based either on
expert judgment or histories of ratings transitions and were, as it turns out, too modest.
Large portions of the ABS CDO were comprised of super senior AAA debt — often held on
the books of the issuer, but hedged using monoline or AIG CDS for very low premiums (as
little as 12bp, MacKenzie, 2009, p. 48). This gave rise to the ability to book negative basis
trade profits by buying AAA rated super-senior debt and ‘fully hedging’ it with monoline /
AIG Financial Products insurance. Banks, therefore, had no need to model correlation —
since they were ‘hedged’ — this was left then to ‘ratings agencies, AIG and the monolines’
(MacKenzie, 2009, p. 49).
From 2004 successive vintages of ABS CDO performed progressively worse, increasing
from 30% of events of default for 2005 to 80% for the 2007 vintage. MacKenzie argues
that the key role of the ratings process was not ratings shopping per se because this can-
not explain why default rates were two orders of magnitude higher than those models (p.
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53). Instead, he argues that the ratings process was ‘counterperformative’ in two senses:
First, the increased ‘popularity of ABS CDOs caused a structural change in the market for
underlying [MBS]’: whereas earlier mezzanine tranche insurers had been ABS specialists,
new CDO arrangers were ‘indiscriminate buyers’. Previously, these buyers had placed a
ceiling on acceptable credit risk (and calculated this riskiness themselves) but by 2004, all
that mattered was how they would be rated. The net effect was a reduced constraint on
subprime originators (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 59), causing an amplification of the mortgage
origination agency problem. Second, ‘the modelling of mortgages [. . . ] changed mortgages
again in a way that rendered the models much less accurate’. By this MacKenzie means that
the increased reliance on ‘hard’ criteria such as FICOR scores and LTVs, resulted in the
decreasing accuracy of these variables as predictors (Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2010)). We can
think of this as a multitask agency problem, where we would like the firm to screen agents
on soft and hard features but can only measure performance on one of these dimensions.
Increasing house prices result in a diverging alignment between these two tasks.
The final steps by which the subprime crisis was magnified into a generalised financial
crisis were the decisions by many banks to retain, or in some cases purchase, supersenior AAA
tranches for their own balance sheets; as well as to move into subprime origination through
vertical integration in order to overcome the transactions costs associated with warehousing
ABS for the construction of ABS CDOs (MacKenzie, p. 62).20 Indeed these moves were in
many cases completed at precisely the time when subprime lenders were weak on account of
the softening of the housing market as I show in the next section.
Then, once the cost of buying ABX protection rose (and the index fell), banks holding
ABS (in the warehouse) or ABS CDO supersenior on the balance sheet had large losses
which they had to mark-to-market undermining credibility in the system as a whole.
20. See the next part for a discussion of vertical relationships.
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3.2.3 On Bubble Psychology
The decline in underwriting standards must be understood in light of the speculation in
the housing market. In many cases, the willingness to lend and to borrow was based on
expectations of further price increases. Demyanyk and Hemert (2008) find that for each of
five categories of credit score, mortgages originated later (2007 vs. 2006 vs. 2005) had higher
rates of serious delinquency than mortgages originated earlier. Garriga (2009), studying
HMDA data, finds that loan denial rates were increasing dramatically even before 2007 —-
they were up 33% by 2004 relative to 2002, and by 75% by 2007 relative to 2002. Most of
these denials were for refinancings, which accounted for most new loans by 2003. This is
suggestive of speculative pressure from ‘below’.
Bhardwaj and Sengupta (2008), examining loan-level data of securitized subprime orig-
inations, find that subprime mortgages required housing price appreciation to be viable.
Mortgages on earlier vintages were prepayed, but this became impossible for later origi-
nations. The evidence they present is fourfold. First they show that 70% of the subprime
originations they consider were refinances. Second, a majority were of the hybrid-ARM form.
Next, ‘teaser’ rates were not teasers per se; instead, they were at a similar level to fixed rate
subprime mortgages (FRMs). Finally, prepayment penalties were typically applied with the
term of application at least as long as the time to reset.
The authors also note two further important features of subprime mortgages — namely
that resets always were step-ups and never step-downs and furthermore, that subprime mort-
gages were at much lower levels than other subprime loans (such as auto), since backed by
appreciating collateral. Bhardwaj and Sengupta cite Gorton (2009)’s view of these mort-
gages as a form of bridge-financing, and argue that this was sustained by prepayments.
By 2007, 64% of total 2003-vintage hybrid ARMs had been prepayed (p.3), with a similar
number for FRMs. Prepayments drop for later vintages, as the housing market tightened.
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Lenders, concerned by the high risk of these borrowers had imposed conditions that would
require these borrowers to refinance, but protected themselves with prepayment penalties
until reset. On this account, refinances were more likely for cash-constrained consumers, hit
by the shock of a lost job or medical necessity (p.7).21 These loans were ideal for liquidity
constrained borrowers with a lack of other sources of credit.
There is a feedback mechanism between declining underwriting standards and expecta-
tions of house price increase. Improved credit scores fed into more borrowing for investment
into housing, an increased value of collateral and hence higher credit worthiness. And insti-
tutional features like ‘stated income’ fed into this.
Underwriting ‘standards’ should be thought of not just in terms of measurable factors
such as loan-to-value ratios, credit scores, and the presence or not of a second lien, but
also as dependent on the anticipated future path of house prices. To make loans which
one did not think the borrower could repay (excepting some optimistic expectation of house
price appreciation) is to loosen underwriting standards in the common sense of the phrase.
A rhetorical confusion can arise depending on whether we are thinking of underwriting
standards de jure or in fact. The credit worthiness of refinancing mortgage buyers may
have improved as a result of rising house prices (at least before 2005) and so underwriting
standards were not ‘looser’ in this sense, but lenders may have ‘known’ that this was driven
by perhaps unsustainable price appreciation.
On the other hand, writers may deny that participants ‘knew’ that prices were unsustain-
able as just described, and it may be that as articulated by Shiller, that the crucial element
was the ‘social contagion of boom thinking’. Either way, once the contagion had dissipated,
and prices were overtaken by ‘fundamentals’, defaults started to rise. The Bhardwaj and
21. Cash-out refinancings are used in this setting for consumption-smoothing. A different, though not
entirely distinct motive to refinance would be to take advantage of lower interest rates (‘rate-refinancing’).
Bhardwaj and Sengupta observe that proportionately more subprime than prime mortgages involve cash-out.
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Sengupta (2008) study concludes that it was not the resets themselves that caused the jump
in default, but rather the lack of ability to refinance as the housing market weakened. In
other words, nonprime mortgages were never really ‘long-term mortgages’ in anything but
name. They were short-term loans made to liquidity constrained, poor credit borrowers and
speculators, who were unable to refinance when prices fell (Tung 2009). Other evidence
is provided by Frame, Lenhert, and Prescott (2008) who study LoanPerformance data to
find that for subprime mortgages originated between 2001-2004, most were terminated (on
account of prepayment or default) within 36 months.
We are left then with a question about the causes of the decline in underwriting standards,
as well as the contemporaneous ramp-up in housing prices. Other candidate explanations
may include: deregulation, the low interest rate environment, demand for loans for MBS
driven by excess liquidity linked to a global savings glut, and affordable housing goals.
Wherever one comes down on these issues, and their relative importance is fundamentally
an empirical question, the ultimate unfolding of the crisis clearly points to the important role
of leverage, both of the lenders, and of the borrowers (who had placed ever-lower capital down
against their loans). Mian and Sufi (2009), studying a dataset of some 70,000 homeowner
credit files in the period 1997- 2008, find a doubling of debt-to-income ratios of US households
between 2002 and 2007 to a 25-year record level. On their estimates, 1/3rd of 2006-2008
new defaults are explained by home equity borrowing on the back of rising house prices. In
particular, default rates were most up in areas where house prices had experienced steepest
appreciation, and where credit scores were lowest.
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3.3 The Mortgage Finance Industry
As set out in Reiss (2009), innovations in technology, legal changes, and financial innovation
have dramatically changed the way mortgages are originated, financed and administered.
Reiss describes this as a ‘fracturing’ — and describes the end product in the following
way, ‘it is common for a given mortgage to be originated by a mortgage broker contacted
by telephone; serviced by a mortgage banker; insured by a mortgage insurance company;
legally owned by a trust; and beneficially owned by an institutional investor’.
Ashcraft and Schuerman (2008) draw on the example of a 2006 vintage New Century
Financial securitized pool of mortgages to sketch seven informational frictions arising in the
subprime mortgage securitization process: mortgagor/originator frictions (predatory lend-
ing); originator/arranger (predatory borrowing and lending — arising out of the informa-
tional advantage of the originator over the arranger); arranger/third party (potentially ad-
verse selection since the arranger knows better the underlying quality of the originated loans);
servicer/mortgager (moral hazard — during delinquency the mortgagor has little incentive
to maintain the value of the home, this creates incentives to foreclose quickly); servicer/third
parties (moral hazard — incentives for the servicer to inflate expenses in delinquency where
it gets paid off the top); asset manager/investor (standard principal/agent type); and in-
vestor/credit rating agency (model error). They further recognise that these frictions are
likely to be magnified in a crisis. Since we are primarily interested (in Section 4 below) in
loan modifications, the 4th and 5th frictions are what are primarily at issue here.
I sketch the roles of the various players in a little more detail below, drawing heavily on
Dungey (2007). I then consider the nature of the vertical relationships between these players.
These vertical relationships, and the embedded informational and agency constraints, are
central to understanding how the subprime crisis originated and magnified, as well as why
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now resolution and intervention are so difficult.
3.3.1 Players
Mortgage originators
Kregel (2008) identifies, mortgage originators as either: Financial holding companies, spe-
cialised mortgage banks, or independent financial companies. As noted in Aschraft and
Schuerman, it is the role of the originator to finance the initial home purchase, and perform
the original underwriting. For this the originator receives borrower fees, and the margin on
the onward sale of the subprime loans. Important subprime lenders included: Ameriquest
Mortgage; New Century; CitiFinancial; Household Finance; Option One Mortgage; First
Franklin Financial Corp; Washington Mutual; Countrywide Financial; Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage; and GMAC-RFC.
Servicers
Servicers service loans either for themselves, or for investors. The accounting for both of
these activities is the same, although the incentives obviously differ. In addition to the basic
fee 22, the GSEs incentivize servicers with a bonus payment on performance and for loss
mitigation; while private labels generally have servicers hold the equity tranche of the deal.
Servicer fees are senior to investor income, but servicers also bear the first expenses in case
of delinquency. Once delinquency is dealt with, either through refinancing or foreclosure and
sale, again the servicer is paid first, with the investor receiving the remainder. As noted,
scheduled interest income in general must be passed on to the investor by the servicer, even if
22. Smith et al (2009) describe the mortgage fee arrangements as ‘.25% to .50% of each loan’s balance per
year’.
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the borrower is actually in default (but only up to 90 days delinquent). Only actual principal
needs to be passed through to the investor.
Servicers administer the loan under pooling and servicing agreements which, for example
might limit the number of modifications the servicer can perform (Adelino et al, 2009, p.
3). Ashcraft and Schuerman (2008) — drawing on Dungey (2007) — argue that the core
tensions between servicers and investors relate to ‘(a) reasonable and reimbursable expenses
and (b) the decision to modify and foreclose’ (p.8). As noted, under delinquency, the servicer
advances interest and principal to investors, and is also responsible for property taxes and
insurance. Under foreclosure, the servicer is required to cover all expenses until liquidation
— but then is compensated ‘off the top’. This creates an incentive for servicers to inflate
costs between foreclosure and liquidation (as well as fees under delinquency).
The relationship between the servicer and mortgagor is one characterized by moral hazard
(Ashcraft and Schuerman 2008). The mortgagor ‘has unobservable costly effort that affects
the distribution over cash flows shared with [. . . ] the servicer’. When the mortgagor has
limited downside liability when in a delinquent state he might not make an effort to maintain
the property where he intends (or is likely to) default anyway (p.7). To mitigate this, under
delinquency the servicer is required to advance the payments of property taxes and insurance.
This confluence of factors can encourage immediate foreclosure by the servicer (to the extent
that the incentives of the servicer are aligned with the investor).
Mortgage insurers
Private mortgage insurers insure the lender, not borrower against default — they thus provide
a service similar to that of the FHA (the latter has restrictions on maximum loan amounts).
They bear the ‘first loss’ from default (after the borrower, who is the equity holder), typically
providing 30% coverage on a 30-year loan with a 95% LTV (Dungey 2007). It should be
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noted that private mortgage insurance can be cancelled when there is sufficient equity in the
home. Insurer costs are increasing in foreclosure delay. Insurance premiums are funded in
one of three ways — on a flow (lender or borrower paid) or bulk (lender paid) basis. Typically
in securitizations, the insurance is ‘bondholder paid’ as a form of credit enhancement, on a
‘pool’ basis.
Issuers
The arranger / issuer monitors the originator as well as creating the trust and underwrites
and structures securities the trust will issue to investors (it co-ordinates this activity with
the rating agency to insure timely sequencing). Investors pay issuers fees for this service,
and issuers make some margin over the cost of acquiring the underlying assets. Notice that
there is a significant informational gap between the issuer and the borrower / originator who
may collude to engage in predatory borrowing / lending (Ashcraft and Schuerman 2008).
The issuer then sells the loans to a special purpose vehicle — a bankruptcy remote trust
(remote from the arranger). These trusts were often implicitly guaranteed by the issuer —
once conditions started to deteriorate they were brought back onto the balance sheet.
3.3.2 Vertical Relationships, Integration and Disintermediation
One of the crucial factors that needs to be understood in terms of this crisis, is the dis-
intermediation (through securitization), and reintermediation (through vertical integration)
of mortgage finance. In order to better understand the crisis — its origins, as well as the
current difficulties around loan modification and the possibility that there are currently an
excessive number of foreclosures, one needs to distinguish the vertical integration incentives
from the forces pushing towards disintermediation. Williamson (1975, 1985) argued that
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integration facilitates adaptation.23
Other discussions of the performance implications of vertical integration decisions are
found in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). A situation of ex-post
hold-up may arise, since ultimately, the investor needs the servicer healthy, and so may
adjust covenants (requirements in the debt that must be maintained, e.g. maximum debt
levels, or the interest rates can reset higher) to help the servicer. The servicer also thus ex
ante may invest too little in developing appropriate loan modification ability.
To estimate the performance benefits of vertical integration, we might look at default rates
among loans serviced by servicers for their own portfolios, as opposed to those serviced for
private label securitizations. Levitin (2009d) has argued that redefault rates are significantly
worse for the latter.
Since firms vary as to whether they are vertically integrated or not, there must exist
some cost to integration (such as, for example managerial capabilities). Empirical mea-
surement is difficult since the firm boundary decision is endogenous). As noted in Ashcraft
and Schuerman (2008) (Tables 2-4, 2008, p. 4), Countrywide for example was both the
third biggest originator of subprime debt as well as the biggest subprime MBS issuer, and
subprime mortgage servicer).
Against the vertical integration incentive is the fragmentation-linked securitization im-
perative. Securitization has been noted to facilitate ‘regulatory arbitrage’, and there may be
further tax-based, accounting, and bankruptcy-remoteness advantages.
The winter/spring 2007 issue of industry publication, the American Securitization Jour-
nal, contained an article analyzing the decision by investment banks whether to integrate
backwards into origination and/or servicing (Currie 2007). One reason given for why an
23. Forbes and Lederman (2009) have, for example, found evidence in the setting of the airline industry that
a vertically integrated airline/regional carrier can have better performance through being able to overcome
transactions costs arising from non-contractible services.
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investment bank might want to integrate was the elimination of double marginalization
(‘taking out as many of the middlemen as possible [. . . or] capturing the spread from the
creation value of the loan to the full offer price of the loan’). For example it was the strat-
egy employed by Lehman Brothers. By 2006 when investment banks bought as many as
11 originators and servicers, industry participants were noting that access to product for
ABS underwriting was becoming important and there were increasing numbers of bidders
on loan sales such that having a ‘captive’ pool of loans seemed attractive. At the same time,
slowing house prices meant that the value of mortgage originators was beginning to appear
attractively cheap.
Other benefits cited included accruing all the fees from origination of the loans to selling
into the securitization. Furthermore, the better credit of the acquirer relative to the origi-
nator would lower the cost of capital for new loan issuance for the merged entity. The final
benefit is cited (now perhaps somewhat ironically) as improved risk management, including
for instance, having ‘much more information about the quality of the loans [. . . ]’ which goes
to the asymmetric information between originator and issuers.
Companies that bought subprime mortgage originators (and servicers) in 2006 included
Barclays Capital, Bear Stearns, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. Lehman’s
presence was particularly big, of the $133bn in MBS it sold in 2005, $86bn it originated itself
Currie 2007. Origination was not the only thing Investment Banks targeted though, Currie
(2007) goes on to cite economies from ‘bringing securities in-house’, and for example the
potential to use the ‘servicing business as a distressed debt platform to buy non-performing
loans’.
A further reason for buying a servicing business is related to the agency relationship
between the investors/issuers and the servicers. For example Currie (2007)) quotes the co-
head of mortgage trading at Bear Stearns as saying ‘I believe having a captive servicer is
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integral to being in the mortgage-backed security issuance business. In the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina we tried to ascertain the status of certain properties. On loans where we
weren’t the servicer we had a very difficult time getting this information’ and, furthermore,
‘better servicing means better loan recoveries [. . . ]’
Of course, not all banks aimed to expand vertically. The last wave began in 2006 as
subprime originators were falling in value, although Bear and Lehman’s were already in-
vested following the previous slump in subprime at the turn of the century. Reasons for not
integrating into origination or servicing included not wanting to lose flexibility in purchase
(UBS), lack of fit into other business lines (Goldman), and reputational risk from links to
predatory lending charges (HSBC, Citigroup).
3.4 Modifications, Foreclosure, and Securitization
Modification data can be difficult to analyze, but reports indicate that attempts to modify the
loans of many of the houses in foreclosure have been unsuccessful. Levitin (2009d) describes
the various private sector, administration, and industry association modification initiatives,
HOPE Now Alliance, FHASecure, Hope4Homeowners, and the Making Home Affordable
Program, as having very limited success. Press coverage corroborated these failings (Norris
2009).
3.4.1 Reasons for intervention
First we consider why it might be appropriate to intervene in the contracts so as to mitigate
the extent of a foreclosure crisis. M. White (2009) states that since some of the foreclo-
sure cost are external, lenders foreclose ‘too often’. This, in her view, is the market failure
justifying administration intervention. Levitin (2009b) lists concerns such as pecuniary ex-
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ternalities on neighbourhoods and local tax bases; increased blight and potentially crime, and
the erosion of ‘social bonds’, detailed in the Congressional Oversight Panel (2009) as ‘com-
munity ties are cut, affecting friendships, religious congregations, schooling, transportation
and medical care’.
The essential point is that there may be externalities on non-contracting parties. In terms
of pecuniary externalities, and by way of historical analogy, we might consider the striking
by the Congress under Roosevelt of the gold indexation clause. As Kroszner (1998) details,
the debt relief this implied resulted even in the increase in the price of corporate bonds
containing gold clauses. This he argues shows that the benefits in some cases of avoiding
the costs of bankruptcy more than offset the loss to creditors of trying to recover part or all
of the losses from devaluation.24
3.4.2 Limitations on intervention
There are various (not mutually exclusive) views of limitations on loan modifications. As
summarised in Levitin (2009d) and the Congressional Oversight Panel (2009), these are (i)
that the securitization structures, embodied in the pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs),
introduce contracting rigidities and adverse incentives for renegotiation (Gelpern and Levitin
2009), (ii) that securitization has resulted in various incentive problems and inadequate fee
structures for servicers (COP, 2009; Smith et al, 2009); (iii) that concerns about redefault
and self-cure (particularly in a setting of rapidly declining house prices) make it unprofitable
for investors to modify loans (Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen 2009); and (iv) that loan servicers
are insufficiently experienced and lack capacity to perform these modifications (Congressional
24. See Kroszner (1998) ‘the anticipated benefits of enforcement of the gold clause [. . . ] must be more than
offset by the expected reduction of payments to bondholders due to bankruptcy and distorted investment
incentives [. . . ] a ’debt relief Laffer Curve’ exists [. . . ]’
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Oversight Panel 2009).
Pooling and Service Agreement Contract rigidities and Renegotiation
Bernanke (2008) has pointed to ‘anecdotal evidence’ suggesting inefficiencies arising from
the diffuse nature of investors holding RMBS which has left renegotiation almost impossible:
this apparent market failure owes in part to the widespread practice of securitizing mortgages,
which typically results in their being put into the hands of third-party servicers rather than
those of a single owner or lender. The rules [. . . ] do not always provide them with clear
guidance or the appropriate incentives to undertake economically sensible modifications [. . . ]
some modifications may benefit some tranches of the securities more than others, raising the
risk of investor lawsuits. More generally, the sheer volume of delinquent loans has overwhelmed
the capacity of many servicers, including portfolio lenders, to undertake effective modifications.
Eggert (2007) also endorses this view when he states that in the ‘tranche warfare of
securitization, unnecessary foreclosures are the collateral damage’. Smith et al (2009) cite
foreclosure counsellors’ experience with many servicers who say ‘[that because of their] in-
vestor guidelines, they’re not allowed to do [anything except a repayment]’.
Gelpern and Levitin (2009) present the most detailed exposition25 of the ways in which the
securitization structures may be limiting foreclosure modification. As summarised in Levitin
(2009a, p.2), these include ‘outright contractual prohibitions and limitations, litigation risk,
and adverse incentives for the servicers who make the modification decisions’. The next
section sets out in more detail the organizing framework they provide.
A typology of securitization contractual rigidities Gelpern and Levitin (2009) con-
sider the separate question of the immutability of the PSAs from that of the mortgage
contracts themselves (rigidities there may include: prepayment penalties, restrictions on
25. But see also, Cordell et al. (2008).
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modifying single-family principal residence mortgages in bankruptcy, and the existence of
multiple liens).
Instead, they focus on the rigidities imposed by the pooling and servicing agreements
governing the RMBS securitization relationship between the servicer and the SPV, and
hence investors. These PSAs, they argue, lead to ‘excessive’ foreclosures and numerous and
varied spillover effects. Rigidities, on their account, range from the formal (prohibitions on
amendment) to the functional (characterised by collective action problems).
The two formal rigidities from securitization they identify are explicit limitations on loan
modifications26 and statutory and contractual voting thresholds.27 To this they add a struc-
tural rigidity (through bankruptcy remoteness and passive management)28 and functional
rigidities arising out of tranching, resecuritization and insurance which aggravate collective
action rigidities.29 In fact, and as they stress, making this debt non-renegotiable was the
purpose of the design ex ante. But while this may have been bilaterally optimal, it now may
be socially inefficient. The authors argue that voluntary loan modifications initiatives are
unlikely to greatly reduce foreclosures in light of these PSA-induced rigidities. We consider
26. Modification might be prohibited; may be restricted to various forms, may require third party consent,
or may be limited in number. Hunt (2009) finds that most deals embed some limitation and in 10% of 2006
subprime RMBS modifications are banned.
27. The effect of the 1939 Trust Indenture Act (TIA) is to require investor unanimity to modify the
economic terms of the RMBS (p.17), although it should be noted that this is an area where case law to
provide guidance is absent. At the very least, the effect of the Act is to create uncertainty, which is a factor
where servicers are risk-averse. In addition to the TIA, there are often explicit supermajority requirements
in the terms of the PSAs.
28. In contrast, Gelpern and Levitin (2009) note that in the case of corporate default, the institution of
bankruptcy is in place to overcome creditor collective action problems.
29. Aside from the number of diverse investors, the fact that RMBS are tranched can result in further
co-ordination problems (p.29). Subordinated trancheholders may veto modification, for example, if they are
out of the money. This is the common problem of hold up. Alternatively, senior trancheholders may have
no incentive to modify, since assured of repayment regardless. It is only the ‘pivotal’ or ‘fulcrum’ tranche
which should be decisive.
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government interventions in these debt markets in more detail below, but it should be noted
here that none of the initiatives thus far have attempted to require contracting parties to
infringe on the terms of their PSAs.
As described by the authors, the fact that multiple investors must delegate authority to
the servicer to manage the mortgage pool on their behalf results in agency investor risks,
in that the servicer ‘will renegotiate the underlying loans, reducing payments into the pool’
(p.13). However, the exact nature of the agency problem the authors consider is not clear.
Gelpern and Levitin (2009) note that the problems identified above are amplified under
resecuritization. Furthermore, agreement from net interest margin insurers also may be
required to modify underlying mortgages as well as the PSAs.
An important point, not explicitly dealt with by the authors, but hinted at by Bernanke
(above) is the fact that different tranches of the securities are often tied to different sources of
cash. For instance, some might be comprised of principal repayments, and another against
the interest income. This will result in large divergences in interests when it comes to
restructuring the loan. This might make it particularly difficult for private label servicers to
write down principal or extend term (contractually, the nature of the modification may also
differentially impact servicer remuneration).
Contractual immutability and externalities. Gelpern and Levitin identify benefits of
immutability as possibly including: enhanced disclosure, ex ante investment, discouragement
of holdup and minimization of agency costs. For the borrower, this type of rigidity can lower
costs of borrowing30. But, as noted, there can be externalities attached to this bilateral
30. We should be clear on who the borrower is we mean here — it is unlikely that homeowners were
aware of whether or not their loan would be securitized — the question of pass-through and the industrial
organization of the origination business is one that deserves further research. It may be that the competitive
variable was quantity of loans — with competition in essentially an unregulated market resulting in a decline
in underwriting standards. If this resulted in loans being made which were unsuitable for borrowers, in some
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arrangement.
The arguments around flexibility have a similar nature to those advanced for the in-
troduction of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism at the start of the decade. The
outcome of that process for political economy reasons, as explained in Gelpern and Gu-
lati (2007), was the introduction of Collective Action Clauses into New York law-governed
sovereign debt contracts. Gelpern and Levitin (2009) make the point that formal rigidity in
sovereign debt contracts has not restricted states from term modifications. But the position
of RMBS, with these additional and even stronger structural and functional features render,
in their view, these securities ‘more effectively immutable than sovereign bonds’ (p.35).
In their view, the servicing regime — in which consumer debt is transformed into business
debt — is an archetype of ‘bankruptcy contracting’. The SIV is remote from the statutory
bankruptcy regime, and absolute priority is enforced through the tranching process. How-
ever, while bilaterally efficient, there are important externalities from these contracts onto
communities, other creditors, financial markets, and the macroeconomy (p. 43). These may
involve: higher foreclosure rates which have spillover effects in the region; as well as on hold-
ers of other RMBS (and there is then, furthermore, a feedback mechanism here). This then
spills over into financial markets more generally through increasing uncertainty, counterparty
risk, and illiquidity. In the current crisis, Gorton (2009) has characterised a crucial aspect
as a run on the wholesale financing market in the form of lenders requiring ever-increasing
haircuts on MBS held as collateral in repo transactions. The effect on the macroeconomy as
a whole again feeds into higher foreclosure rates.
The final part of Gelpern and Levitin (2009) considers various possible responses to con-
tractual rigidities. These include: statutory bankruptcy; government carrots (e.g. financing
subsidies for renegotiation) and sticks (state foreclosure moratoria). The third method is an
sense, then this might be consumer surplus reducing.
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invocation of eminent domain (e.g. through nationalization). Furthermore, Congress might
pass legislation rendering certain PSA clauses as unenforceable. The authors then examine
the use of these mechanisms in the context of various New Deal programs. For example,
the effect of the Gold Clause decisions is that legitimate government macroeconomic policy-
making legally trumps private contracts (indeed allows governments to rewrite these) (See
also Kroszner 1998). Finally, they consider failed efforts to address the farm mortgage crisis
— in this instance co-ordination failures among secured creditors resulted in insurmount-
able ‘functional rigidities’ — that is, collective action problems. However, these problems
were recognised and rectified in the 1986 enactment by Congress creating Chapter 12 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which sought to help address the then crisis in farm foreclosures.
Securitization and Servicer Incentives
The lack of incentives of servicers to modify has also been touched on in general terms by
Lewis Ranieri, one of the early creators of the private label MBS market in the following
terms:31
the cardinal principle [. . . ] is you’re always financially better off restructuring a loan around
a credible borrower than going into a foreclosure [. . . ] the problem now with the size of
securitization [. . . ] so many loans are not in the hands of a portfolio lender but in a security
where structurally nobody is acting as the fiduciary. And part of our dilemma here is ‘who is
going to make the decision on how to restructure around the credible borrower and is anybody
paying that person to make that decision’ 32
31. Remarks at the 2008 Milken conference on financial innovation, Video at Economist’s
View http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2008/05/financial-innov.html.
See also the discussion by Mike Konczal at http://rortybomb.wordpress.com/2009/07/31/
the-financial-innovation-that-wasnt/
32. However, Ranieri goes on to argue in this interview that government intervention is not required since
‘we know what to do [. . . ] if we’re allowed to do it’, since technology ‘has made it immensely easier’ and the
relevant know-how exists. This appears to have been overly optimistic.
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In much the same way, Levitin’s (2009b) survey article describes the agency problem
between servicers and investors as fundamental. He provides the example of the FDIC
seizure of IndyMac and its decision to modify securitized portfolio loans to increase asset
value (Levitin, 2009b, p. 625) to suggest that where that agency problem is absent, investors
will find and have found it profitable to modify.
The crux of the issue is compensation. Fee structures have been described as providing
insufficient incentive. The fee is generally ‘.25% or .50% of each loan’s balance per year’
(Smith et al, 2009). The labor intensive, lengthy and arduous process of modification may
result in costs exceeding those fees.33 The mechanics of payment is important here as well.
Cash flow for the servicer may be tight — since they need to advance delinquent payments
to investors even if not yet received, but once the delinquency has been ‘resolved’, they are
paid ‘off the top’. This may incentivize them to foreclose quickly (Geanakopolos and Koniak
(2009)). Under foreclosure, compensation is on a cost-plus basis, and the fees the servicers
can charge typically include ‘collateral inspection fees, and process serving fees, etc’ (Levitin,
2008c).
Geanakopolos and Koniak (2009) have summarised the argument:
‘Once a homeowner is in default, the servicer must advance that homeowner’s monthly pay-
ments to the bondholders, getting repaid itself only when the house is sold or the loan is
modified. So cash-strapped servicers want to foreclose prematurely or do a quick-and-dirty
modification (without due diligence and thus without considering principal reduction) to get
their money back fast.’
33. Industry commentator David Merkel has observed that it may be useful to contrast CMBS servicing
with these RMBS arrangements. In this setting delinquent loans are shifted from servicer to special servicer
who receives a premium for successful workouts. The cost is offset against reduced interest payments for
the junior certificateholder, who is frequently an originator. This is again suggestive of the agency cost,
but it should be stressed that more work is needed here. For Merkel’s comments, see his Aleph Blog,
http://alephblog.com/2009/12/31/nine-notes-and-comments/
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Or, as Levitin (2008) has even more succintly observed in testimony to the House Judi-
ciary Committee:
‘The choice between modification and foreclosure is a choice between limited fixed-price in-
come and a cost-plus contract arrangement with no oversight of either the costs or the plus
components.’
Concerns about Redefault and Self-Cure
Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) present evidence that the lack of incentive for servicers
to renegotiate mortgages is not due to securitization. Their view is that foreclosure is often
privately optimal for investors so that the agency frictions are not decisive. Instead they
argue that servicers and investors are more concerned with post-renegotiation redefault or
self-cure, namely that either borrowers will default again anyway or will become solvent
without costly renegotiation.
Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) compare renegotiation rates of ‘private-label loans’
to ‘portfolio loans’ and find no statistically significant, nor economically meaningful difference
(they argue that their findings are robust to unobserved heterogeneity). They report reasons
why portfolio loans may also be difficult to renegotiate — including accounting rules, staff
shortages, and agency problems between loan portfolio managers and investors. They also
note the following ‘institutional evidence’ in further support of their claims: low modifications
in earlier housing crashes predating securitization; equal treatment provision statements in
PSAs, directing servicers to behave as the mortgage owner; and the absence of lawsuits
directed at servicers by investors in mortgage-backed securities.
There is a little bit of conceptual difficulty here — on the one hand they are arguing
that there weren’t very serious modification difficulties induced by securitization, at least
relative to the other factors they model; on the other hand they are saying that what frictions
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there were at least matched by the accounting-standards-induced renegotiation frictions on
portfolio loans. They relegate to a footnote the possible explanation that the requirement for
equal treatment of private label and portfolio loans in PSAs leads servicers to avoid portfolio
loan modifications. Instead they concentrate their analysis on arguing simply that expected
recovery under foreclosure is higher than under renegotiation.
The two factors they concentrate on are self-cure, namely that ‘more than 30 percent of
seriously delinquent borrowers ‘cure’ without receiving a modification’ (p. 7) and redefault —
namely the fact that many modifications suffer from recidivism which given declining house
prices results in even less recovery. These two factors are the basis for their theoretical model.
One limitation of their empirical study is that they cannot actually observe modifications and
must impute them from information on loan terms. A further problem is that the dataset
they employ (LPS) under represents subprime mortgages (p.12).
A similar paper is Foote et al. (2009). They also dispute the contention that foreclosures
are not in investor interests (while agreeing they may be socially inefficient). For them,
the allegedly inappropriate compensation structures (in a situation of crisis) governing the
servicer investor relationship are not decisive. They also emphasise instead redefault and
self-cure. As in Levitin (2009) and COP (2009), Foote et al. (2009) find that origination DTI
ratios are not a strong default-predictor,34 in comparison to FICO scores, falling house prices
and unemployment. It is important to make a point about interpretation here. We cannot
equate origination DTIs with underwriting standards.35 For the reasons outlined in part I, it
appears clear that the mortgage industry originated too many ‘unaffordable mortgages’. It
is not apparent what it means to say that falling house prices predict defaults, without any
34. This paper also uses LPS data. As noted this under represents subprime mortgages. Furthermore, it
does not include any information on secondary loans on properties securing a loan (Foote et al p.11). Thus
DTI levels are too low.
35. I do not think the authors do this, but I have seen some writers make this leap.
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understanding of why house prices are falling. Similarly, to the extent that unemployment
is a result of the collapse of the housing bubble, it is also endogenous. The fact that an
individual has a large amount of negative equity is evidence of poor underwriting, which is
to say, the underwriting of an unaffordable mortgage.
In any event, Foote et al. (2009) argue that the most important reason for the lack of
successful modifications is not skewed servicer incentives, what they label the ‘renegotiation
failure’ theory, but the twin factors of redefault and self-cure. In dismissing the renegotiation
failure theory, they cite Cordell et al’s (2008) interviews with investors, and Hunt’s work
showing that outright modification bans are rare (Hunt (2009)). They also contend that
fears of investor lawsuits of servicers are overblown, since there have not been many lawsuits.
This last argument is unconvincing, since there haven’t been many modifications reducing
the total amount owed either. Finally, they cite the point made by Eric Maskin in a response
to the op-ed by Geanakopolos and Koniak (2009), namely that were there these large gains
to be had from renegotiation, mortgage holders, servicers, and borrowers would find a way
to do these renegotiations. They state, that the transactions costs would have to be $180bn.
To some that might not be an implausibly large number. It is certainly true though that
redefaults and self-cures are important considerations.
A model of the decision to foreclose. It is useful to consider the model of Adelino,
Gerardi, and Willen (2009) of the foreclosure decision. The version in Foote et al. (2009) is
slightly more detailed, but in the same spirit.
There are three periods t = 0, 1, 2. In period 0, the lender modifies or not. A payment m
is owed at 1, and the balance M at 2. House collateral is P1 at 1 and P2 at 2. At 1, under no
modification, the homeowner defaults with probability α0, and the lender forecloses receiving
P1−λ. With probability 1−α0, the lender receives m+M . The PDV under no modification
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is α0 ∗min[P1− λ,M ] + (1− α0)[m+ (1/R)M ]. Under modification, the lender receives m∗
at 1, and M∗ at 2, unless the borrower defaults with probability α1 at 2. So the PDV under
modification is m ∗ +(1/R)α1 ∗ min[(P2 − λ),M∗] + (1 − α1)(1/R)M∗. Comparing these
two terms one sees the following tradeoffs. Modifications can recover capital for lenders
from aiding borrowers who otherwise would default, but it also loses capital by reducing
payments for those who would have paid back (‘self-cures’). The final group are those who
were going to be foreclosed anyway (‘redefaults’) — for this group, while a modified payment
is recovered at 1,m∗, the lender may lose by modifying if housing prices weaken further.
On this account, the crucial point that, for example, M. White (2009) cited earlier, misses
is this ‘Type II error’, namely the value which modified mortgages would have had in the
absence of modification — in other words, the possibility of self-cure (which, in their data
is about 30% of seriously delinquent mortgages). In addition, if borrowers are going to
redefault (in their data, 30-45% of cases, in a 6 month timeframe), then lenders receive lower
house prices which may be insufficient to compensate for the receipt of the t=1 payment.
Foote et al. (2009) analysis of the LPS data indicates that portfolio loans are not that
more frequently modified than private label securitized loans.36 Finally, Foote et al argue
that modifications in the past were not as frequent as is usually assumed (p.32). They base
this claim on a review of foreclosure statistics from the Great Depression. Furthermore, a
number of state-enacted foreclosure moratoria were passed during the Depression.37 Thus,
evidence that ‘we see far fewer foreclosures than we did in the 1930s’ is perhaps suggestive
that renegotiation in the past was not as common as imagined. On the other hand, the
Great Depression was a wider and deeper crisis so we should anticipate worse foreclosure
36. They note though, that their analysis does not permit controlling for all the characteristics of these
loans (p. 31)
37. See for example Levitin (2009, p. 628, fn, 220) ‘in 1933, twenty one states enacted legislation that
functioned as foreclosure moratoria’.
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figures.
Levitin notes that the implication of the Adelino et al paper are two: firstly, that the num-
ber of ‘preventable’ mortgage foreclosures are fewer than is typically assumed; and secondly,
that widening ‘safe harbour’ provisions for servicers — that is granting servicers flexibility
to modify loans without fear of litigation — is unlikely to make much difference.38 Levitin
argues though, that while capturing some important reasons why modifications might be im-
paired (namely redefault and self-cure), these concerns are still not large enough to explain
the low rates of modifications we observe.
Levitin also argues that securitization servicers and portfolio lenders view self-cures and
redefaults differently. Servicers are paid first following sale, so for them redefault is not
a concern, while it obviously is for portfolio lenders (although, if servicers are liquidity
constrained it still might be). He also argues that self-cure is also not as great a concern
since the amount of servicer compensation is not very elastic to interest reductions (which
are the majority of modifications).
Levitin thus concludes that there may be a common factor driving the low rates of securi-
tization servicer and portfolio lender modifications — which he speculates might be capacity
related (see below). If this is true, we obviously cannot conclude then that contractual
rigidities through securitization do not hinder modification initiatives.
Levitin points out further that in his analysis redefaults vary significantly across secu-
ritized loans and portfolio loans,39 with redefault rates for securitised modifications being
significantly worse. This must arise either from differences in the loans, or differences in the
38. Levitin (2009) ‘Is Redefault Risk Preventing Mortgage Loan Mods?’ at
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2009/07/is-redefault-risk-preventing-mortgage-loan-mods-.html ;
accessed 17 November 2009.
39. Levitin (2009) ‘Does Securitization affect Loan Modifications’, at
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2009/07/a-few-days-ago-i-wrote-a-long-and-detailed-critique-of-
a-boston-federal-reserve-staff-study-that-argued-among-other-things.html ; accessed 17 November 2009.
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modifications. Levitin notes that the overwhelming majority of securitized loan modifica-
tions do not involve a reduction in principal, and furthermore, servicers extend the term of a
loan in far fewer cases for private loan securitizations than for portfolio loans. Furthermore,
term extensions are far more frequent in modifications performed where Freddie Mac, Fannie
Mae or Ginnie Mae is the servicer. In more detail, he observes (2009, pp7-8) that ‘we know
that almost no loan modifications address negative equity by reducing principal balances.
Of the 185,156 loan modifications in the first quarter of 2009, only 3,389 or 1.8% involved
principal balance reductions, and all but four of these were for loans held in portfolio, rather
than securitized’. Furthermore, ‘we also know many loan modifications do not address af-
fordability by reducing monthly payments. 45.8% of the loan modifications done in the first
quarter of 2009 resulted in monthly payments remaining unchanged or even increasing (in
18.5% of cases).’ I do not think this important empirical debate has been resolved.
Capacity limitations
In addition to the structure of the PSAs, the Congressional Oversight Panel (2009) identifies
various servicer capacity problems (pp39-40). These include a lack of preparedness for the
crisis and notably poor staffing. The Panel observes that whereas previously work done by the
servicers was routine, ‘loan mitigation is slower, more complex, and much less automated.’
The irony of the situation has not been lost on many commentators: loan modification is
in many cases far more arduous than taking out the loan was in the first place. A 2008 New
York Times piece (Goodman and Morgenson 2008) reports that in many cases WaMu loans
‘merely required borrowers to provide an address and Social Security number, and to state
their income and assets’ whereas in Smith et al’s (2009), survey of foreclosure intervention
counsellors who mediated between borrowers and servicers over the period October 2008
and January 2009, there is the clear indication that the modification procedure is difficult,
119
lengthy, and often unsuccessful. Servicers are significantly constrained in their personnel
capacity to help negotiate workouts, although some improvements have been noticed since
the MHA programme was launched although fundamental problems persist.
On the other hand an industry publication characterises the ‘biggest problem’ as the
lengthy nature of the modification process, ‘as borrowers often will not even return phone
calls from the servicer seeking to reduce their payments’ (Temple 2009). Temple also notes
the problems of unaffordable payments and redefault. In his view, modifications raise moral
hazard, and hence the costs of borrowing, through lowered cash flow for investors (who thus
require higher ex ante returns).
3.5 Government Intervention in the Foreclosure Crisis
First we consider some of the key features of the foreclosure process. Firstly, foreclosure law
is state-based, which gives rise to regional variation. In all cases, though, the borrower is
the legal owner of the property, what the mortgage holder owns, is a right to force the sale
(required to be in a public auction) in order to satisfy the debt.40 Thus, properties only
become real estate owned (REO), if the servicer (typically), buys the property at auction.
Foreclosures may also differ along the following dimensions: they may be judicial or non-
judicial (the latter is cheaper); the extent of the right of redemption (whereby the borrower
can repurchase their former home) can vary; and bankruptcy treatment can be different
across states. It would be interesting to consider the impact of these regional differences on
40. An interesting feature of the current crisis is that due to the speed of the origination to securitization
process, in some cases, purported mortgage holders are not able furnish evidence of their ownership, ‘on Oct.
9 in federal bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York [r]uling that a lender, PHH Mortgage,
hadn’t proved its claim to a delinquent borrower’s home in White Plains, Judge Robert D. Drain wiped out
a $461,263 mortgage debt on the property [. . . ] some of the nuts and bolts of the mortgage game — notes,
for example — were never adequately tracked [. . . ] nobody truly knows who owns what.’ Morgenson, G
(2009), ‘If Lenders Say ‘The Dog Ate Your Mortgage”, New York Times, 24 October 2009.
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foreclosure and modification outcomes, as well as to research the public auction design.
3.5.1 Interventions
For this account, we draw, in particular, on Robinson (2009). Traditionally, most modifica-
tions do not reduce the total balance due (or even the payment), and instead delay payment
while adding fees or past fees (Smith et al, 2009). Various initiatives have been launched
at the industry, state and federal levels to try and stem the flow of foreclosures. The Hope
Now Alliance was initiated by various stakeholders to try and induce struggling homeowners
to contact their servicer (Smith et al, 2009). The alliance helped fund the Hope Hotline
Telephone Service in this respect.
Initially, in December 2007, Treasury Secretary Paulson introduced the Streamlined Fore-
closure and Loss Avoidance Framework, ‘Teaser Freezer’, plan which sought to incentivize
mortgage servicers servicing ARM securitized loans to freeze resets for a period of five years.
Robinson (2009) reports that lack of investor approval for modifications represented an im-
pediment.
The FDIC introduced a Loan Modification Program, ‘Mod in a Box’, for certain securi-
tized or serviced IndyMac loans, following the bankruptcy of that institution. Modification
was to be performed for eligible loans where that modification would yield a positive net
present value according to three steps namely: interest rate reduction (to reduce debt-to-
income to 38%); extended amortization period; and finally, partial payment forbearance
which tacks on a zero interest balloon payment to the end of the loan. Robinson (2009)
reports the importance of redefault probability as a constraint, in particular for negative
equity borrowers, in a declining house price environment. As a technical point, the presence
of mortgage insurance had the mechanical effect of biasing the NPV calculation towards
foreclosure — this is something the ‘Second Look’ Program has been designed to overcome.
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Under this program, the servicer would forward the loan failing the NPV test to the mort-
gage insurer, who would then determine whether or not an advance claim could be provided
which might permit loan modification.41
FHASecure was designed to assist the refinance of non-FHA ARM loans into FHA fixed-
rate mortgages. This aided orders of magnitude less people than expected. Congress es-
tablished Hope for Homeowners (H4H) which allowed allows homeowners to refinance their
distressed mortgages with an FHA-insured mortgage. According to Levitin (2009b) this pro-
gramme has not been very successful thus far. Under revised Treasury guidelines, servicers
receive $2,500 up front for loans modified under this procedure Robinson 2009.
The Streamlined Modification Program was a GSE-owned or securitized variation of the
FDIC’s ‘Mod-in-a-box’ programme which included the following aspects: a term extension
to reduce the DTI to 38 per cent; incremental interest rate reductions; and again, a deferred
principal balloon payment to be added due at maturity or upon sale. The GSEs would pay
$800 to the servicers for each modified mortgage.
The Home Affordable Modification Program, which is mandatory for TARP banks and
voluntary otherwise, is a similar programme to the Streamlined Modification Programme
and Mod-in-a-Box. The pooling and servicing agreements are still binding, however.
The protocol of the program allows servicers to choose the means by which to lower the
monthly mortgage payment — i.e. it permits them to pick the combination of principal/
interest/ insurance/ taxes reduction so as to reduce the ratio of payment to current income
to 31%; the losses from which investors and government are to share (Treasury covers half
the cost of reducing DTI from 38% to 31%). Servicers receive $1000 up front per modified
loan, and an annual $1000 per loan for those modified that remain current. Recognising, that
41. ‘MICA’s ‘Second Look’ Program To Expand Loan Modifications’, MICA Press Release, 27 July 2009
at http://www.privatemi.com/news/pressreleases/detail.cfv?id=152
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with declining prices, lenders would like to foreclose as early as possible if redefault is likely;
the Home Price Decline Protection (HPDP) initiative compensates owners and servicers for
modifications done where prices are declining based on a general house price index Robinson
2009. Modified loans are to be those with positive NPV, according to the following sequential
procedure: capitalization of arrearages; incremental reduction of interest rates to reach 31%
DTI; term extension to up to 40 years; and principal forbearance.
Thus HAMP is meant to address the following considerations (Robinson, 2009): the cost
of modification (with Treasury matching funds); servicer constraints and capacities (with
incentives for modification, and incentives for keeping the loan current); investor concerns
about the chance of redefault (with a HPDP payment), and uncertainty (with a standardized
protocol).
3.5.2 Criticisms
Consider the incentives of a borrower with negative equity. If the cost of the modified loan
is lower than the cost of renting, then that borrower would want to modify; even if they fully
anticipated defaulting at some point in the future. In this case, the servicer would likely
not want to modify ex ante. Indeed, this view has been expressed by Edward Pinto, former
Fannie Mae Chief Credit Officer42, ‘This fear has been heightened by the concern of some
servicers that borrowers will use the trial period to game the foreclosure process and delay
their own foreclosures by another 5 or 6 months.’ This may particularly be a concern in an
environment where the norms against walking away have been loosened. The importance
of norms has been argued by B. White (2009). Indeed, there do not appear to be strong




moral reasons for arguing that borrowers who own more than their homes are worth should
continue to make payments on them. He argues that at work is a desire to ‘avoid the shame
and guilt of foreclosure’ and ‘exaggerated anxiety over foreclosure’s perceived consequences’.
Shiller speculated that the emotional binds would loosen over time.43 One can dispute the
magnitude of the moral constraint, but it seems silly to suggest that it was not present at
all.
Geanakopolos and Koniak (2009) criticised HAMP at its inception noting that it insuffi-
ciently reduced principal for underwater homeowners. They noted further that for subprime
and non-prime mortgages:
there is room to make generous principal reductions, without hurting bondholders and without
spending a dime of taxpayer money, because the bond markets expect so little out of foreclo-
sures. Typically, a homeowner fights off eviction for 18 months [. . . ] the subprime bond market
trades now as if it expects only 25 percent back on a loan when there is a foreclosure [. . . ] It
is those ‘underwater’ on their mortgages — with homes worth less than their loans — who are
defaulting, but who, given equity in their homes, will find a way to pay [. . . ] This couple could
rent a comparable home for $10,000 a year, less than half of their current mortgage payments
[. . . ] walking away from their home will further weaken their credit rating and disrupt their
lives, but pouring good money after bad on a home they do not really own is costlier still.
As noted in a New York Times editorial of 11 November 200944, this plan was designed
to reduce foreclosures by financing interest rate reductions. Hence, it appears to have been
43. Robert Shiller is quoted at the Wall Street Journal blog Real Time Economics as saying ‘[s]trategic de-
fault on mortgages will grow substantially over the next year, among prime borrowers, and become identified
as a serious problem. The sense that ‘everyone is doing it’ is already growing, and will continue to grow, to
the detriment of mortgage holders. It will grow because of a building backlash against the financial sector,
growing populist rhetoric and a declining sense of community with the business world. Some people will take
another look at their mortgage contract, and note that nowhere did they swear on the bible that they would
repay.’ 5 January 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/01/05/2010-predictions-from-shiller-blinder-
rajan-and-more/
44. ‘More foreclosures to Come’, New York Times, 12 November 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/opinion/12thu2.html
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founded on a belief that the proximate cause of increasing foreclosures was default due to
exploding interest rates. However, as observed in Levitin (2009), the causes of defaults and
foreclosures have changed over time. Initial defaults may have been driven by speculator
walk-aways when housing prices first flattened and hybrid ARMs reset, but later defaults
included pay-option ARM holders45 and other negative equity prime borrowers.
Note also that the HAMP programme was structured to operate within the constraints
of the pooling and servicing agreements.
3.5.3 Other Possible Interventions
The Smith et al (2009) survey of foreclosure counsellors has the following recommended
modifications, ‘market level interest rates [. . . ] a fixed term [. . . ] or with principal reductions
to reflect the true value of the property’.
Levitin (2009) identifies as the ‘only one option’ that the federal government permit
bankruptcy mortgage modifications for single-family principal residence mortgages in Chap-
ter 13, eliminating the negative equity position through ‘cramdown’.46 47 Following the
1978 bankruptcy reform principal residence mortgages were exempted from modification in
Chapter 13, on the basis that ex ante interest rates for borrowers would be lower through
45. Taken out by prime borrowers with imperfect documentation and hence ‘Alt-A’ rated.
46. Levitin notes however, that Chapter 13 requires the debtor to possess a regular income — but this
will obviously not be the case for those who are unemployed. M. White (2009) also considers cramdown.
On her account, the pooling and servicing agreements embedded in the securitization process resulted in
socially inefficient rigidities. The policy dilemma identified by White (2009) is that administration loan
modification programs have been relatively ineffective on account of requiring lender agreement, but that
cramdown modifications in Chapter 13 would lead to ‘too many’ loan modifications.
47. There are two points here in favour of eliminating the special treatment accorded primary residence
debt in bankruptcy. If it is true that this dramatically lowers the cost of access to mortgage finance, then it
may be an important reason for ‘excessive investment’ in housing. Instead, if there is a limited effect, then
it is possible to eliminate the adverse externalities from foreclosure without the effect of restricting access to
credit in the future.
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incentivising ex ante lender competition. In fact, Levitin (2009c) argues that his empirical
examination reveals that ‘mortgage prices are largely insensitive to bankruptcy modification
risk’. The crucial ingredient here is that foreclosure loss be at least as large as bankruptcy
modification loss. In which case, ex ante credit costs should not be higher. In support of this,
Levitin (2008a) notes that there is no spread between ‘conforming mortgages on vacation
homes and multifamily properties are currently priced the same as single-family principal
residences’. Nor, for example, do Fannie and Freddie ‘track the difference in bankruptcy
modification risk’.48
Furthermore, argues Levitin (2009), this is not too administratively burdensome for the
courts to handle. He writes that, ‘in an age of a trillion dollars in government bailouts,
bankruptcy modification is a rare bargain. Bankruptcy courts are well staffed relative to
historic filing levels, and court fees cover the administrative costs of the process.’
There are significant political obstacles to efforts to allow cramdown in bankruptcy. An
article in Slate from February 2009 described the Obama administration as ‘laying the po-
litical groundwork to empower bankruptcy judges to order ‘cramdowns’ of unpaid mortgage
debts — forcing investors to accept those elusive but all-important reductions of principal
owed’ but goes on to note the ‘serious opposition from the securities and banking industries’
(Katz 2009). Temple (2009), writing in the American Securitization Journal, states the
position succinctly, ‘such proposals would raise serious questions about the rule of law and
the property rights of investors who funded the mortgages while having very little positive
48. However, and as he points out in a brief footnote (70) rationing may be in quantity of credit rather
than prices. We cannot conclude without knowledge of this quantity effect. Levitin, in a separate paper,
presents historical evidence based on the period 1979-1993 where there was institutional variation across
federal districts about whether they permitted strip-down (Levitin (2009c), p. 598). The result here was
that for some classes of credit LTVs were lower where strip down was permitted. He argues that his analysis
suggests no effect on credit availability or the number of bankruptcy filings, but Levitin (2009c) does not
present this evidence. However, his analysis showing that the losses from bankruptcy may in fact be lower
than the losses from foreclosure are certainly suggestive.
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impact on the number of homes being foreclosed. As with modifications, I believe the sin-
gle most important flaw related to cram-down is that it requires judicial intervention on a
borrower-by-borrower basis.’ We should also note that many of the difficulties in perform-
ing modifications in general, and performing certain types of modifications in particular, are
technical in nature. One reason, for example, why banks may oppose modifications including
principal reductions is accounting treatment. Reductions in principal result in an immediate
write-down on the balance sheet, whereas interest rate reductions result in a fall in future
discounted income.
3.5.4 Observations on the Political Economy of Intervention
Undoubtedly, some of the most important obstacles to any intervention in these debt markets
are political. Skeel (2001)’s history of American bankruptcy law might provide a model of the
type of analytical narrative approach one could apply to this issue. His is a discussion framed
in the interest group theory of public choice, where the relevant interest groups at various
stages include creditor groups and their advocates, and bankruptcy lawyers and judges (p.
15). In addition to interest groups, he notes the importance of which committees are ac-
tive in congressional deliberations; the ‘undeniable influence’ of ideology; and the important
role of particular individuals (most notable is his account of the role of William Douglas
and his SEC). It is Skeel’s contention that there are three primary forces shaping American
bankruptcy law and its development (p. 16). These are: the compromise between creditor
interests and the forces of prodebtor movements and other ‘populist’ forces. Attempting to
shape these forces towards accretion of their own prominence have been bankruptcy profes-
sionals seeking to expand the law’s scope. Roughly speaking, Republicans have aligned with
creditor interests and Democrats with prodebtor movements, while bankruptcy professionals
have aligned with themselves.
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I have spent some space outlining Skeel’s history, since it aids in considering the type of
approach that one might take to the present case. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2009) consider
the relative magnitudes of the effects of constituent interests, special interests, and politician
ideology in the context of voting behaviour on two acts — the American Housing Rescue and
Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008 and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
Their findings are: mortgage defaults, particularly of own-party constituents, increased the
likelihood of voting for the housing bailout (particularly in competitive districts); financial
firm campaign donations increased the likelihood of voting in favour of the bank bailout and;
finally, they show that Republican politicians are driven more by ideology than constituent
or special interests and argue that ‘this [. . . ] suggests that politicians, through ideology, can
commit against intervention even during severe crises.’
This work provides some empirical basis for the important tension that exists (as sug-
gested by Skeel (2001)), between debtor and creditor interests (and hence debtor and creditor
regions) which were again on display in the setting of the mortgage cramdown debate. In
March of 2009, House legislation was passed that ‘would let federal judges lengthen mortgage
terms, cut interest rates and reduce loan balances for homeowners in bankruptcy court, even
if the lender objects, on the borrower’s primary residence’49, but this did not come to a vote
in the Senate. On 11 December 2009, the House voted 241-188 against an amendment to
H.R. 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, brought by John
Conyers, and supported by House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank,
containing the same language.50 The measure was opposed by banks and what Bloomberg
archaically described as ‘broker-dealers’. The American Bankers Association chairman, in
49. Bloomberg, 8 December 2009,
50. Bloomberg, 11 December 2009
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his discussion of this success, stated51
An amendment to add mortgage bankruptcy cramdown to the bill was defeated on the floor
by a strong majority. Given that this amendment had passed the House earlier this year, our
win is a strong reflection of the hard work of the state associations and grassroots bankers last
week. Since the cramdown concept has now been defeated in both the House and Senate this
year, hopefully it will not be brought up again.
This would appear to be the last word on the matter. It may be interesting to examine,
in a similar manner to Mian et al, the determinants of voting on this amendment.52 One
way of getting at the tension between servicers and investors would be to examine whether
there was a difference in opinion over the bankruptcy cramdown prohibition. Levitin (2009b,
p. 625) asserts that opposition has been led by the servicers, who exert greater influence
than investors who might benefit from cramdown. On the other hand, Foote et al (2009,
pp22-23), cite a survey of investors by Cordell et al (2008) which found that ‘investors [. . . ]
were not enthusiastic about an idea to reimburse servicers for expenses of loss mitigation’.
This suggests that they may not see value in principal reduction, and hence may similarly
oppose bankruptcy reform of the sort envisaged.
Finally, it is important to note also that should the number of individuals choosing to
walk away from their mortgage dramatically increase, this could produce some pressure
for loan modifications (Lowenstein 2010). Certainly, in an environment where regulators
are intervening heavily in mortgage markets to support home prices, and there exists a
moral constraint on walking away, it is not clear why we should expect a large number of
modifications.
51. Huffington Post, 16 December 2009,
52. Levitin (2009, p. 649-650) observes that in fact a similarly shaped bankruptcy reform passed the House
in 2008 and ‘was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, but never came to a floor vote because of
the inability to get cloture and avoid filibuster’. The legislation was Helping Families Save their Homes in
Bankruptcy Act, S 2136, 110th Cong (2008).
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3.6 Conclusions
I conclude by presenting some questions arising out of this survey potentially deserving of
further study.
Industrial Organization As a general point, it is important to understand the trade-
off between integration and disintermediation. As noted, since the firm boundary is an
endogenous decision, this presents some challenging but important empirical problems.
Political Economy The foreclosure crisis can be used to address some classical questions
in public choice and political economy, such as the relative importance of interest groups,
politician preferences and voter preferences. Firstly, it is unclear why there was such con-
certed opposition to the votes on bankruptcy cramdown. A useful exercise may be to perform
a similar analysis to that in Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2009) but applied to the three house
votes on cramdown. It would also be interesting to get a sense of why the legislation did not
make it out of the Senate Finance Committee. Perhaps linked to this is further investigation
of the role of congressional intervention in promoting the mortgage expansion, the extent of
congressional and executive interference in administrative decisions, etc. Another instructive
example here might be the work of Romer and Weingast (1992).
Barriers to Loans Modifications Further work is needed if we are to understand the
reasons for foreclosures and why loan modification programs were so apparently unsuccessful.
These are also important questions to consider in the context of regulating the industry going
forward.
It should first be noted that an important reason for our lack of understanding of the
failures of loan modifications is a shortage of data. The Congressional Oversight Panel’s
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March 2009 report states that ‘the existing data are plagued by inconsistencies in data
collection methodologies and reporting, and are often simply unverifiable. Worse still, the
data being collected are often not what is needed for answering key questions, namely what
are causing mortgage defaults and why loan modifications have not been working’ (p.14).
As noted, foreclosure rules differ across states in terms of whether they are judicial
or non-judicial; the extent of the right of redemption; and bankruptcy treatment. How
do modification rates vary by foreclosure rules, rules around the right of redemption, and
bankruptcy treatment? What was the relationship between the bankruptcy reform of 2005
and the foreclosure crisis?
In thinking across borrowers: How important are the social norms against walking away
from your mortgage and did those change? When others default in your neighbourhood,
does this make it more likely that you will default? What is the size of this effect? Linked
to this are incentives across servicers. Do servicers internalize they place on others when
foreclosing on a borrower?
Furthermore, we need to better understand the precise nature of the agency relationship
between borrower and servicer? Roughly, the servicer would like the borrower to undertake
some unobservable effort to pay if able. We can think of this in the moral hazard framework.
But there is also an adverse selection element, since the servicer has many borrowers, and
would only like to modify the ‘good risks’.
Some of these questions are more closely examined in Chapter 4 where I and a coauthor
study the question of the effects of one foreclosure on neighboring houses. But there is a lot
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4.1 Introduction
The housing bubble and crisis of the last decade has resulted in an unusually large number of
foreclosures in the United States. Completed foreclosures—when a mortgage borrower does
not make payments on their loan and the lending institution claims the mortgaged property—
increased dramatically starting in 2007 from 404,849 properties per year, peaking at 1.05
million completed foreclosures in 2010.1 The length and severity of this crisis have increased
academic interest in the consequences of home foreclosures and have raised questions about
how and why foreclosures spread (e.g., Guren and McQuade (2013)).
In this paper we ask whether home foreclosures are contagious: does one completed
foreclosure increase the probability that geographically neighboring borrowers end up in
the foreclosure process? The answer to this question informs our understanding of home
foreclosures, borrower and lender behavior, and appropriate policy toward mortgages and
foreclosure procedures. Foreclosure contagion is suspected of exacerbating the housing crises
during the Great Depression and the recent financial crisis (Campbell (2013)). Identifying
and understanding contagion in foreclosures will provide a better understanding of how and
why such crises spread. Furthermore, the presence of contagion is relevant to policy makers
concerned with mitigating the spread of home foreclosures.
Our chief contribution is to develop a randomly assigned instrument for foreclosures,
which we apply to administrative data to achieve credible, policy-relevant estimates of fore-
closure contagion. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to use a randomly assigned
instrument to study the local effects of foreclosures. In Chicago (Cook County), IL, where
foreclosure cases are decided in court, we use the randomization of new cases to fixed groups
1. We use “foreclosure filing” to refer to the initiation of the foreclosure process by the lender, and
“completed foreclosure” to refer to a foreclosure proceeding ending with the mortgaged property being sold
at auction. However, lenders are not always successful in foreclosing on a home, and so not all filings end in
completed foreclosure—we refer to such unsuccessful foreclosure attempts as “dismissals.”
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of judges as an instrument for a completed foreclosure. Intuitively, our estimates compare
the neighborhoods around two types of properties going through the foreclosure process (i.e.,
situations in which a borrower is in default and the lender wants to claim the home as col-
lateral): properties randomly assigned to “difficult” judges that, as a result, are foreclosed
upon and sold at auction versus properties randomly assigned to “lenient” judges that dis-
miss the foreclosure case. Since our empirical strategy necessarily relies upon the comparison
of neighborhoods around homes in default that do and do not end in foreclosure, our esti-
mates speak directly to the policy question of how strongly lenders should be incentivized
to renegotiate delinquent loans. 2 This instrument allows us to surmount the endogeneity
of home foreclosures—a key empirical challenge—present in existing studies of foreclosure
externalities that primarily rely on fixed effects analyses of very local neighborhoods (e.g.,
Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011), who study how real estate sale prices are influenced
by foreclosures within 0.1 miles).
We develop a novel data set that matches administrative records of foreclosure court cases
to records on foreclosure filings and auctions for Cook County. This county, which contains
most of the city of Chicago, is the second-most populous in the U.S. and was relatively hard
hit by the housing crisis: the surrounding MSA experienced the 12th largest decline in city-
wide housing prices between 2007 and 2011, while 5.2% of the 1.9 million households in Cook
County experienced a completed foreclosure. Our data covers the universe of foreclosure
filings and completed foreclosures in Cook County between 2004 and 2011, allowing us to
leverage the random assignment of foreclosure judges while observing the precise location
2. There is a developed literature that uses judicial bias as an instrument, as we do herein, including:
Kling (2006) (sentencing propensities of judges to instrument for incarceration length); Autor and Houseman
(2010) (job placement rates of non-profit contractors to instrument for receiving temporary help jobs); Chang
and Schoar (2006) (judicial fixed effects to measure judge-debtor-friendliness); Dobbie and Song (2013)
(judge discharge rates to instrument for bankruptcy protection); Doyle (2007) (placement frequency of child
protection investigators to instrument for foster care); and Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013) (allowance
rates of disability examiners to instrument disability insurance receipt).
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of the associated property. We also use administrative data on residential housing sales to
assess whether a completed home foreclosure lowers neighboring housing values.
Concrete evidence on foreclosure-related externalities and contagion has been elusive,
owing to empirical challenges (Frame (2010)). Home foreclosures are known to be correlated
with neighborhood characteristics and changes in housing prices and macroeconomic circum-
stances (Mian and Sufi (2009) and Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2012)). Existing studies that find
negative housing price effects of foreclosure have relied primarily on local analyses that ex-
plicitly control for property and neighborhood characteristics (Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak
(2011); Immergluck and Smith (2006); Schuetz, Been, and Ellen (2008); Pennington-Cross
(2006); Leonard and Murdoch (2009); and Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2007)) or repeat-sales
analyses (Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) and Gerardi et al. (2012)). Similarly, exist-
ing studies finding evidence of foreclosure contagion rely either on local analyses (Towe and
Lawley (2013)) or aggregate analyses controlling for neighborhood and zip code character-
istics (Goodstein and Lee (2010)). Few studies have taken a quasi-experimental approach
to identifying the externalities associated with foreclosure.3 One notable exception is Anen-
berg and Kung (forthcoming), who find a drop in real estate listing prices immediately after
foreclosed properties are listed on the market. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to
use a randomly assigned instrument to estimate contagion and local price effects of home
foreclosures.
We find evidence of foreclosure contagion using our instrumental variables strategy that
compares neighborhoods with completed foreclosures to neighborhoods where foreclosure
cases are dismissed. Relative to dismissal, a completed foreclosure raises the probability of
3. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2012) exploit changes at state borders in policy toward foreclosure (in particular,
the distinction between judicial vs. non-judicial states) to instrument foreclosures, although this instrument
is not randomly assigned (for example, Pence (2006) shows substantial changes in housing market conditions
at the boundaries between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states).
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any new foreclosure filing within 0.1 miles by 10% per year and leads to about 0.5 new filings
per year. This foreclosure contagion effect is robust and persistent, lasting for three to four
years after the case is decided. Additionally, our estimates show that substantial contagion
in foreclosure filings occurs even in neighborhoods with no recent foreclosures—the “first”
completed foreclosure in a neighborhood substantially increases foreclosure filings in the
following years. Interestingly, there is no evidence of contagion at the height of the crisis
(2009–2011); contagion is present primarily during the peak and initial decline of the Chicago
housing market (2004–2008). We interpret this temporal pattern as evidence that contagion
operates through borrowers who are on the margin of the default decision (2004–2008), rather
than those in dire straits (2009–2011). A neighboring completed foreclosure may not be very
meaningful to a borrower who is already in negative equity (thus, relatively insensitive to a
foreclosure-induced loss of property value) or when foreclosures are common-place (and so
the marginal foreclosure conveys little information).
Contagion is not limited to new foreclosure filings—a completed foreclosure increases the
number of neighboring completed foreclosures as well. This result suggests that contagion is
costly and plays a role in the geographic spread of foreclosures. In particular, we find that, on
average, each completed foreclosures induces an additional 1.5 completed foreclosures within
four years. Taken literally, our estimates suggest that in the absence of the contagion ex-
ternality, Chicago would have experienced more than 50% (roughly 43,000) fewer completed
foreclosures between 2004 and 2010.4 We also find that a completed foreclosure increases the
number of completed foreclosures even among neighboring cases that had already begun.
While our estimates suggest that a completed foreclosure lowers neighboring residential
sale prices, our estimates are largely driven by selection into sale. Within the first year of
4. These figures are based on a simple back of the envelope calculation. Our estimates suggest that each
completed foreclosure causes more than 1 additional completed foreclosure within three years, and so an
absence of contagion suggests 50% fewer completed foreclosures.
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a case ending in a foreclosure, relative to a case that ends in dismissal, the average price of
neighboring housing sales drops by up to 40%. However, using a repeat-sales methodology
to adjust for property quality, our estimates of this effect fall substantially to zero. We
interpret this as evidence that a completed foreclosure disrupts the housing market in terms
of the types of homes that sell, causing a larger share of lower-quality homes to transact
at correspondingly lower prices than the average home in the neighborhood. At the same
time, due to the small size of our housing sales sample and the resulting imprecision of our
housing price estimates, we cannot rule out a small negative effect of completed foreclosure
on neighboring home values (holding quality constant).
We show evidence consistent with the commonly held belief that foreclosure contagion
is driven by an increase in borrowers defaulting on their loans in response to a neighboring
foreclosure, rather than lenders filing for foreclosure against already delinquent borrowers.
There is substantial evidence that lenders and mortgage servicers—third parties employed by
creditors to manage loans—indiscriminately favor pursuing foreclosure on delinquent mort-
gages, rather than modification (see discussions in Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) and
Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) and Levitin and Twomey (2011)). We argue that in the
absence of borrower-driven contagion, lenders would not exhibit positive foreclosure conta-
gion. Given that we do observe positive contagion provides evidence that borrowers respond.
Moreover, there is substantial contagion even among mortgages serviced by lenders known
for automating foreclosure procedures and who are, thus, unlikely to respond to very local
market conditions.
There are two prominent explanations of why a completed foreclosure will increase the
probability that neighbors default on their own mortgages. The first hinges on a completed
foreclosure lowering neighboring home values, thus increasing the likelihood that borrowers
are in negative equity or “underwater” on their loans—i.e., owing more than the mortgaged
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property is worth (Campbell and Cocco (2011); Campbell (2013); and Goodstein et al.
(2011)). As one becomes further underwater on one’s loan, the incentive to default on
the mortgage increases: the loss on the asset grows relative to the costs associated with
foreclosure (primarily moving costs and a drop in credit score). The second explanation
is that a completed foreclosure transmits information to neighbors (Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2013); Towe and Lawley (2013)). Specifically, a completed foreclosure may send
a signal to neighbors about the future of the neighborhood (influencing the expected value
of the property to the borrower), or about the foreclosure process itself (e.g., neighbors may
learn about the likelihood of a mortgage modification if they default on their loans).
Contagion is driven not by borrowers in severe negative equity, but by borrowers who are
on the margin of being underwater. We use information about loan principal and outstand-
ing balance to construct a proxy for borrowers being underwater and find that a completed
foreclosure induces additional new filings among non-underwater loans only. Moreover, this
effect is concentrated among loans who are on the margin of being underwater with outstand-
ing debt at the time of filing within 10% of the initial principal. For example, a neighboring
foreclosure may act as a “wakeup call” for borrowers in positive equity, sending a strong
signal about the current value of their property, the future of the neighborhood, and/or
information about the foreclosure process itself. On the other hand, those who are very
underwater on their loans may already be well informed about the foreclosure process and
the consequences thereof and/or have a sufficiently large negative equity position that an
additional loss in value is negligible with respect to the default decision.
Contagion varies substantially depending on whether neighbors have mortgages serviced
by the same lender, which we interpret as evidence that information—in this case, infor-
mation about lenders—plays an important role in reducing contagion. Specifically, we find
that when a completed foreclosure occurs there are significantly fewer new foreclosure fil-
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ings among loans serviced by the same lender than loans serviced by different lenders. This
difference may be driven by borrowers learning more and different information from the
experience of neighbors whose loans are serviced by the same institutions: the neighboring
foreclosure may send a signal about their lender’s behavior, lowering the perceived prob-
ability of a successful renegotiation of the loan and, thus, reducing strategic incentives to
default.
Our results suggest that policies that keep delinquent borrowers in their homes, for exam-
ple by encouraging lenders to modify delinquent loans, may reduce the spillovers associated
with home foreclosures. We are able to speak to this question since our empirical strategy
identifies foreclosure spillovers for the set of marginally delinquent loans for whom the id-
iosyncrasies of the overseeing judge matter (i.e., the cases that are likely to comply with
the instrument)—these are the cases most likely to be influenced by policy interventions. In
principle, our results provide support for government policies that encourage modification,
such as the Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) (even if there have
been considerable (and well documented) problems in implementation). For example, as of
December 2013 HAMP has achieved 27,525 successful modifications of delinquent mortgages
in the Chicago MSA. However, this understates the true benefit of the program—our con-
tagion estimates imply that HAMP prevented an additional 44,040 completed foreclosures
(and the spillovers associated with these).5 Extrapolating our contagion estimates to the
national level, by succesfully modifying 1.1 million delinquent mortgages, HAMP has pre-
5. HAMP numbers are from the December 2013 Making Home Affordable Program Performance Re-
port from the U.S. Department of the Treasury (available at www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Pages/Making-Home-Affordable-Program-Performance-Report.aspx). The progress report
identifies 46,183 permanent loan modifications for the Chicago-Joliet-Naperville MSA. The report indicates
a 40.4% redefault rate (within four years) among HAMP modified loans, leaving 27,525 successful modifi-
cations. Summing our estimates of contagion in completed foreclosures from Table C.8 suggests that each
completed foreclosure induces, on average, an additional 1.6 completed foreclosures (and 1.6 * 27,525 =
44,040).
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vented an aditional 1.76 million completed foreclosures. Of course any program must weigh
general equilibrium considerations—these include the effects on ex-ante incentives for loan
origination, and incentives for default by other borrowers. Our finding that contagion is
minimal or even negative among borrowers with the same creditors, may provide evidence
that these incentives for strategic default matter—we interpret this finding as demonstrating
that borrowers update the probability of a modification downward and are discouraged from
defaulting on their loans. As such, a policy that raises the cost of default (e.g., achieving
a reduction in loan principal only by going through bankruptcy, as suggested by Levitin
(2009a)), or a more direct policy that targets the vacancy and neglect associated with REO
properties, may be preferred.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in Section 1 we outline the judicial foreclosure
process in the state of Illinois and randomization of judges to cases in Cook County. Section
2 sketches our data sources—administrative records on court cases, geocoded administrative
records on foreclosure filings, and deed transfer records. In Section 3 we outline the empirical
strategy, which exploits the random assignment of judges for quasi-experimental identifica-
tion, the results of which we present in Section 4. Section 5 explores possible mechanisms,
and Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Judicial Foreclosure in Illinois
Cook County, Illinois, provides a good context in which to study foreclosure contagion.
Firstly, it was badly affected by the foreclosure crisis. Between 2002 and 2011, the county
saw 302,166 foreclosure proceedings initiated by lenders (“foreclosure filings”), and 134,924
completed foreclosures. These trends are illustrated in Figure C.1. There is a sharp increase
in the number of foreclosure cases filed in Cook County (left axis) from about 1,000 per
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month in 2004 to more than 3,000 filings per month in 2008. At the same time, foreclosure
proceedings became more likely to end in a completed foreclosure: the completed foreclosure
rate (right axis) jumps from 45% for cases filed in 2004 to 65% in 2008. Secondly, the foreclo-
sure process in Cook County, IL, goes through the court system, allowing us to instrument
a foreclosure outcome using random assignment of judges to cases.
In Illinois, as in many so-called “judicial foreclosure” states, lenders must take delinquent
borrowers to court in order to claim a mortgaged property. When a borrower has missed
three mortgage payments (i.e., is in default), a lender or the third party servicing the mort-
gage may initiate the foreclosure process by filing for foreclosure on the associated property
with the chancery court (we refer to this event as a foreclosure filing). If after ninety
days the borrower has not made up all missed payments, the trial begins and the lender’s
attorney must establish that the borrower: has borrowed money from the lender; has signed
a mortgage note promising the property as collateral; and is behind on payments. At the
same time, the borrower may mount a defense, for example by disputing any of these facts
or claiming that the lender has violated lending laws (e.g., the Truth-in-Lending Act). After
hearing the arguments, the presiding judge decides the case, either dismissing the foreclosure
action or filing a judgment of foreclosure. If the case is dismissed, the borrower typically
continues to reside in the home. If a judgment of foreclosure is filed, then the case proceeds
to a foreclosure auction, which we refer to as a completed foreclosure.6 If the sale price
does not cover the outstanding balance of the mortgage then the borrower is still considered
in debt to the lender, although it is common for lenders to forgive this remaining debt. In
the vast majority of cases (around 95% for Cook County), the lending institution purchases
6. Following a foreclosure judgement, a redemption period begins during which the borrower may pay off
the entire outstanding mortgage plus late fees, attorney fees, court costs, and taxes. The redemption period
ends either three months after the judgment or seven months after the initial foreclosure complaint is served,
whichever is later.
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the property at auction for the amount of the outstanding loan—in doing so the lender need
not record a loss on their balance sheet.7
A dismissal may refer to several possible outcomes, most of which result in the property
remaining occupied by the borrower. First, if a borrower makes all missed payments within
90 days of the filing, then the case is dismissed and the mortgage is reinstated. Second,
rather than continuing to pursue an ongoing foreclosure case, the lender may modify the
terms of the mortgage to make payments more affordable to the borrower. Third, the lender
may “lose” the case by failing to adequately establish non-payment of the mortgage or that
they are owed the debt, or the borrower’s defense may be successful. Fourth, a case may
be dismissed because the lender does not take action in pursuing the foreclosure. Fifth, a
lender may accept a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, in which the borrower forfeits the home to
the lender without going through the courts. Finally, the borrower may negotiate a short
sale of their home: the lender accepts the proceeds from the sale of the home as payment for
the mortgage. Deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and short sales are generally not an option when
there are multiple liens on the property, a fact we exploit to confirm that our results are not
driven by these outcomes in which delinquent borrowers lose their property (Agarwal et al.
(2011)).8 In our data we cannot distinguish which of these outcomes occurs; we only know
whether the case ends in dismissal or completed foreclosure. However, with the exception
of a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure or a short sale, in all of these dismissal outcomes the house
remains occupied by the borrower.
7. See statistics for Cook County compiled by the Woodstock Institute:
blog.cookcountyil.gov/economicdevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Wodstock-Institute-Foreclosure-
Filings-2007-2012.pdf
8. Anecdotally, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and short sales are uncommon in Cook County for the reason
that, in both cases, creditors are typically taking a loss, while mortgage servicers will accrue lower fees
(relevant in cases where the property is being managed by a mortgage servicer): in Illinois, by accepting
a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure the lender must forgive all debt, while short sales typically transact at a price
below the outstanding debt (Ghent and Kudlyak (2011)).
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Foreclosure cases are randomly assigned to a case calendar, which restricts the set of
judges that will ever hear an action on the case. A case calendar is a weekly schedule of
court-room/judge pairings, usually made up of two or three judges. Judges typically only
hear cases associated with their case calendar. Similarly, since chancery court cases are only
assigned to one calendar, only the associated judges will oversee an action on that case. When
a case is filed, it is assigned a unique case number, sorted by property type (single-family
home, condominium, commercial property, etc.), and randomly assigned to a case calendar.9
As of 2010, there were 12 chancery court case calendars hearing foreclosure cases (there are
additional calendars that hear only other chancery court cases). Judges are assigned to case
calendars each year by the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
There are several ways that a Cook County judge might influence the outcome of a fore-
closure case, which is necessary for the validity of our instrument.10 Firstly, the judge has
discretion to determine how long a defendant has to find a lawyer and mount a defense.
Secondly, even if a defendant does not mount a defense, the judge determines whether or not
the lender successfully establishes that the borrower is behind on payments and that the debt
is owed to the lender. Establishing these points is not trivial. Throughout the foreclosure
crisis, there have been accounts of mistakes and wrongdoing in the prosecution of foreclo-
sures (Kiel (2012)), including failures of banks to produce proper documentation or lenders
9. Random assignment of cases to case calendars is performed by the Chancery Court computer sys-
tem. As described on the Chancery Court’s FAQ page, “When a case is filed in the Law Division
it is randomly assigned via a computer program to a calendar letter. You may contact the Informa-
tion Desk in Law Division to obtain the Judge’s information associated with the calendar letter.” See
www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org/?section=FAQSPage
10. There is substantial evidence of judicial bias in many settings: Anderson, Kling, and Stith (1999) illus-
trate important differences across judges in decision-making—sometimes suggestive of bias (e.g., Abrams,
Bertrand, and Mullainathan (2008) or Yang (2012)), and sometimes more generally based on “personal assess-
ments” of case-specific information (Iaryczower (2009)). Berdejo and Chen (2010) present evidence suggestive
of unconscious judicial bias—illustrating priming effects on judges of wars (which suppress dissents)—as well
as more partisan behavior before Presidential elections.
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initiating foreclosure proceedings without reviewing the history of the loan (“robosigning”).
Similarly, it us up to the judge to evaluate a borrower’s defense, for example by determining
whether a mortgage is legal in the first place (e.g., is not in violation of (predatory) lending
laws). Anecdotal evidence suggests that judges vary substantially in their leniency on these
issues.11
In what follows, we use the random assignment of foreclosure cases to case calendars to
instrument the outcome that the case ends in foreclosure. As discussed above, judges may
influence the outcome of a case. At the same time, the case calendar to which a foreclosure
case is randomly assigned determines the possible judges who will ever hear the case. If
judges vary sufficiently in their biases toward foreclosure, then the case calendar to which
a case is assigned may influence whether a case ends in foreclosure or dismissal.12 Thus,
our identification relies on the comparison of two delinquent borrowers going through the
foreclosure process, one of whom is randomly assigned to a “lenient” case calendar and
ends in dismissal, while the other is randomly assigned to a “strict” calendar and ends in
foreclosure. To implement this study we require data on Cook County foreclosure cases,
including case calendar assignment and the case outcome (foreclosure or dismissal).
11. The Washington Post observes, for example, that “[in] Suffolk and Nassau counties on Long Island
and Kings County... which have among the highest rates of foreclosure in the state and where the 81 judges
handling foreclosures have become infamous over the past few years for scrutinizing paperwork ... the level
of tolerance for document mistakes varies from judge to judge ...” (emphasis added). “Some judges chastise
banks over foreclosure paperwork”, Washington Post, 9 November 2010.
12. Of course, once assigned to a case calendar, the judge within that calendar who hears a case may is
not necessarily random. For this reason, we use the case calendar (group of potential judges) as the unit of
randomization to ensure orthogonality of the instrument to unobservable characteristics. As long as there is
sufficient bias across judges to ensure that the case calendar (group) to which a case is assigned influences
the outcome, then the instrument remains valid.
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4.3 Data
We use geocoded administrative data for Cook County from three sources: Cook County
chancery court records, foreclosure filings, and deed transfer records. Publicly available
chancery court records for 2004–2010 provide us with details of each foreclosure case, includ-
ing the information necessary to construct our instrument: the case calendar to which the
case is randomly assigned and the outcome of the case (dismissal or foreclosure). To study
neighborhood outcomes, however, we need to know the location of borrowers’ homes. To
this end, we match each chancery court foreclosure case record to the associated foreclosure
filing record (2002–2011), which has been provided to us by Chicago-based Record Infor-
mation Services, Inc. (RIS). These records allow us to observe new foreclosure filings that
occur around any given delinquent homeowner’s property, which we use to study foreclosure
contagion. To observe how completed foreclosures affect housing markets—prices and sales
volumes—we rely on deed transfer records (1995–2008) provided to us by the Paul Milstein
Center for Real Estate at the Columbia Graduate School of Business. These records allow
us to observe the state of the housing market around each property going through the fore-
closure courts. Finally, we bolster the information about each neighborhood using data from
the 2000 Decennial Census and Zillow housing price indices.
The Cook County chancery court makes public all court records, which include details
on each foreclosure case. We manually collected data for each of the 217,230 chancery court
cases filed between January 1 2004 and June 30 2010 from the court’s public electronic
docket.13 Each record identifies the case number (a unique identifier assigned by the court),
the type of case (e.g., foreclosure vs. other chancery case), the plaintiff (lending institution
or mortgage servicer), the defendant, and the case calendar. The records also include every
13. www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org
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action on the case (and corresponding date), although the action descriptions are terse.
We rely on foreclosure filings from RIS to identify the location of properties going through
the foreclosure process. The RIS data span all 307,209 foreclosure cases filed between 2002
and 2011 in Cook County. These records contain the same variables as the online chancery
court records, except RIS does not collect the case calendar. However, RIS also collects
information not included in the court records, such as the type of property (single-family,
condo, etc.), details about the mortgage (type of mortgage, original loan principal, outstand-
ing balance at time of foreclosure filing), any additional lien holders identified on the filing,
and the address and latitude/longitude of the home under foreclosure. Finally, RIS also
collects a record of each foreclosure auction between 2002 and 2011 (168,577 in total). This
allows us to conclusively observe a foreclosure outcome and associated date.
We match the chancery court records to the RIS foreclosure filings by case id.14 The
resulting data set covers 174,187 foreclosure filings in Cook County filed between January
2004 and June 2010. For each record, we observe the date the case is filed, whether and when
the case is dismissed or foreclosed, the location of the home under foreclosure, and the above-
mentioned details of the property and mortgage. We consider a case as ending in completed
foreclosure if the RIS records indicate that a foreclosure auction occurs for that property
and mortgage, and we consider the auction date to be the end of the case. We consider a
foreclosure case as being dismissed if it does not have an associated foreclosure auction and
if the chancery court data records a dismissal action, where we take the date of the dismissal
action as the relevant “dismissal date” (see the Data Appendix for details of these variable
definitions). For our analysis, we drop 847 filings associated with Veterans Affairs mortgages
(VA), 12,755 filings made during the Cook County foreclosure moratorium of 2009,15 and
14. See the Data Appendix for more details on the cleaning process.
15. Cook County enacted a moratorium on new foreclosure filings on April 16, 2009 to last through Septem-
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12,365 filings made during the first or last year in which a case calendar hears foreclosure
cases, as cases may be non-randomly assigned as the calendar makes the transition.16 Our
results are robust to these sample restrictions.
The majority of cases end in a completed foreclosure, while a small fraction of cases are
unresolved due to right-censoring. As can be seen in Table C.1, which provides descriptive
statistics (imposing the above-mentioned sample restrictions), 90,653 (61.2%) cases have an
associated foreclosure auction, 50,140 end in dismissal (33.8%), and the remaining 7,427
foreclosure cases remain undecided due to right-censoring. The average length of a case is
about 373.6 days, although this is significantly longer for cases that end in foreclosure (428.7
days vs. 274.9 for dismissals). Since the Cook County chancery court records are up to
date as of the date of collection (early 2012), and the RIS foreclosure auctions are up to
date through 2011, we do not observe the end of particularly long cases. This is especially
true for cases filed in 2009 and 2010, from which 79.08% of the undecided cases originate.
We omit these undecided cases from our analyses (as well as cases for which we observe the
decision, but do not have data on our outcomes for that year).
Among dismissals, we see that only 12.0% of the borrowers “redefault”, suggesting that
the dismissal outcome does not merely delay a completed foreclosure. We define redefault as
ber 1, 2009. This moratorium applied to all new filings except those in which the borrower agreed not to
mount a defense prior to filing. The effect of the foreclosure moratorium can be seen in Figure C.1: we see
that the number of cases filed dips sharply during the moratorium (left axis), while the foreclosure rate jumps
up (right axis). Interestingly, it seems the moratorium finished early—new filings spike before September 1,
2009.
16. Case calendars have been added over time to ease the burden on existing calendars. In our data, we
observe the addition of six new calendars to the foreclosure roster and the phase-out of 16 calendars (that
move from hearing foreclosure cases to hearing exclusively other chancery cases). Unfortunately, the details of
these phase-in and phase-out processes are not well publicized and we observe unusually low case assignment
to these calendars during the phase-in periods. Our concern is that as new calendars are introduced to the
foreclosure process they are restricted in the type of foreclosure cases that they hear. Indeed, including cases
assigned to new case calendars in our sample brings our IV estimates closer in line with the OLS estimates,
suggesting some non-random assignment to newly introduced calendars.
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a new foreclosure filing occurring against the same loan after the first case has been decided;
this definition excludes future defaults to the same borrower on different loans and future
defaults from different borrowers at the same property. Since dismissed cases make up our
counterfactual in studying the neighborhood-level effects of completed foreclosures, this low
rate of redefault is reassuring—in most instances dismissing a case does not merely delay
the foreclosure (for example, while the lender finds a missing mortgage note), but provides
a concrete resolution of the mortgage default within the time frame that we observe.
To study the neighborhood-level effect of completed foreclosure on housing sales and
prices we rely on deed transfer records for Cook County from 1995–2008. These records
cover the universe of real estate transactions and indicate the date of sale, the sale price,
and the property type (residential, commercial, etc.). We restrict this data to residential
real estate transactions between 2000 and 2008,17 which leaves us with 862,215 residential
real estate sales. The mean sale price for these transactions is $276,401, while the median is
$215,000. We geocode the transactions using the reported property address (using Yahoo!
Placefinder), allowing us to observe transactions near properties associated with foreclosure
cases.
Finally, we add data from the 2000 Decennial Census matched by tract and the IRS
Statistics of Income (SOI) and Zillow (matched by zipcode). The Census provides us with
details (as of 2000) on the population density, race, and median of the census tract in which
each property is located. The IRS Statistics of Income provide a measure of zip-code-level
income (mean adjusted gross income) derived from aggregated tax returns. These data are
available for the 1998, 2001, 2002, and 2004–2008 tax years (for 2003, we use the mean of
2002 and 2004, while for 2009+ we use the observed adjusted gross income in 2008). Zillow
provides zip-code-level housing price indices for 2000–2011.
17. See the Data Appendix for more details.
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4.4 Empirical Strategy
Our primary objective is to estimate whether and to what extent a completed home foreclo-
sure is contagious, which we define in terms of the question: does one completed foreclosure
cause new foreclosure filings? To this end, we compare the number of new foreclosure fil-
ings in neighborhoods around properties going through the foreclosure process that end in
a completed foreclosure to properties that end in dismissal. An obvious concern is that
there is non-random selection into completed foreclosure (versus dismissal); we deal with
this endogeneity and omitted variable bias by instrumenting a completed foreclosure using
the random assignment of foreclosure cases to chancery court case calendars.
For each property that goes through the foreclosure courts, we measure all outcomes
annually within an x-mile radius of the property. We measure outcomes relative to the date
that the case is decided (either the date of the foreclosure auction or the date of the court
action in which the case is dismissed). For case i, let d(i) be the time period in which the
case is decided and Yi,d(i)+t be the outcome for property i measured within an x-mile radius
of the property, t periods from the decision date. In practice, we measure time in terms
of years: d(i) is the year in which case i is decided, d(i) + 1 is the year after the case is
decided, and so on.18 In our baseline specification we use a 0.1-mile radius around each
property, although our results are not sensitive to taking smaller or larger radii (of the same
order of magnitude). We choose this radius both for comparability with existing literature
(e.g., Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011)) and to reduce the extent of observations with
overlapping neighborhoods (see the discussion in the following paragraph). As an example
of how we construct our outcomes, one measure of contagion we consider is the number of
18. We have also tried months and quarters. However, since home sales and foreclosure filings in small
geographic areas are low-frequency events, estimates using these finer units of time end up being low-powered
and imprecise.
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new foreclosure filings within a 0.1-mile radius of each property every year since the case is
decided.
One consequence of using foreclosure cases (rather than mortgages) as the unit of obser-
vation is that the neighborhoods around cases may overlap. Ideally, we would use mortgages
as the unit of observation and relate the probability of each mortgage defaulting to the
number of neighboring foreclosures (instrumented by the expected number of neighboring
foreclosures). However, in our data we only observe mortgages when they have an associ-
ated foreclosure filing; we do not observe mortgages that never enter into the foreclosure
process. With our specification, cases within 2x miles of one another will have overlapping
neighborhoods of observation. The completed foreclosure (versus dismissal) treatment will
be imperfectly assigned—e.g., the neighborhood around a case that is dismissed may overlap
with the neighborhood around a case that ends in completed foreclosure.19 However, our
instrument is still randomly assigned and will not be correlated with neighborhood overlap.
Additionally, the geographic clustering of our standard errors (discussed below) will account
for correlated shocks between observations with overlapping neighborhoods. Finally, we test
the sensitivity of our contagion estimates to this potential overlap by restricting our sample
to cases with no neighboring foreclosures or foreclosure filings within recent years of the
case’s decision (we discuss this exercise in Section 4.5.1).
To achieve our goal of comparing cases filed at the same time that have different outcomes
(owing to the random assignment of case calendars) we include several sets of fixed effects
in our baseline specification. Filing-month fixed effects, Mm(i), where m(i) is the filing
month associated with case i, allow us to compare foreclosure and dismissal among cases
filed at roughly the same time (and, as explained below, we construct our instrument at
19. The extent of overlap is not trivial given the high volume of foreclosure filings in Chicago during the
crisis and the possibility of foreclosure contagion. The median observation in our sample has four neighboring
filings within 0.2 miles in the two years prior to the end of the case and one neighbor within 0.1 miles.
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the filing-month level). However, cases filed in the same month may be decided in different
years. Since we do not want our estimates to be based on the comparison of cases decided
in drastically different times (e.g., the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 versus the peak
of the boom in 2006) we include year-of-observation fixed effects, ψd(i)+t.
20 In our baseline
specification, we also include property-type fixed effects, Φi (single-family home, condo,
etc.), as cases are sorted by property type prior to randomization to case calendar. Finally,
we include a vector of covariates, Xi (loan principal at origination, a dummy variable for
the lender/plaintiff being a “large” plaintiff (six largest plaintiffs each representing ≥ 7000
filings), a dummy variable for the plaintiff having a “large” attorney (three largest attorneys
each representing ≥10,000 cases), whether the census tract has an above-median share of
white residents, a set of dummy variables for the quartile of median census-tract income, and
census tract population density). While these controls improve precision, our estimates are
robust to excluding both the property-type fixed effects and the covariates. The resulting
relationship we estimate is:
Yi,d(i)+t = β0 + β1Fi + βXi +Mm(i) + Φi + ψd(i)+t + ui,d(i)+t (4.1)
where Fi is an indicator for case i ending in foreclosure. Our goal is to estimate β1 from
Specification 4.1 separately for each value of t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} for contagion and t ∈ {0, 1, 2}
for price and sales effects (due to data limitations).
We cluster our standard errors along two dimensions: filing month and census tract
(Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011)). Clustering on filing month captures correlation due
20. One concern is that the length of the case is itself endogenous. We have explored this in several ways:
in Table C.14 we estimate the baseline effects measuring the outcome as of the date that the foreclosure case
is filed (rather than decided). While this leads to somewhat noisier estimates (the treatment is diluted by
cases that have not yet been decided) the results are generally consistent with our baseline estimates. In
Table C.15 of the appendix we add controls for the length of the case and find that our contagion results
hold.
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to macroeconomic trends—cases filed in the same month may experience similar shocks.
Since we also expect correlation between properties that exist in the same geographic area,
we cluster at the census tract level. One issue with multi-way clustering that we occasionally
encounter is invalid negative variance terms (and a non-positive-definite variance matrix).
As suggested in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), we conservatively address this by
taking the maximum of the standard errors clustered only on filing month, clustered only
on census tract, and clustered on filing month and census tract (and the minimum of the
corresponding first-stage F-statistics).
Measuring Local Contagion and Prices
We define two outcomes to test for contagion. Firstly, we consider an indicator for whether
any new foreclosure filing occurs within x miles of property i in year d(i) + t—how does a
completed foreclosure affect the probability of observing any new foreclosure filing? This
outcome is of interest when there are few filings in the neighborhood and speaks to the
question of whether a completed foreclosure influences the general state of nearby mortgages.
However, this measure is of limited interest in neighborhoods or time periods with high
filing rates filing—when all neighborhoods have at least one filing, a completed foreclosure
will have no effect on the probability of any new filing. Secondly, we consider the count of
new foreclosure filings within x miles of property i in year d(i) + t—how does a completed
foreclosure affect the total number of new filings? In both cases, we omit new foreclosure
filings at the same address or associated with the same foreclosure case, but at a different
address (e.g., a loan taken with multiple properties as collateral). We also consider the
effect of a completed foreclosure on the probability of any and total number of neighboring
completed foreclosures.
We also examine the effect of a completed foreclosure on local housing prices, although
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our estimates are hampered by sample size. While important in its own right, understanding
the pecuniary externality associated with completed foreclosure helps assess whether loss of
home equity as a channel of foreclosure contagion. We take the log of the average sale price
of all properties that sell within the x-mile radius of property i in the year of observation
d(i)+t. Importantly, we omit the delinquent property itself to ensure that our price estimates
are not influenced by an own-price discount of foreclosure (as found by Campbell, Giglio,
and Pathak (2011)). This measure does not account for selection into sale—the types of
homes that sell after a completed foreclosure may be different from the types of homes that
sell after a dismissal. This selection may drive any observed price effects. Unfortunately,
a hedonic approach is not possible since we do not observe property characteristics in our
data.
While we cannot estimate selection into sale in terms of the types of homes that sell, we
can observe whether the volume of sales itself changes. For each property going through the
foreclosure process, i, we take as an outcome the count of sales, as of d(i) + t, that have
occurred within x miles of property i since the year of decision, d(i). We omit sales at the
delinquent property i itself to avoid the mechanical effect of foreclosure on sales. A change
in the quantity of sales in response to a completed foreclosure suggests that some sellers (or
buyers) are selecting into or out of the market. At the same time, observing no response of
sales volume does not prove that there is no selection.
To further explore selection into sale, we study the subset of repeat-sales (about 44%
of the sample) in our data to adjust for fixed property characteristics. We estimate the
quality-adjusted home value by netting out property-specific fixed effects—details are in the
appendix. Our estimates of the effect of a completed foreclosure on the log of the mean
quality-adjusted price will not be biased by selection into sales under two assumptions.
Firstly, we assume that there is not differential occurrence of repeat sales around properties
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that end in completed foreclosure vs. dismissal (i.e., no selection into sample). Secondly,
we assume that the property characteristics that determine sale price are not changing dif-
ferentially for properties near a completed foreclosure vs. a dismissal (i.e., the error in the
repeat-sales adjustment is invariant to the case outcome). Our repeat-sales estimates may
suffer from imprecision due to measurement error in the repeat-sales adjusted measure of
home value.
The means of the various outcomes, as displayed in Table C.2, suggest foreclosure con-
tagion and a foreclosure price effect. These averages are constructed using all concluded
cases (with the above-mentioned sample restrictions) observed annually for up to five years
after the case decision for contagion outcomes, and up to two years after for price and sales;
each observation represents a case-year. The means in the upper panel of Table C.2 sug-
gest foreclosure contagion: on average, there are 0.435 fewer new foreclosure filings per year
around properties whose cases are dismissed than properties associated with foreclosures.
There is also evidence that completed foreclosures disrupt the housing market (see the lower
panel): properties that end in foreclosure see a higher volume of neighboring sales (3.099
per year relative to 2.962 near dismissed homes). At the same time, these sales occur at a
lower average price—$157,181.90 vs. $184,212.50—although this difference is not apparent
in the repeat-sales-adjusted price. While these descriptive statistics suggest negative exter-
nalities of home foreclosure, these comparisons of means suffer from omitted variable bias
and endogeneity of home foreclosure.
Instrumental Variables Approach and First Stage Regression
There are several reasons home foreclosures may be endogenous to neighborhood-level char-
acteristics. A completed foreclosure is not a random event—it is the product of the choice of
a borrower to default on a loan, the choice of a lender to pursue a foreclosure, and the actions
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of the associated attorneys and judges. The borrower default decision may be influenced by
local housing prices, the type of mortgage a borrower has, and the borrower’s financial posi-
tion (both in terms of balance sheet, and cash flow). For example, foreclosures may be more
likely to occur in neighborhoods with lower housing price levels and negative price growth
(Campbell and Cocco (2011)). Similarly, the lender’s decision to pursue a foreclosure versus
a loan modification depends on the home value, the probability that the borrower re-defaults
on a modified loan, the probability that the borrower brings him/herself out of delinquency
without a modification, and, if the loan is serviced by a company that is not the creditor,
the potential fees associated with foreclosure (Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008), Levitin
and Twomey (2011)).
Descriptive empirical evidence suggests that observable borrower and neighborhood char-
acteristics are correlated with home foreclosures. Table C.1 shows means for various covari-
ates broken down by case outcome, where the fourth column contains the p-value on the
test of equality between the foreclosure and dismissal. Cases that end in foreclosure are
significantly less likely to be single-family homes (59.0% vs. 68.4%), more likely to have a
plaintiff that is a “large institution” (47.3% vs. 47.2%) or have a plaintiff represented by a
“large attorney” (68.7% vs. 68.2%), are less likely to have a conventional fixed-rate mortgage
(65.3% vs. 66.5%), and tend to be in neighborhoods with lower median income (43,748.26
vs. 46,409.49), a lower share of white residents (43.3% vs. 46.8%), and a lower population
density. While studies have attempted to control for omitted variable bias using very local
fixed effects analyses (see summaries in Foote et al. (2009), Towe and Lawley (2013)), ours
is the first study to directly address the endogeneity of home foreclosure with a randomly
assigned instrument.
We use a measure of the propensity to foreclose for each chancery court case calendar as
an instrument for completed foreclosure. We construct our instrumental variable to capture
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the notion of judicial bias—the judges on some case calendars are more likely to foreclose
than others, all else equal—by taking the “jackknife” or “leave-one-out” foreclosure rate for
each case calendar, as is common in studies that use judicial random assignment as an instru-
mental variable (e.g., Kling (2006), Doyle (2007), Dobbie and Song (2013)). Specifically, for
each case i, filed in month m(i) and randomly assigned to calendar k, we take the foreclosure






where Km(i) is the set of all cases filed in month m(i) and assigned to calendar k, n(Km(i))
is the cardinality of set Km(i), and Fj = 1 if case j ends in a completed foreclosure. A case
calendar with “strict” judges whose cases end often in foreclosure will have a high value of
the instrument, Zi, while a calendar with “lenient” judges will have a low value. By omitting
case i when constructing the instrument, we ensure that we are not regressing the outcome
of the case on itself (resulting in a mechanical correlation in the first stage). Calculating
this instrument at the filing-month level accommodates changing case-calendar rosters and
attitudes of judges over time.21 Failing to account for these changes may violate monotonicity
of the instrument.
Our first-stage regression relates an indicator for a case ending in foreclosure to our
measure of case-calendar strictness. For each case, we regress an indicator for the case ending
in foreclosure (Fi) on the instrument. As with the second stage described in Specification
4.1, we include filing month fixed effects, Mm(i), property-type fixed effects, Φi and year of
observation fixed effects (Ψd(i)+t). The resulting first-stage regression is:
21. For example, we see in Figure C.1 that the foreclosure rate changes over time.
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Fi = α0 + α1Zi + αXi +Mm(i) + Φi + Ψd(i)+t + vi (4.3)
We rely on the usual instrumental variables assumptions: the instrument influences the
outcome of the foreclosure case (instrument relevance), the instrument is randomly assigned
(instrument exogeneity), the instrument does not itself influence neighborhood outcomes
except through foreclosure of the house in question (exclusion restriction), and an increase
in the instrument is associated with an increase in the probability of the case ending in
foreclosure (monotonicity). We check the instrument relevance by examining the first-stage
F-statistic for all of our regressions (presented in the Tables discussed in subsequent sections)
and find a strong relationship between the instrument and completed foreclosure (Table C.13
in the Appendix presents the coefficients from the baseline first-stage relationship: a one
percentage-point increase in the case-calendar foreclosure rate increases the probability of a
completed foreclosure by 0.556 percentage points).
If the rules of the Chancery Court are followed, then the instrument should be randomly
assigned and appear independent of case characteristics. We run two sets of regressions to
check the assumption that the instrument, Zi, is exogenous. First, we regress Zi on a set of
pre-treatment covariates (controlling for property type and filing month):
Zi = γ0 + γXi +Mm(i) + Φi + ei (4.4)
where Zi is the instrument, Xi is a vector of fixed or pre-treatment property and case
characteristics, and Mm(i) and Φi are filing month and property type fixed effects. Random
assignment (conditional on filing month and property type) implies that none of the covari-
ates predict the value of the instrument (H0 : γi = 0) and nor do they jointly determine
the value of the instrument (H0 : γ1 = γ2 = ... = γk = 0). Second, we regress each of these
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covariates on a full vector of case calendar dummies:
Xji = ρ0 +
∑
k
ρkκki +Mm(i) + Φi + ui (4.5)
where Xji is a given pre-treatment characteristic j observed for case i, and κki is a vector
of calendar-specific dummy variables such that κki = 1 if case i is assigned to calendar k.
We then test the joint significance of these dummy variables: H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = ... = ρk = 0 .
The first column of Table C.3 presents the coefficient estimates from Specification 4.4
and the p-value for the joint significance test of the covariates. We see no evidence of
systematic correlation between pre-treatment covariates and the instrument, and cannot
reject the hypothesis that the covariates are jointly insignificant. The second column displays
the p-value for the joint significance test of case calendar dummies for Specification 4.5,
where the outcome variable is given by the row. Again, there is no systematic relationship
between case calendar assignment and pre-treatment covariates, with the exception of loan
principal.22 Importantly, we see no relationship between the instrument and total filings and
total completed foreclosures (our two main contagion outcomes) in the year prior to the case
being filed. We conclude that, conditional on filing month and property type, case calendars
are randomly assigned.
The assumption that the instrument does not itself influence neighborhood-level outcomes
is reasonable. The outcomes we are studying are the result of the decisions of those not
involved in the court case (e.g., neighboring home owners). Moreover, while foreclosure
cases span many months, defendants will have minimal direct contact with the presiding
judges.
22. Given that we are conducting 19 significance tests in this table, we would expect to observe significance
at the 5% level about once (or 0.95 times). Moreover, the relationship between loan principal and the
instrument is economically small: a one percentage-point increase in the case-calendar-specific foreclosure
rate is associated with a drop of 0.0045 standard deviations in the instrument.
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Finally, we find no evidence of a failure of monotonicity. The assumption maintains that
a higher value of the instrument—i.e., being assigned to a stricter case calendar—weakly
increases the probability of foreclosure for all cases. One can imagine a prejudiced judge
who is lenient toward delinquent wealthy borrowers, for example, but push for foreclosure
against defendants of lower social class. Then if there are disproportionately more of one
type of borrower, a higher value of the instrument will not mean a higher probability of
foreclosure for all cases. We explore this possibility by relating group-level foreclosure rates
(e.g., foreclosure rate among cases in predominantly white vs. non-white census tracts)
within each case calendar to the overall foreclosure rate for each calendar and find that
foreclosure rates for sub-groups are all increasing with the overall case calendar foreclosure
rate. A discussion of these results can be found in the appendix.23
Interpretation of the Two-Stage Least Squares Estimate
Our estimate captures the local average treatment effect (LATE) for foreclosure cases in
which judges are influential, compounds the effect of all subsequent completed foreclosures
caused by the initial foreclosure, and is representative of neighborhoods with many foreclo-
sure filings. The estimate does not represent the effect of a completed foreclosure relative to
a mortgage that is in good standing; rather, the estimate represents the effect of a completed
foreclosure relative to the effect of a foreclosure case being dismissed. We argue that this
parameter is of interest to policy makers.
Firstly, as discussed in Doyle (2007), if there are heterogeneous treatment effects the pa-
rameter identified by a judicial random assignment instrumental variable (or in Doyle’s case,
23. As suggested by Mueller-Smith (2013), we have also estimated our baseline specification by construct-
ing the instrument separately for various sub-groups. If monotonicity is violated, then these results may
differ substantially. While we do not see a substantial difference in our baseline results (see Table C.16
in the Appendix), these “monotonicity-robust” estimates are imprecise; as splitting the data into filing-
month/characteristics cells often yields few observations per cell.
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rotationally assigned case workers) is the LATE for “marginal” cases—those where the judge
is likely to have an influence. Intuitively, there are cases that will always end in foreclosure
and cases that will always end in dismissal; the set of “compliers” with our instrument are
the marginal cases where the judges on the case calendar have influence on the outcome.24
We find that the characteristics of the sub-population of loans that comply with our in-
strument are consistent with cases on the margin of foreclosure or dismissal, representing
individuals who have a higher ability to pay than the typical delinquent borrower, but are
facing difficult circumstances that could be mitigated through loan modification. We stratify
the sample along several margins: tract-level quartile of income (from the 2000 Decennial
Census), whether the loan is from a “large” lender, whether the mortgage is conventional,
whether the zip code experiences positive price growth in the year that the case is filed, and
a proxy for whether the property is worth less than the loan (“underwater”).25 Our goal is to
proxy characteristics of borrowers who are likely to benefit from loan modification; creditors
may be more willing to modify in such situations (Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009)),
making them more responsive to judicial input. For each sub-sample, G, we estimate the
first-stage:
Fi = α0 + α1GZi + αXi +Mm(i) + Φi + Ψd(i)+t + vi ∀i ∈ G (4.6)
We then take the ratio of the estimate of the first-stage relationship for group G to the
estimate for the full sample from Specification 4.3: ˆα1G
α̂1
. As described by Angrist and Pischke
24. We can conceive of situations where judges will not matter. Sophisticated borrowers may always be
able to renegotiate the terms of their mortgages (and a dismissal of the case), regardless of who the judge
is. Other borrowers may resign themselves to walking away from their home and mortgage and choose not
to appear in court at all.
25. We define a proxy for a borrower being underwater as whether or not the outstanding debt at filing is
larger than the initial loan principal.
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(2008), the ratio of the sub-group-specific first stage to the full-sample first stage represents
the relative likelihood that a complier belongs to the given subgroup.
We interpret our estimates of these ratios, presented in Table C.4, as demonstrating that
compliant cases are likely to be on the margin of completed foreclosure. The upper panel
shows that compliers are more likely to be in the upper two quartiles of income than the
general population of foreclosure cases. Taking income as a measure of a borrower’s ability
to repay their loan, these estimates suggest that compliers are more likely than the typical
borrower to be able to resume payments if the case is dismissed.
At the same time, the compliant sub-population may benefit from a mortgage modifi-
cation. Compliant borrowers are less likely to be in a zip code with positive price growth.
Falling house prices may be largely responsible for the default crisis (Mayer, Pence, and
Sherlund (2009)): borrowers may be in default because they expect to lose money on their
mortgages as housing prices fall and the value of the asset drops below the cost of the debt.
A modification reducing the loan principal or the interest rate may reduce the anticipated
loss, making default and foreclosure less appealing. At the same time, compliant borrowers
are not in dire straits—they are less likely to be underwater on their loans, so a modification
may be more effective (home value is not so low that the mortgage is a lost cause) and may
result in smaller losses to lenders than modification of more severely underwater loans. Ad-
ditionally, compliers are less likely to have conventional loans. There is some suspicion that
unconventional mortgages are responsible for many defaults during the crisis. For example,
borrowers with low “teaser” interest rates or balloon payments may have been expecting
to refinance their loans to avoid higher monthly payments, but found themselves without
this option during the financial crisis. In such cases, a modification may be particularly
effective (by mimicking the effect of a refinance).26 Finally, it is interesting to note that the
26. At the same time, there is debate about the importance of unconventional loans in the default decision
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differential characteristics of the compliant population appear borrower specific—compliers
are no more or less likely to have a loan from a “large” lender.
Secondly, our LATE estimate does not simply identify the effect of a single completed
foreclosure, but compounds the effects of all subsequent induced foreclosures. If foreclosures
are contagious, then a completed foreclosure will lead to subsequent foreclosure filings. In
turn, some of these filings will become completed foreclosures and themselves cause new
filings. Since our empirical strategy compares the neighborhoods around cases in the fore-
closure courts each year after the case is decided and does not control for the effects of
subsequent foreclosures, our estimates will compound the effects of these subsequent foreclo-
sures. We believe that this parameter is relevant to policy makers since it represents broad
consequences of the marginal foreclosure, although is imperfect, as the 0.1 mile radius will
only partially capture the effect of successive foreclosures.
Similarly, if there is foreclosure contagion, our LATE represents neighborhoods with
several completed foreclosures. There is selection into our sample: we only observe neigh-
borhoods around properties going through the foreclosure courts. If completed foreclosures
induce subsequent filings resulting in additional observations in our data, neighborhoods with
previous completed foreclosures will be over-represented in our sample. This does not affect
the validity of the instrument—case calendars are still randomly assigned—but influences
the interpretation of the LATE. Nonetheless, we find that our contagion estimates persist
when we restrict the sample to properties with no foreclosures in the past two years within
0.1 miles.
Finally, our estimates are conditional upon a foreclosure filing having occurred in the
neighborhood. Our empirical strategy and data set necessarily rely on comparing neigh-
borhoods around properties that are already going through the foreclosure process. Our
(c.f., Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009)), so this channel may be less relevant.
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estimates will not account for any externalities associated with a borrower default or a fore-
closure filing. Many have argued that it is a completed foreclosure and subsequent real-estate
ownership of the associated property that drives foreclosure-related externalities. While we
cannot speak to any spillovers from borrower default, our estimates provide a well-identified
answer to whether there are negative spillovers associated with the completed foreclosure
itself.
The LATE represented by our estimates is a relevant parameter for the policy question of
how best to address the problems of delinquent borrowers. Policymakers concerned with fore-
closures can focus on several stages of the lending process: how easy it is to originate/obtain
mortgages, how to prevent borrowers from defaulting, and what to do once a borrower has
defaulted. Our parameter, which is estimated conditional on foreclosure filing, focuses di-
rectly on the latter question.27 Moreover, the LATE is relevant for cases on the margin of
foreclosure and dismissal, and who are influenced by foreclosure court judges. These cases
are also likely to be influenced by policies discouraging foreclosure on delinquent loans.
4.5 Neighborhood-Level Effects of Completed Foreclo-
sure
We find robust evidence of foreclosure contagion that persists over several years. Neighbor-
hoods around a completed foreclosure are 10% more likely to have at least one foreclosure
filing in a given year relative to neighborhoods around a dismissed property and experience
around 0.5 to 0.7 more total filings per year. We also find that residential properties that
27. Of course, the usual partial-equilibrium caveat applies: any change to foreclosure policy may affect
ex-ante incentives (e.g., Mayer et al. (2011)) and housing market outcomes (e.g., Pence (2006)), which are
not captured in our reduced-form estimates.
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transact around completed foreclosures do so at a price discount (on the order of 30–40%),
although this effect may be largely explained by negative selection into sale.
4.5.1 Contagion in Foreclosure Filings
Our estimates demonstrate that completed foreclosures are contagious. Table C.5 presents
our baseline 2SLS estimates of the effect of a completed foreclosure on the probability of
observing any neighboring foreclosure filing in a year and on the annual count of neighboring
foreclosure filings within 0.1 miles of the at-risk property. The 2SLS estimates show that a
completed foreclosure increases the probability of observing any new filing within 0.1 miles
by 0.052 percentage points in the year of the decision (a 7.4% increase in the mean for
all dismissed cases). This effect increases over time to 8.2 percentage points (11.7%) in the
second year after the decision, 9.0 percentage points (12.8%) in the third, and 24.7 percentage
points (35%) in the fourth year out. Similarly, the 2SLS estimates show that a completed
foreclosure causes 0.54 to 0.70 new foreclosure filings per year in the year the case is decided
and the following three years. This contagion represents a 25–32% increase in total annual
filings relative to an average of 2.161 filings per year around dismissed properties. Note that
the instrument is strong in the year of the decision through the second year after the decision
(F-stats around 200), although is relatively weak three, four and five years out owing to the
smaller sample for these periods.
Our contagion estimates are generally not sensitive to the specification, sample, or ge-
ographic measurement of the outcome. The results are robust to excluding the covariates,
omitting the property fixed effects, dropping cases decided in the summer months (the court
automatically dismisses inactive cases during this time), using a monotonicity-robust instru-
mental variable, using the full sample and including the foreclosure moratorium, omitting
each filing year one by one, and dropping neighborhood-years with foreclosure filings above
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the 99th percentile (see Tables C.16, C.17, C.18, and C.19 in the Appendix). We also esti-
mate our baseline results measuring outcomes within 0.25 miles of the delinquent property
and find that contagion (and price effects, discussed below) persist—See Table C.20.28 Fi-
nally, we confirm that our estimates are driven by dismissals where the defendant retains
possession of the property (rather than deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure or short sales). We esti-
mate our baseline results on the sample of cases in which the plaintiff identifies that there
are additional liens against the property. Although less precise, the point-estimates for this
sample are comparable to the full-sample estimates and are not significantly different (see
Table C.21 in the Appendix).
We further explore the validity of our estimates by applying the same 2SLS procedure
to our contagion outcomes measured in the three years prior to the case being filed. If our
instrumental variable is truly randomly assigned, we should not expect to see any effect of a
case ending in foreclosure before the case has even started. We present these “pre-treatment”
estimates in Table C.7. Reassuringly, when instrumented by case calendar leniency, a case
ending in foreclosure appears to have no relationship to local housing prices prior to the start
of the case—the point estimates are close to zero and generally insignificant.
We examine the cumulative effect of a completed foreclosure in order to appreciate the full
extent of contagion. Rather than using as an outcome the number of new foreclosure filings
per year for each year since the decision, we instead consider the total number of new filings
28. The estimates for price generally decline as we increase the radius. We find minimal effect for any new
foreclosure filing—this is due to the fact most cases have at least one new filing per year within this expanded
radius (and so there is little variation in the outcome). On the other hand, the effects for total filings tend
to be larger. There are two explanations for this. First, as the radius expands, the compounding effect of
neighboring completed foreclosures (induced by the initial observation) grows—the larger radius allows for
capturing more of the neighborhood around neighboring foreclosures. Second, as the radius grows the total
base number of properties that might file for foreclosure grows. Increasing the radius 2.5 times increases
the area of the neighborhood 6.25 times, thus dramatically increasing the potential number of properties
that may be affected by the completed foreclosure. However, the estimates themselves only grow by a factor
between about 2 and 4, suggesting that the effect declines with distance.
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since the decision. These estimates are presented in the second panel of Table C.5 and show
that a completed foreclosure leads to a significant divergence in foreclosure filings relative to
a dismissal. As noted above, in the year of the decision a completed foreclosure causes 0.691
new filings. However, neighborhoods around completed foreclosures have experienced 2.09
more foreclosure filings by the second year after the decision, and 6.45 more filings by the
fourth year after the case ends. One completed foreclosure may have a substantial impact
on the composition of a neighborhood, at least in the short and medium term.
One concern with our findings is that they are specific to neighborhoods that are experi-
encing a wave of foreclosures. Firstly, our period of study (2004–2011) is largely made up of
the housing crisis. Secondly, since we only observe neighborhoods where a foreclosure filing
has occurred, and since we do find that foreclosures are contagious, there is likely selection
into our sample—foreclosure filings (and, thus, observations in our data) are likely to be in
neighborhoods with recent completed foreclosures. From a policy perspective, it is especially
important to understand the cumulative impact of the first foreclosure in a neighborhood.
A completed foreclosure is contagious even in a neighborhood that has not experienced
a foreclosure in recent years. We restrict our sample to cases where there have been no
completed foreclosures within 0.1 miles in the two years prior to the decision (the results are
similar if we restrict to cases with no filings within two years) and estimate the cumulative
contagion effect of a completed foreclosure, presented at the bottom of the second panel
of Table C.5. We find clear evidence that completed foreclosures are contagious even in
neighborhoods with no other recent completed foreclosures, although these results are less
precise than when we use the full sample owing to a smaller sample size: a completed
foreclosure leads to 1.3 more filings by the end of the first year after the decision, and almost
four more filings by the third year out. Even the first completed foreclosure in a neighborhood
has externalities. Moreover, these results suggest that the contagion we observe is not an
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artifact of selection into the sample (cases induced into the sample because of neighboring
prior completed foreclosures).
Similarly, these results suggest that overlapping treatment and control neighborhoods
(i.e., properties around a case that ends in dismissal may also be within the neighborhood
of a case that ends in foreclosure) is not a serious problem with our baseline estimates. No
new filings within 0.1 miles in the past two years reduces the potential for such overlapping
neighborhoods. That contagion persists in these neighborhoods is reassuring. Of course, this
is an imperfect test: cases that have no new filings within 0.1 miles in the past two years
have a median of 1 new filing per year within 0.2 miles (whose 0.1 mile radius neighborhood
will overlap). However, the extent of overlap for such cases is not too large. For example, the
overlapping region of a case that is 0.15 miles away represents 14.4% of the total neighborhood
area. When we restrict the sample to cases with no new filings within 0.2 miles in the past
two years, thus eliminating all potential for overlap, we suffer from small sample size. The
(unreported) point estimates still suggest foreclosure contagion (around 0.6 new filings per
year in the first three years), but the estimates are very imprecise.29
Finally, we find that contagion is strongest during the peak of the housing bubble and
beginning of the crash, and disappears at the height of the foreclosure crisis. We estimate
the baseline specification restricting the data to a constant sample of cases for which we
observe a full three years after the decision.30 We present estimates for the constant sample
29. An additional concern relates to the length of cases—as seen in Table C.1, cases ending in dismissal are
significantly shorter than cases that end in completed foreclosure. A possible explanation is that foreclosure
externalities are driven by borrower behavior while in default, and the effect is larger for cases ending in
completed foreclosure since these cases are longer. To rule out this explanation, we estimate our baseline
2SLS estimates, adding flexible controls for the length of the case. We try three different sets of controls—log
of the number of months, a quadratic in number of months, and dummy variables for the number of quarters
of length—and present these results in Table C.15 in the Appendix. These estimates show contagion effects
that are comparable to our baseline estimates, although the addition of these length-of-case controls reduces
the precision of the estimates.
30. This also addresses the issue of interpretation with the baseline estimates in the top panel of Table C.5
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(cases decided in 2004 through 2008 and observed for three years after the decision) in Table
C.6. These estimates show strong evidence of contagion—a completed foreclosure increases
the probability of any neighboring filing by between 6 and 17 percentage points. Similarly, a
completed foreclosure during this period increases the total number of new filings by 1.2 in
the year of the decision, increasing to 1.6 the year after, and dropping down to 1.1 and 0.7
new filings in the subsequent two years. Interestingly, contagion is stronger for this sample
than for the baseline sample. In the bottom panel of Table C.6 we present estimates of
contagion for the complementary sample—cases decided in 2009 through 2011, which we
observe for two or fewer years after the decision. There is little evidence of contagion during
this time period; the point estimates are very small (-0.018 to 0.027 for any filing, 0.099 to
0.239 for new filings). It is not surprising that during this period of heightened foreclosure
activity we find no effect on any new filing per year—if most neighborhoods are already
experiencing a foreclosure filing (regardless of neighboring foreclosure cases), then there will
be little movement in this outcome. However, the fact that we find no effect of a completed
foreclosure on the total number of new filings suggests that foreclosure contagion is not a
strong force during this time period.
We interpret this finding of differential contagion by time period as evidence that fore-
closure contagion acts on marginal borrowers—those on the threshold of being able to stay
in their homes. In particular, at the peak of the housing bubble and beginning of the bust,
it may be that a completed foreclosure sends a stronger signal to mortgage holders at risk
of default—for example, a signal about the future of the neighborhood and local property
values or conveys information about the foreclosure process. Conversely, during the height
of the crisis (2009–2011) it may be that mortgage holders are already well informed about
that the sample changes each year (e.g., for cases decided in 2010, we only observe the year of decision and
one year out).
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the state of their mortgages and the foreclosure process itself. Indeed, neighborhoods in the
latter period experienced 16% more filings in the year the case is decided than in the earlier
period. Similarly, in Section C.4 of the Appendix, we extend our empirical method to relate
counts of new filings to lagged counts of completed foreclosures for small neighborhoods. We
find a smaller, although non-zero, contagion effect in the latter period, and also find evidence
that the marginal contagion effect of a completed foreclosure diminishes as a neighborhood
experiences more foreclosures.
4.5.2 Contagion in Completed Foreclosures
To better understand the costs of foreclosure contagion, we look for contagion in completed
foreclosures. Above, we established contagion in foreclosure filings—the result of new bor-
rower defaults and lenders pursuing foreclosure action (we take up the discussion of these
two actions in more depth in Section 4.6). However, if we do not see contagion in com-
pleted foreclosures, then contagion in filings is unlikely to be a large contributor to the
spread of a foreclosure crisis. Moreover, the costs of new filings that end in dismissal are,
perhaps, smaller than the costs of new completed foreclosures (for example, owing to pecu-
niary externalities of completed foreclosure, moving costs associated with the displacement
of homeowners, etc.).31
We find contagion in completed foreclosures. We estimate the baseline contagion IV re-
gressions replacing the outcomes with an indicator for any neighboring completed foreclosure
31. One difficulty in studying contagion in completed foreclosures is that the response may be driven by
judges. While this is not an issue when studying contagion in foreclosure filings—an event that depends
only on the actions of the borrower and lender—judges have an influence over the outcome of a foreclosure
case. We cannot explicitly rule out judge behavior as driving contagion in completed foreclosures. However,
we do not expect judge contagion to be a dominant force—this would require judges to be well informed
about recent events in the neighborhoods around the delinquent properties associated with their cases,
which we find unlikely given the volume of cases and judicial random assignment (judges do not specialize
in neighborhoods).
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(within 0.1 miles of the property in the given year since the case is decided) and the count of
completed foreclosures. We present these estimates in Table C.8 and find that a completed
foreclosure moderately increases the probability of observing any neighboring completed fore-
closure (by 13.8 percentage points three-years out). Moreover, there is a notable increase in
the number of neighboring completed foreclosures: one completed foreclosure causes between
0.28 and 0.56 additional completed foreclosures annually (or between 40 and 93 percent off of
the mean). Thus, contagion appears to play an important role in the spread of foreclosures;
mitigating completed foreclosures may reduce the depth and costs of a housing crisis.
The timing of contagion in completed foreclosures suggests that borrowers and/or lenders
who are already involved in the foreclosure process respond to nearby events. Given how
long the foreclosure process takes—from default to filing to completed court case—it may
seem strange that we find contagion in completed foreclosures in the year of the decision.
However, borrowers and lenders may respond at any stage of the foreclosure process. For
example, a neighboring completed foreclosure may influence the effort a borrower puts into
fighting an ongoing foreclosure case by conveying information about the costs of fighting
foreclosure or the probability of a successful loan modification.32
Indeed, we find that completed foreclosures influence cases that are ongoing. For each
case, i, we split neighboring completed foreclosures into two groups: completed foreclosures
among cases filed before case i is decided and cases filed after case i is decided. By focusing
on the former group, we can observe how the outcome of case i influences ongoing foreclosure
cases. We define as an outcome the count of completed foreclosures among cases filed before
the decision (and an indicator for any completed foreclosure in this group as another outcome)
32. Of course, this need not be a question of effort—given a binary choice (with no effort necessary) between
keeping their home and walking away, delinquent borrowers may be swayed toward the latter by neighboring
completed foreclosures (e.g., the neighboring event reduces the borrower’s perception of the value of the
neighborhood).
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and estimate our contagion model—the results are presented in the lower panel of Table
C.8.33 The estimates show that a completed foreclosure causes 0.11 to 0.60 new completed
foreclosures per year among cases that were filed before the decision in the first two years
after the decision (these cases drive the contagion in the first two years, during which there is
minimal contagion among newly filed cases). These results provide evidence that contagion
acts not only through influencing the behavior of borrowers and lenders before filing (e.g.,
encouraging borrower default), but also by changing how borrowers/lenders approach an
ongoing foreclosure case.
4.5.3 Housing Markets
Our baseline 2SLS estimates, presented in the first panel of Table C.9, suggest that a com-
pleted foreclosure lowers the average neighboring sale price over several years. The columns
of Table C.9 present the baseline price and sales effects for the year in which the case is
decided, and one and two years after. The estimates suggest that a completed foreclosure
depresses neighboring residential sale prices by 12.7% in the year of the foreclosure, 41.1% in
the year after and 35.8% two years out.34 However, the precision of these estimates suffers
from a smaller sample size than our contagion results (we only observe housing sales through
33. We present similar estimates for the complementary sample—completed foreclosures among cases filed
after case i is decided—in Table C.22 of the Appendix. These estimates (in the upper panel) show a negative
effect of a completed foreclosure on neighboring completed foreclosures for the year of decision and the year
after, with a positive effect by the 2nd year out. However, the negative effect is not a result of more cases being
dismissed—estimates in the lower panel show no (or sometimes negative) effect of a completed foreclosure on
neighboring dismissals for this sample. Thus, it appears that the negative estimate for completed foreclosures
is a result of cases taking longer to be decided after a neighboring completed foreclosure, perhaps because
those cases that are induced into filing by the neighboring foreclosure are different in some sense (e.g., more
complicated, borrower puts up a stronger defense, etc.).
34. That the effect becomes more pronounced one year out is consistent with the theory that foreclosures
lower neighboring prices through a disamenity effect, and with existing studies that find that the housing-
price effects of foreclosure are driven by the supply-effect of the property being listed, keeping in mind that
banks generally do not list foreclosed properties on the market immediately.
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June 2008 and only observe prices when a home sells): they are only significant in the year
after the decision and the first-stage F-statistics are around 20. Nonetheless, these estimates
are not sensitive to the same robustness checks described in Section 4.5.1 (see Tables C.17,
C.23, and C.24 in the appendix). Similarly, we see no pre-filing relationship between local
housing prices and the eventual outcomes of the cases (see Table C.7).
Our 2SLS estimates show suggestive evidence that a completed foreclosure influences the
volume of residential housing transactions in a neighborhood. The point estimates of the
effect of a completed foreclosure on the cumulative number of neighboring residential sales
since the case decision shows a large increasing trend—while this effect is not statistically
significant, it appears as though a completed foreclosure may induce additional home sales.
Keep in mind that we omit sales of the delinquent home itself from the count of sales—this is
not a mechanical increase in sales due to foreclosure auctions and REO sales. This increase
in number of sales raises the question of whether the drop in sale price after a completed
foreclosure is caused by selection into sale of lower quality (and thus, lower price) homes
or a drop in the value of neighboring properties (conditional on quality). In particular, if
this drive to sell in response to a completed foreclosure is stronger among those with lower-
quality houses (for example, because they are in a more precarious financial situation), then
we would expect a decline in average neighboring sale price.
Our repeat-sales-adjusted price results suggest that there is negative selection into resi-
dential sales after a completed foreclosure, which may explain much of the negative sale-price
effect associated with completed foreclosure. As explained in Section 4.3, we use a repeat-
sales methodology to adjust reported sale prices for property quality. We then estimate the
effect of a completed foreclosure on the log of the average neighboring quality-adjusted sale
price. The point estimates of the effect of home foreclosure on the log of the mean repeat-
sales adjusted price tend to be small: 0.059 in the year of the decision, 0.003 the following
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year, and are not significantly different from zero; controlling for property quality yields
smaller price effects of completed foreclosure.35 By pooling the unadjusted (i.e., baseline)
and repeat-sales-adjusted price regressions (allowing all fixed effects to vary by group) and
testing the cross-equation restriction that the effects of completed foreclosure are different
(i.e., H0 : βraw prices = βrepeat sales), we find that the treatment effects for adjusted prices are
significantly smaller (in absolute value) than for the unadjusted prices in the year after the
decision (p-values for this test are presented in the adjusted-price panel of Table C.9). We
examine the relationship between completed foreclosure and quality more explicitly by using
as an outcome the log of the mean price at previous sale (adjusted for year-of-sale effects) for
all neighboring repeat sales observed in the given year. If completed foreclosures induce more
low-quality properties to sell, we would expect these properties to have sold at a lower price
in the past. We find a large negative, although insignificant, effect of completed foreclosure
on the price at previous sale (see the bottom of Table C.9).
We conclude that there is negative selection into sale—when a neighboring foreclosure
occurs, the properties that do sell tend to be of a lower quality. The difference between
our repeat-sale adjusted and unadjusted baseline sale price estimates, along with the earlier
estimates that suggest an increase in sales volume after a completed foreclosure, suggest
that lower-quality homes are more likely to transact after a completed foreclosure. This may
be the case if owners of lower quality homes in a neighborhood are those who have lower
income or wealth. Given a signal that the neighborhood is declining (i.e., a neighboring
completed foreclosure), these owners may be eager to sell before the neighborhood “falls
apart” in order to avoid the liquidity shock, both from the difficulty of selling an underwater
35. In Table C.25 in the appendix, we confirm that the difference between the baseline and repeat-sales
adjusted estimates is not driven by a selected sample of repeat sales. We estimate the baseline price effects
for two measures of neighboring unadjusted price: mean log sale price for all non-repeat sales, and mean log
(unadjusted) sale price for all repeat sales. In both cases, the point estimates are comparable to the baseline
price effects—large and negative—although the smaller sample size reduces precision.
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property and the inability to borrow against an underwater home. Of course, we cannot
conclude that all foreclosure-related pecuniary externalities are driven by this selection into
sale. Existing studies of foreclosure-price externalities (e.g., Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak
2011) find estimates one order of magnitude smaller than our own, and, although our quality-
adjusted point estimates are generally zero or positive, given the imprecision of our estimates,
we cannot rule out that there are negative effects of completed foreclosure on the quality-
adjusted value of neighboring properties.
4.6 Evidence of Contagion Mechanisms
While our reduced-form estimates provide clear evidence of contagion, interpreting the causes
of contagion is difficult since a foreclosure filing is the result of a joint decision of the borrower,
who defaults on his/her loan, and a lender or servicer that chooses to pursue foreclosure on
the borrower’s home. Both parties may be influenced by a neighboring completed foreclosure,
which may lower the value of the asset and alter the incentives for the borrower to repay
and the lender to file for foreclosure. We study heterogeneity in the treatment effect of
foreclosures—across loan types, lender identity, and market conditions—to gain insight into
the importance of borrower and lender behavior.
4.6.1 Distinguishing Borrower and Lender Response
Our goal is to distinguish whether contagion is driven by borrowers or by lenders. We
argue that lenders would exhibit no response to a local completed foreclosure or even anti-
contagion—fewer foreclosure filings in response to a completed foreclosure. This provides a
weak test for the presence of borrower-driven contagion. We then explicitly test for borrower-
driven contagion by examining contagion among loans from lenders known for automation of
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foreclosure proceedings (who are, thus, unlikely to respond to very local market conditions).
Lenders and mortgage servicers—third parties who are paid by creditors to collect mort-
gage payments and manage defaults—have three options when dealing with a delinquent
borrower: do nothing, pursue foreclosure, or renegotiate the loan. Through foreclosure,
lenders acquire the mortgaged property and gain the benefit of the value of the property
(servicers collect fees for managing the foreclosure). Lenders or servicers may instead modify
the terms of a mortgage with the goal of making the payments more affordable—e.g., by
reducing the principal or interest rate on a loan. The benefit of modification is ensuring
that loan payments continue, at the cost of a lower lifetime value of repayment. Finally,
when faced with a borrower who is not making payments, a lender or servicer can always
do nothing, although this is generally not optimal.36 Existing empirical studies have found
that mortgage modification is uncommon (Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009), Ding, Quer-
cia, and White (2009)). There are several (non-exclusive) explanations for why lenders and
servicers prefer foreclosure to modification: borrowers may redefault on a modified loan
(Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009)); frequent modification encourages strategic default
among borrowers who can pay, but would benefit from modification (Foote, Gerardi, and
Willen (2008)); foreclosing and purchasing the property at auction allows creditors to delay
recognizing a loss on their balance sheets; modification requires coordination and agreement
among all creditors (e.g., multiple holders of a mortgage-backed security or a second lien on
the property), some of whom may need to accept a loss (Gelpern and Levitin (2009)).
These incentives to file for foreclosure against delinquent borrowers are unlikely to respond
to neighboring completed foreclosures (unless borrowers themselves change their behavior),
36. Inaction may be a good strategy if renegotiation and foreclosure are costly to the lender and if there
is a high probability that the default will “self cure”—i.e., the borrower will resume making payments.
Additionally, accounting rules adopted in April 2009 allow creditors to keep a delinquent loan at face value
on balance sheets if there is a reasonable chance that the loan may be repaid.
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making lender-driven contagion unlikely. In the Appendix, we adapt the simple framework
of Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) and Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) to explore
how the lender’s incentive to modify or foreclose might change with a neighboring completed
foreclosure. Intuitively, suppose that a completed foreclosure does not influence the behavior
of neighboring borrowers (i.e., no borrower-driven contagion), but lowers neighboring home
values.37 A lender would be weakly less inclined to foreclose since the collateral is worth
less relative to the value of the modified loan, although the lender may still foreclose for the
reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph. Moreover, mortgage servicers are not likely
to respond to a neighboring foreclosure at all. Servicer compensation in foreclosure depends
on fees incurred during the foreclosure process and not on the value of the home itself—
servicers are indifferent to the value of the collateral. On the other hand, since servicer
compensation on a loan in good standing is typically a function of the monthly payments
collected, modifying a mortgage entails lower future payments to the servicer and servicers
do not typically recover fees for modifying a loan. Thus, when faced with a delinquent loan,
pursuing foreclosure is generally more valuable to servicers, and the decision to take this
action is orthogonal to the value of the property. This is consistent with the discussion
of Levitin and Twomey (2011) who note that servicers have no stake in the value of the
property under consideration, and will take the action that maximizes the fees they collect,
which is typically foreclosure.38 In summary, under the assumption that borrowers do not
37. If a completed foreclosure has no influence on neighboring home prices and if we maintain the as-
sumption that borrowers are unresponsive to a completed foreclosure, then lenders and servicers should not
respond—the conditions of the neighboring loans are unchanged.
38. Levitin and Twomey (2011) also point out that, although foreclosure is preferable to modification from
the servicer’s perspective, there is incentive to delay the foreclosure process. Servicers must forward missed
mortgage payments to the creditor and are repaid when the borrower resumes payment or the property is
sold at foreclosure auction. However, servicers charge late fees that are paid when payments resume or the
foreclosure occurs. Levitin and Twomey (2011) show that servicers can benefit by waiting several months to
accrue late fees before beginning the foreclosure process. Since this wait period is unlikely to be influenced
by a neighboring completed foreclosure, it does not relate to contagion.
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respond to completed foreclosures, a neighboring completed home foreclosure should (weakly)
discourage foreclosure filings—the collateral is less valuable to the lender and servicers are
indifferent to home value.
The above-outlined servicer and lender incentives provide a simple test for the hypothesis
of no borrower-driven contagion, which we reject. Specifically, this null hypothesis can be
rejected if we observe positive contagion (since lenders would display weak anti-contagion).
That we observe contagion in Table C.5 suggests that borrowers respond. Note, that while
this confirms the presence of borrower contagion, this does not rule out lender response—
when borrower default probabilities are changing, lender response is ambiguous.
To further establish that contagion is driven primarily by borrowers, we study contagion
among loans held by lenders and servicers who are known to have automated foreclosure
filing processes. We identify foreclosure filings by all lenders/servicers investigated in the
Independent Foreclosure Review Settlement conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.39 We then redefine
our contagion outcomes in terms of new foreclosure filings among automating lenders only
and re-estimate our baseline 2SLS contagion models. The new outcomes are: the count of
new foreclosure filings among automating lenders and an indicator for any new foreclosure
filing from these lenders. Because this restriction reduces our power—we are studying filings
among a subset of lenders, which are lower frequency events—we pool all post-decision years
(d(i) + t where t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) and restrict the contagion effect to be constant across
39. Throughout the mid- and late-2000s, many lenders and servicers adopted automated foreclosure filing
procedures (Levitin and Twomey (2011)). In many cases the delinquent borrower’s situation and background
were not given close consideration. As investigations have revealed, employees of several large mortgage
servicers and financial institutions falsely testified that they had personally inspected delinquent borrowers’
information, even though the processing speeds made it impossible for this to be true (this was the so-called
“robosigning” controversy, settled for $25bn in April 2012 between the federal government, 49 state attorneys
general and the five largest servicers). See Kiel, P. “The Great American Foreclosure Story: The Struggle
for Justice and a Place to Call Home”, ProPublica, 10 April 2012.
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all years (see Table C.26 in the Appendix for annual estimates). Clustering our standard
errors on the census-tract dimension accommodates correlation between the same property
across different years of observation. If contagion is driven largely through lender response,
then we should find no effect of a completed home foreclosure on the number of foreclosure
filings among lenders likely to be automating foreclosures. At the same time, if contagion
is driven primarily through borrower response, then our estimates should be comparable to
our baseline full-sample contagion estimates.
We find that contagion is primarily borrower-driven—contagion in foreclosure filings per-
sists when studying loans among automating lenders. Table C.10 presents the pooled esti-
mates for all filings (upper panel) and for filings among automating lenders. One concern
is that the total number of loans in a neighborhood from automating lenders is necessarily
smaller than the total among all lenders (as in the baseline estimates). If new filings are
proportional to the existing number of loans, then we would expect a larger response in the
total count of new filings for the baseline than for automating lenders. To address this, we
focus on the estimates of the log of total filings in the third column. We observe similar
contagion effects for the two outcomes: an increase in foreclosure filings of 9.4% per year in
the baseline sample versus an increase of 8.4% among filings from automating lenders.40
We also observe similar contagion in the probability of observing any new filing (0.062
versus 0.039). Thus, given the incentives of lenders and servicers and the finding that
contagion persists among automating lenders, we conclude that contagion is mainly borrower
driven.
40. Similarly, while the point estimates for total filings are different, 0.74 for the baseline and 0.115 for the
automating lenders, relative to the mean number of filings for each group (2.44 filings per year within a 0.1
mile radius for all filings, 0.37 for automating lenders), these estimates are remarkably similar (30.3% versus
a 29.7%).
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4.6.2 Foreclosure Contagion and Negative Equity
We investigate whether foreclosure contagion is driven by mortgages held by individuals who
face high debt relative to the value of their property. Mortgage default theory (e.g., Campbell
and Cocco (2011), Deng, Quigley, and Order (2000)) suggests that borrowers will only default
when the value of their home falls below the balance of their mortgage, putting the borrower
“underwater.” Intuitively, if the market value of a home is greater than the outstanding debt,
a homeowner who is having difficulty making mortgage payments may sell the property and
use the proceeds to pay off the debt. Conversely, underwater borrowers who are having
difficulty making payments do not have the option to sell. To the extent that foreclosures
lower or send a signal about neighboring home values, foreclosure contagion may operate
through pushing borrowers (further) underwater (Campbell (2013)).41 We use a proxy for
equity—relating the size of the initial loan to the outstanding debt at foreclosure filing—to
determine whether contagion is driven by individuals who are likely to be underwater on
their loans. Understanding which borrowers are most influenced by a neighboring completed
foreclosure sheds light on the mechanism of contagion and the borrower default decision
more generally.
We examine whether foreclosure contagion is more prevalent among loans with large
outstanding debt relative to the initial balance. For each foreclosure filing, we proxy the
borrower being underwater at the time of filing by whether or not the lender’s claim against
the borrower (i.e., the outstanding debt at filing) is larger than the initial loan principal.
41. The benefit of foreclosure is muted when borrowers have more than one mortgage taken against the
property (e.g., a mortgage and a home equity loan). In Illinois, mortgages are “recourse” debt—if the
foreclosure auction generates less revenue than the value of the outstanding debt, the borrower still owes
the creditor the balance. In the majority of cases the lender purchases the property in the amount of the
outstanding debt to avoid writing down a loss (i.e., the property becomes REO), in which case borrowers
no longer owe. However, a borrower is still on the hook for any additional liens on the property. Thus, a
foreclosure will not always render borrowers debt free.
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Although we observe the lender’s claim at the time of filing, we do not observe a direct
measure of the property value and so we proxy the value using initial loan principal.42 For
each foreclosure case we split the count of neighboring foreclosures in two—filings among
borrowers that are underwater according to our proxy (Ni,u,d(i)+t) and filings in positive





, Yi,j,d(i)+t = Ni,j,d(i)+t, and Yi,j,d(i)+t = log(Ni,j,d(i)+t) for j ∈ {u, p}, and
estimate our baseline 2SLS specification jointly allowing the time-specific fixed effects to
vary with the type of filings under consideration:
Yi,j,d(i)+t = β0 +βu ·Fi ·1[j = u]+βp ·Fi ·1[j = p]+βXi+Φi+Mj,m(i) +ψj,d(i)+t+ui,d(i)+t (4.7)
Pooling the estimates for both outcomes allows us to test the null hypothesis that a
completed foreclosure has the same effect on underwater borrowers as borrowers in positive
equity (H0 : βu = βp).
43 We assume that, were it not for their differing loan to value ratios,
borrowers in positive and negative equity respond similarly to a neighboring completed
foreclosure, and that lender behavior does not vary along these margins (i.e., any observed
heterogeneity in estimates is driven by whether or not the neighbors are underwater on their
loans).
We find that contagion is more prevalent among borrowers who are not in negative equity.
We present the 2SLS estimates of Equation 4.7 in the upper panel of Table C.11. We pool
42. We have experimented with alternative definitions of underwater, for example by making assumptions
about loan-to-value ratios at origination to determine home value and adjusting this using local price indices
or comparing outstanding balance at filing to local home values. Our results are not very sensitive to these
changes.
43. Using log count of filings and the probability of any filing for each group avoids the problem that we do
not observe the base number of loans in each category. Additionally, having a randomly assigned instrument
ensures that, in expectation, neighborhoods with completed foreclosures have similar numbers of underwater
borrowers as neighborhoods with dismissals.
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five years of post-decision observations (t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}), restricting the treatment to be
constant across all years (we present the yearly estimates in Table C.27 of the Appendix).
These estimates show that a completed foreclosure increases the probability of observing
any non-underwater filing by 6.6 percentage points and total non-underwater filings by 9.6
percent, while having little effect on filings from underwater borrowers (0.023 and -0.3%).
The difference between the two groups is significant.44
We suspect that this finding that contagion is more prominent among borrowers who are
not underwater is driven by borrowers who are on the margin of negative equity. Since being
in negative equity is generally considered a necessary condition for default, it is unlikely
that contagion is driven by borrowers who have lots of equity in their homes. At the same
time, using loan principal at origination to proxy housing value in defining underwater and
non-underwater loans may have some error on the margins—we may be classifying borrowers
who are “just” underwater as being in positive equity. In this case of misclassification, our
estimates suggest that the response may be coming from those who are in slight negative
equity, rather than those who are very underwater. Either way, our estimates do not imply
that those who are severely underwater will not default on their loans, but that they are
not responsive to neighboring foreclosures, whereas those who are on the margin of negative
equity are responsive. For example, a borrower who is severely underwater may default
regardless of what happens to their neighbors. However, for a borrower with debt close to
44. We also examine heterogeneity by local price growth, loan type and by zip-code income level (a proxy for
ability to pay). Deng, Quigley, and Order (2000) argue that the decision to default depends on expectations
of home value. We adjust our baseline contagion specification by interacting the foreclosure effect with
an indicator for positive zip-code-year price growth, but find no evidence that price growth matters for
contagion—see Table C.28 in the Appendix. Campbell and Cocco (2011) argue that the probability of
default is decreasing in ability to pay (income relative to loan payments) and that incentives for default
vary depending on the structure of loan payments. We proxy ability to pay with zip-code-level median
income (from the IRS SOI), but find no discernible difference in contagion by income quartile. These results
are plotted in Figure C.5 of the appendix. We also find no significant difference between the response
among neighboring borrowers with conventional fixed-rate mortgages and those with alternative mortgage
products—see Table C.29.
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100% of their home value, a nearby foreclosure may be quite important: not only might it
push them into negative equity, but it might also convey information about the foreclosure
process, lender behavior, or the future of the neighborhood (signals of less import to a
severely underwater borrower who has thought through the default decision).
We further explore if contagion is driven by individuals on the margin of negative equity
by comparing our 2SLS contagion estimates for filings among borrowers who have close
to zero equity in their home (as measured by our proxy) to contagion for filings among
borrowers with lots of equity or who are severely underwater. We define filings on the margin
of underwater as those where the absolute difference between loan principal at origination
(ρ) and the outstanding debt at filing (d) is less than 10% of principal: ρ−d
ρ
∈ [−0.1, 0.1]. As
above with underwater and non-underwater filings, we split the count of neighboring filings in
two—marginal and non-marginal filings—and estimate the analogue to Specification 4.7 for
these two groups. The results, presented in the lower panel of Table C.11, demonstrate that
contagion is driven by borrowers on the margin of negative equity: a completed foreclosure
induces a 6.3 percentage point increase in the probability of observing any filing for those on
the margin versus an insignificant 0.8 for other filers, and a 10.7% increase in the number
of new filings among those on the margin, versus an insignificant drop of 3.5% (in all cases
the difference between the two groups is significant). Thus, we conclude that contagion is
operating through borrowers who are on the margin of negative equity, rather than those
who are reasonably well off or in dire straits. This interpretation is consistent with our
finding from Section 4.5.1 that contagion is pronounced for cases decided in 2004–2008 when
borrowers are less likely to be severely underwater, but not for cases decided at the depth of
the foreclosure crisis (2009–2011) when foreclosures are common and many mortgage holders
experience financial difficulty.
182
4.6.3 Foreclosure Contagion and Information
Contagion may also occur because borrowers learn about the foreclosure process, including
the behavior of lenders and servicers, by observing neighboring foreclosure cases. Recent
survey evidence suggests that borrowers learn from defaults and foreclosures within their
social networks (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013)). For example, a neighbor may learn
about the foreclosure process, including the costs of default (and completed foreclosure),
how long the process takes, and the probability of a positive resolution (e.g., mortgage mod-
ification) by observing his/her neighbor’s experience.45 A priori, it is not clear whether the
foreclosure event would increase or decrease the probability of neighboring filings (contagion
vs. anti-contagion). For instance, a foreclosure may lower neighbors’ perception of the prob-
ability of renegotiating one’s loan by defaulting, thus lowering the expected value of default
and discouraging this behavior (Mayer et al. (2011) find evidence of borrowers defaulting in
response to an increase in the probability of modification).
We investigate a specific social network—neighbors with loans from the same lender.46
Individuals with the same lender may be more likely to discuss the foreclosure (and/or
mortgage renegotiation) process with one another. At the same time, a successful (or failed)
mortgage renegotiation provides a stronger signal to individuals with loans from the same
institution; it may be that a neighbor’s foreclosure discourages default among those with
45. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) also find that social norms may matter for contagion. Many
(82.7%) respondents to their survey feel they have a moral obligation to repay their debts. But a neighboring
default may weaken respondents’ sense of moral responsibility and increase their probability of default. We
do not expect this social morality channel to be particularly strong in our context, as our estimates compare
neighborhoods around properties where the borrower has already defaulted—the event that sends a signal
about the moral obligation to repay.
46. We have also examined heterogeneity in the treatment effect across neighborhoods where we expect
weaker and stronger social networks. We study how contagion varies with geography-based proxies for
neighbor connectivity, including racial homogeneity, population density, and housing type (drawing on the
notion of social capital outlined by Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000)), although we find no systematic relationship
between contagion and these proxies. We include a discussion of these estimates in the Appendix.
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loans from the same servicer/lender by lowering the perceived probability of a modifica-
tion. To test for the presence of learning-based contagion, we test whether contagion is
stronger/weaker among neighboring loans from the same lender. Under the assumptions
that i) individuals are aware of (at least some of) their neighbors’ lenders and ii) lenders are
not reacting to local conditions, then the difference between contagion among same-lender
and different-lender loans provides evidence of the importance of learning from neighboring
foreclosures.47 Note that this signal may be present as long as a borrower knows who his/her
neighbor’s lender is and observes the outcome of the case. Since a borrower may learn about
lender behavior by simply observing the outcome of his/her neighbor’s case, heterogeneity
in contagion along this margin provides evidence that borrowers learn from their neighbors’
experiences, but not necessarily that communication through social networks matters.
To test for a difference in contagion between same-lender and different-lender borrowers,
we estimate our 2SLS contagion effects for each subset of neighboring filings. We split the
count of neighboring foreclosures in two—filings with the same lender listed as the plaintiff
(Ni,s,d(i)+t) and filings with any other lender listed as the plaintiff (Ni,o,d(i)+t), and redefine our




, Yi,j,d(i)+t = Ni,j,d(i)+t,
or Yi,j,d(i)+t = log(Ni,j,d(i)+t) for j ∈ {s, o}. We then estimate our baseline 2SLS specification
jointly allowing the time-specific fixed effects to vary with lender type:
Yi,j,d(i)+t = β0 +βs ·Fi ·1[j = s]+βo ·Fi ·1[j = o]+βXi+Φi+Mj,m(i) +ψj,d(i)+t+ui,d(i)+t (4.8)
Pooling the estimates for both outcomes (same-lender filings and other-lender filings)
47. Our same-lender and different-lender estimates are robust to restricting the sample to lenders known
for automating the foreclosure process, suggesting that lenders are not driving the patterns we observe in
these estimates.
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allows us to test the null hypothesis that a completed foreclosure has the same effect on
mortgages held by the same lender as mortgages held by other lenders (H0 : βs = βo).
The 2SLS estimates of βs and βo from Specification 4.8, presented in Table C.12 (pooling
all years; see Table C.33 for yearly estimates), suggest that lender-specific local networks
matter. The estimates show that contagion is primarily driven by foreclosure filings among
loans held by different lenders—0.061 percentage point increase in the probability of any
new filing on a loan from a different lender versus an (insignificant) increase of 0.006 for
loans from the same lender, 0.770 additional foreclosure filings from different lenders versus
a drop in filings of 0.184 among loans held by the same lender, and an increase of 0.085
in the log of total filings among different lenders versus 0.008 for filings on loans from the
same lender. In the first two cases, the difference between the estimates are statistically
significantly different from zero.
We interpret these same-plaintiff results as evidence that borrowers learn about lenders
from the experience of their neighbors.48 Given that there is general contagion among loans
from other lenders, it appears that borrowers experience anti-contagion when a neighbor
from the same lender ends up in a completed foreclosure. A possible explanation for this
difference is that the neighboring foreclosure sends different information to different individ-
uals: contagion among those with different lenders is consistent with the foreclosure lower-
ing neighboring home values or sending a broad signal about the general direction of the
neighborhood (i.e., the value of the neighborhood is deteriorating). Anti-contagion among
48. Another possibility is that lenders are aware of the externalities of completed foreclosures and do not
pursue new filings in neighborhoods where they have had a recent successful foreclosure (while other lenders
do not react). However, we find this to be a less likely explanation for two reasons. Firstly, we still observe,
on average, a positive and significant number of foreclosure filings around foreclosed properties in the year
of and years after the foreclosure decision. Thus, it does not appear that lenders are avoiding foreclosure
externalities altogether. Secondly, the anti-contagion effect among filings from the same lender persist for
several years after the decision, which represents a long time for lenders to be waiting to avoid foreclosure
externalities (while other lenders continue to file in spite of these externalities.
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borrowers with the same plaintiff is consistent with borrowers revising downward the prob-
ability of a positive outcome (i.e., not losing their home) when a neighboring borrower with
the same lender is unsuccessful. This lowered expectation of a positive outcome decreases
the value of (strategic) defaults.49
4.7 Conclusion
We provide clean estimates of the effect of a completed foreclosure on neighboring resi-
dential sale prices and on neighboring foreclosure filings in Cook County, IL. We exploit a
randomly assigned instrument—the set of judges who hear a foreclosure case—to compare
neighborhood-level outcomes around a delinquent property that ends in completed foreclo-
sure to a delinquent property whose foreclosure claim is dismissed.
We find robust evidence of foreclosure contagion. A completed foreclosure leads to about
0.5 to 0.70 more foreclosure filings per year within 0.1 miles and increases the probability of
observing any neighboring foreclosure filing by about 10%. Moreover, a completed foreclosure
causes between 0.25 and 0.5 new completed foreclosures per year. These contagion effects
persist for at least four years after the case is decided.
Contagion is primarily driven by borrowers who are on the threshold of default. We find
contagion among loans held by lenders who are known to automate foreclosure filings and are
likely unresponsive to very local conditions, which we interpret as evidence that foreclosure
contagion is driven by borrowers. Contagion is strongest not during the depths of the crisis,
49. Given our instrument, it is also conceivable that borrowers learn about the impact of a given judge
on foreclosure outcomes. However, we do not expect that foreclosure contagion is driven by a completed
foreclosure revealing information about a specific judge. Firstly, given the random assignment of judges
to foreclosure cases, the probability that a given borrower ends up with a given judge is low—thus, the
neighboring borrower’s expectations about the outcome of default should not change substantially. Secondly,
if learning about judges is the primary driver of foreclosure contagion, then we would not expect to observe
differential contagion among individuals with the same lenders.
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but at the end of the housing boom and beginning of the crash. Moreover, contagion is
most prevalent among borrowers who are on the cusp of being underwater and not those
who are severely underwater on their loans. We interpret this as evidence that a neighboring
foreclosure has the greatest impact on borrowers who are on the margin of defaulting, and
not those who are severely at risk. Finally, we find that contagion is minimal when borrowers
have the same lender, perhaps because the neighboring foreclosure sends a signal about their
lender’s behavior, lowering the perceived probability of a successful renegotiation of the loan,
thus reducing strategic incentives to default.
We find evidence that completed foreclosures disrupt local housing markets. After a
completed foreclosure, the mean residential sale price dips by as much as 40%. However,
this drop is largely explained by selection into sale—in the wake of a completed foreclosure,
the composition of residential sales is skewed toward lower quality (and thus, lower price)
homes. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out that foreclosures do influence the value of homes,
conditional on quality.
While our instrumental-variables method provides clean identification of the effect of fore-
closure, the resulting estimates are of a particular parameter that helps to inform foreclosure
policy. Our estimates represent the effect of a completed foreclosure on the neighborhoods
around properties that are most likely to be influenced by foreclosure judges. These are
the cases that are most likely to be influenced by policy. At the same time, our estimates
compare the neighborhood-level effect of a completed foreclosure relative to a delinquent
mortgage that does not end in foreclosure. This is the relevant parameter for assessing pol-
icy that addresses how easily and how often lenders should be able to foreclose on delinquent
borrowers. Finally, while there may be concerns about the external validity of our estimates,
which are derived from a housing crisis in one of the worse-hit cities, it is in exactly such cir-
cumstances that policymakers and economists must worry most about foreclosure contagion.
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In sum, our estimates of foreclosure contagion suggest room for policy that seeks alternative
solutions for delinquent borrowers.
Bibliography
Abrams, D.S., Marianne Bertrand, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2008. “Do Judges Vary in
Their Treatment of Race?” American Law and Economics Association Annual Meetings
93.
Acemoglu, D. 2010. “When does labor scarcity encourage innovation?” Journal of Political
Economy 118 (6): 1037–1078.
Acemoglu, D, Simon Johnson, and JA Robinson. 2001. “The colonial origins of comparative
development: An empirical investigation.” American Economic Review 91 (5): 1369–
1401.
Acemoglu, D., and J. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York:
Crown Publishers.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, Pablo Querubin, and James A. Robinson. 2008. “When
Does Policy Reform Work?: The Case of Central Bank Independence.” Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, NBER Working Papers Working Paper, no. 1:351–418.
Adelino, Manuel, Kristopher Gerardi, and PS Willen. 2009. “Why don’t lenders renegotiate
more home mortgages? redefaults, self-cures and securitization.” NBER Working Paper,
no. 15159.
Agarwal, Sumit, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet, and Douglas
D. Evanoff. 2011. “The role of securitization in mortgage renegotiation.” Journal of
Financial Economics 102, no. 3 (December): 559–578.




Alston, LJ, and KD Kauffman. 1997. “Agricultural chutes and ladders: new estimates of
sharecroppers and ‘true tenants’ in the South, 1900—1920.” The Journal of Economic
History 57 (2): 464–475.
Ammer, John, and Fang Cai. 2011. “Sovereign CDS and bond pricing dynamics in emerging
markets: Does the cheapest-to-deliver option matter?” Journal of International Finan-
cial Markets, Institutions and Money 21, no. 3 (July): 369–387.
Anderson, J.M., J.R. Kling, and Kate Stith. 1999. “Measuring interjudge sentencing dispar-
ity: Before and after the federal sentencing guidelines.” Journal of Law and Economics
42 (February): 271–307.
Anenberg, Eliot, and Edward Kung. Forthcoming. “Estimates of the size and source of price
declines due to nearby foreclosures.” American Economic Review.
Angrist, Joshua D, and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2008. Mostly harmless econometrics: An em-
piricist’s companion. Princeton University Press.
Ashcraft, A., and Til Schuerman. 2008. “Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mort-
gage Credit.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report May (No. 318.).
Atkinson, Doreen. 2007. Going for broke: The fate of farm workers in arid South Africa.
Human Sciences Research Council.
Autor, DH, and SN Houseman. 2010. “Do temporary-help jobs improve labor market out-
comes for low-skilled workers? Evidence from “Work First”.” American Economic Jour-
nal: Applied Economics 2 (July): 96–128.
Baek, In-Mee, Arindam Bandopadhyaya, and Chan Du. 2005. “Determinants of market-
assessed sovereign risk: Economic fundamentals or market risk appetite?” Journal of
International Money and Finance 24, no. 4 (June): 533–548.
Baland, Jean-Marie, and James a Robinson. 2008. “Land and Power: Theory and Evidence
from Chile.” American Economic Review 98, no. 5 (November): 1737–1765.
Berdejo, Carlos, and Daniel L Chen. 2010. “Priming Ideology: Electoral Cycles Among Un-
elected Judges.” Working Paper, no. January.
Bernanke, B. 2008. “Housing, Mortgage Markets, and Foreclosures.” Speech at the Federal
Reserve System Conference on Housing and Mortgage Markets, Washington, D.C 4
December 2008.
Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case. 1995. “Does electoral accountability affect economic policy
choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
110 (3): 769.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 190
. 2003. “Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States.”
Journal of Economic Literature 41 (1): 7–73.
Bhardwaj, G., and R. Sengupta. 2008. “Where’s the Smoking gun? A Study of Underwriting
Standards for US Subprime Mortgages.” Working Paper.
Bhardwaj, G., and R. Sengupta. 2009. “Did Prepayments Sustain the Subprime Market?”
Blanco, Roberto, and Simon Brennan. 2005. “An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation
between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps.” The Journal of Finance
LX (5).
Block, S., and Paul M. Vaaler. 2004. “The price of democracy: sovereign risk ratings, bond
spreads and political business cycles in developing countries.” Journal of International
Money and Finance 23, no. 6 (October): 917–946.
Bolton, P., and Howard Rosenthal. 2002. “Political Intervention in Debt Contracts.” Journal
of Political Economy 110 (October).
Bonner, P., and K. Shapiro. 1987. “Company estate, company town: Pilgrim’s Rest 1910-
1932.” In: University of Witwatersrand. African Studies Seminar Paper 223.
Borri, Nicola, and Adrien Verdelhan. 2011. “Sovereign risk premia.” AFA 2010 Atlanta Meet-
ings Paper.
Botha, S. 1996. “South Africa’s Party System.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 8, no. 2
(April): 209–225.
Bradford, Helen. 1990. “Getting Away with Slavery: Capitalist Farmers, Foreigners and
Forced Labour in the Transvaal, c. 1920 - 1950.” University of Witwatersrand, History
Workshop.
Brender, A, and A Drazen. 2005. “Political budget cycles in new versus established democ-
racies.” Journal of Monetary Economics 52, no. 7 (October): 1271–1295.
Broner, F., G. Lorenzoni, and S.L. Schmukler. 2007. Why do emerging economies borrow
short term?
Browning, L. 2007. “The Subprime Loan Machine.” The New York Times March 23.
Bubb, R, and Alex Kaufman. 2009. “Securitization and Moral Hazard: Evidence from a
Lender Cutoff Rule.” Working paper.
Buchanan, J.M., and R.D. Congleton. 1994. “The incumbency dilemma and rent extraction
by legislators.” Public Choice 79 (1): 47–60.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 191
Bucks, B., and Karen Pence. 2008. “Do Borrowers Know Their Mortgage Terms?” Journal
of Urban Economics 64 (2): 8–33.
Cameron, Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller. 2011. “Robust Inference With
Multiway Clustering.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 29, no. 2 (April):
238–249.
Campbell, John Y. 2013. “Mortgage Market Design.” Review of Finance 17 (1): 1–33.
Campbell, JY, and JF Cocco. 2011. “A Model of Mortgage Default.” NBER Working Papers
Working Paper, NBER Working Papers Working Paper, no. 17516.
Campbell, J.Y., Stefano Giglio, and Parag Pathak. 2011. “Forced sales and house prices.”
American Economic Review 101 (5): 2108–31.
Carey, JM, and MS Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering
of electoral formulas.” Electoral studies 14 (4): 417–439.
Case, A., and A Deaton. 1999. “School Inputs and Educational Outcomes in South Africa.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3): 1047–1084.
Case, K.E., and Robert Shiller. 2003. “Is there a bubble in the housing market?” Brooking
Papers on Economic Activity 2.
Chang, Tom, and Antoinette Schoar. 2006. “The effect of judicial bias in Chapter 11 reor-
ganization.” Unpublished manuscript. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Charney, C. 1984. “Class conflict and the National Party split.” Journal of Southern African
Studies 10 (2): 269–282.
Chirwa, WC. 1996. “The Malawi Government and South African Labour Recruiters, 1974-
92.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (4): 623–642.
Chomsisengphet, S., and Anthony Pennington-Cross. 2006. “The Evolution of the Subprime
Mortgage Market.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review January.
Christopher, AJ. 1983. “Parliamentary delimitation in South Africa , 1910-1980.” Political
Geography Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July): 205–217.
Chuhan, Punam, Stijn Claessens, and Nlandu Mamingi. 1998. “Equity and bond flows to
Latin America and Asia: the role of global and country factors.” Journal of Development
Economics 55:439–463.
Cline, WR, and KJS Barnes. 1997. Spreads and risk in emerging markets lending. Institute
of International Finance.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 192
Cobbe, James. 1986. “Consequences for Lesotho of changing South African labour demand.”
African Affairs 85 (338): 23–48.
Collin-Dufresne, Pierre, Robert S. Goldstein, and J. Spencer Martin. 2001. “The Determi-
nants of Credit Spread Changes.” The Journal of Finance 56, no. 6 (December): 2177–
2207.
Cordell, L., K Dynan, A Lehnert, N Liang, and E Mauskopf. 2008. “The Incentives of Mort-
gage Servicers: Myths and Realities.” Federal Reserve Working Paper 2008-46.
Corrado, Charles J. 2011. “Event studies: A methodology review.” Accounting & Finance
51, no. 1 (March): 207–234.
Crankshaw, Owen. 1997. Race, Class and the Changing Division of Labour under Apartheid.
London: Routledge.
Crush, J. 1993. “‘The Long-Averted Clash’: Farm Labour Competition in the South African
Countryside.” Canadian Journal Of African Studies 27 (3): 404–423.
Crush, J., and W. James. 1995. Crossing Boundaries: Mine Migrancy in a Democratic South
Africa. Edited by Jonathan Crush and W James. IDASA / IDRC.
Crush, J., A. Jeeves, and D. Yudelman. 1991. South Africa’s Labor Empire: A History of
Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines. Boulder: Westview Press.
Currie, A. 2007. “Buy or Build: The Vertical Integrator’s Dilemma.” the American Securi-
tization Journal Winter/Spring.
Dalle Nogare, Chiara, and Roberto Ricciuti. 2011. “Do term limits affect fiscal policy choices?”
European Journal of Political Economy 27, no. 4 (December): 681–692.
Davies, Robert, David Kaplan, Mike Morris, and D. O’Meara. 1976. “Class struggle and the
periodisation of the state in South Africa.” Review of African Political Economy 3, no.
7 (September): 4–30.
De Klerk, M. 1984. “Seasons that will never return: the impact of farm mechanization on
employment, incomes and population distribution in the Western Transvaal.” Journal
of Southern African Studies.
Dell, Melissa. 2010. “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita.” Econometrica 78 (6):
1863–1903.
Dell’Ariccia, G., D. Igan, and Luc Laeven. 2008. “Credit Booms and Lending Standards:
Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market.” IMF Working Paper April.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 193
Demyanyk, Y. 2008. “Did Credit Scores Predict the Subprime Crisis?” Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis October.
. 2009. “Quick Exits of Subprime Mortgages.” St. Louis Review March/April (91:2):
79–93.
Demyanyk, Y., and Otto Van Hemert. 2008. “Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis.”
Review of Financial Studies.
Deng, Y, JM Quigley, and R Order. 2000. “Mortgage terminations, heterogeneity and the
exercise of mortgage options.” Econometrica 68 (2): 275–307.
DeSilver, D. 2009. “Reckless strategies doomed WaMu.” the Seattle Times 25 October.
Diazweigel, D, and G Gemmill. 2006. “What drives credit risk in emerging markets? The roles
of country fundamentals and market co-movements.” Journal of International Money
and Finance 25, no. 3 (April): 476–502.
Dick, A.R., and J.R. Lott. 1993. “Reconciling voters’ behavior with legislative term limits.”
Journal of Public Economics 50 (1): 1–14.
Ding, Lei, Roberto G. Quercia, and Alan M. White. 2009. “State Anti-Predatory Lending
laws: Impact and Federal Preemption Phase I Descriptive Analysis” (January).
Dobbie, Will, and Jae Song. 2013. “Debt Relief and Debtor Outcomes: Measuring the Effects
of Consumer Bankruptcy Protection.” Revise and Resubmit at the American Economic
Review.
Domar, ED. 1970. “The causes of slavery or serfdom: a hypothesis.” The Journal of Economic
History 30 (1): 18–32.
Doyle, JJ. 2007. “Child protection and child outcomes: Measuring the effects of foster care.”
The American Economic Review 97 (5): 1583–1610.
Duffie, Darrell Darrell, L.H. Pedersen, and Kenneth J. Singleton. 2001. “Modeling Sovereign
Yield Spreads: A Case Study of Russian Debt.” SSRN Electronic Journal.
Duncan, David. 1995. The Mills of God: The State and African Labour in South Africa,
1918-1948. 2nd. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.
Dungey, Doris ‘Tanta’. 2007. “The Compleat UberNerd.” Calculated Risk at http://www.
calculatedriskblog.com/2007/07/compleat-ubernerd.html (2): 337–388.
Eichengreen, Barry, and A. Mody. 1998. What explains changing spreads on emerging-market
debt: fundamentals or market sentiment?
BIBLIOGRAPHY 194
Elul, R. 2009. “Securitization and Mortgage Default: Reputation vs. Adverse Selection.”
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Evans, I. 1997. Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Favero, Carlo, Marco Pagano, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden. 2009. “How Does Liquidity
Affect Government Bond Yields?” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45,
no. 01 (November): 107.
Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo. 1996. “The new wave of private capital inflows: Push or pull?”
Journal of Development Economics 48, no. 2 (March): 389–418.
Foote, Christopher L., Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen. 2008. “Negative equity and
foreclosure: Theory and evidence.” Journal of Urban Economics 64, no. 2 (September):
234–245.
Foote, Christopher, K. Gerardi, L. Goette, and Paul Willen. 2009. Reducing foreclosures: No
easy answers. Technical report. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Forbes, S.J., and Mara Lederman. 2009. “Does Vertical Integration Affect Firm Performance?
Evidence from the Airline Industry.” July.
Frame, Scott, Andreas Lenhert, and Ned Prescott. 2008. “A Snapshot of Mortgage Condi-
tions with an Emphasis on Subprime Mortgage Performance.”
Frame, WS. 2010. “Estimating the effect of mortgage foreclosures on nearby property values:
A critical review of the literature.” Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
no. 3.
Frot, Emmanuel, and J. Santiso. 2010. “Portfolio Managers and Elections in Emerging
Economies: How investors dislike political uncertainty.”
Garcia-Herrero, Alicia, and Alvaro Ortiz. 2006. “The Role of Global Risk aversion in ex-
plaining Latin American Sovereign Spreads.” May.
Garriga, C. 2009. “Lending Standards in Mortgage Markets.” Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Economic Synopses May.
Geanakopolos, J., and Koniak. 2009. “Matters of Principal.” New York Times 5 March.
Gelpern, A, and Mitu Gulati. 2007. “Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study.”
Washington University Law Reviews 84 (7): 1627–1715.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 195
Gelpern, Anna, and Adam Levitin. 2009. “Rewriting frankenstein contracts: The workout
prohibition in residential mortgage-backed securities.” Southern California Law Review
82:1077–1152.
Gerardi, Kristopher, Eric Rosenblatt, PS Willen, and Vincent W Yao. 2012. “Foreclosure
externalities: Some new evidence.” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, no. Working Paper
12.
Ghent, Andra C, and Marianna Kudlyak. 2011. “Recourse and residential mortgage default:
Evidence from US states.” Review of Financial Studies 24 (9): 3139–3186.
Giliomee, Hermann. 1995. “Democratization in South Africa.” Political Science Quarterly
110 (1): 83–104.
Giliomee, Hermann, and L Schlemmer, eds. 1985. Up against the fences. New York: St Mar-
tin’s Press.
Glaeser, EL. 1997. “Self-imposed term limits.” Public Choice 93 (3): 389–394.
Glaeser, EL, and B Sacerdote. 2000. “The Social Consequences of Housing.” Journal of
Housing Economics 3:1–23.
Goodman, P., and Gretchen Morgenson. 2008. “Saying Yes, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky
Loans.” New York Times 27 December.
Goodstein, R, and Y Lee. 2010. “Do Foreclosures Increase Crime?” Available at SSRN
1670842.
Goodstein, Ryan, Paul E. Hanouna, Carlos D. Ramirez, and Christof W. Stahel. 2011. “Are
Foreclosures Contagious?” SSRN Electronic Journal:1–34.
Gorton, G. 2009. “Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of
2007.” Prepared for Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s Financial Markets Conference:
Financial Innovation and Crisis May 11- 13.
Gramlich, E. 2007. “Booms and Busts: The Case of Subprime Mortgages.” Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, no. September:105–113.
Greenberg, Stanley. 1980. Race and State in Capitalist Development: South Africa in Com-
parative Perspective. Yale University Press.
Greif, Avner, and David D. Laitin. 2004. “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change.”
The American Political Science Review 98 (4): 633–652.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 196
Groemping, U. 2006. “Relative importance for linear regression in R: the package relaimpo.”
Journal of statistical software 17 (1): 1.
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2013. “The Determinants of Attitudes
toward Strategic Default on Mortgages.” The Journal of Finance 68 (4): 1473–1515.
Guren, Adam, and Tim McQuade. 2013. “How Do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Down-
turns?” April.
Habakkuk, H.J. 1962. American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century. London:
Cambridge University Press.
Harding, John P. J.P., Eric Rosenblatt, and Vincent W. V.W. Yao. 2009. “The contagion
effect of foreclosed properties.” Journal of Urban Economics 66, no. 3 (November): 164–
178.
Hayek, FA. 1979. “The Political Order of a Free People. Vol. 3 of Law, Legislation, and
Liberty.” London and.
Henderson, N. 2005. “Bernanke: There’s no housing bubble to go bust: Fed Nominee has
said ’cooling’ won’t hurt.” Washington Post, no. 27 October.
Hilscher, J., and Y. Nosbusch. 2010. “Determinants of Sovereign Risk: Macroeconomic Fun-
damentals and the Pricing of Sovereign Debt.” Review of Finance 14, no. 2 (March):
235–262.
Himmelberg, C., Christopher Mayer, and T. Sinai. 2005. “Assessing High House Prices:
Bubbles, Fundamentals, and Misperceptions.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff
Reports, no. 218.
Hornbeck, R., and S. Naidu. 2013. “When the Levee Breaks: Labor Mobility and Economic
Development in the American South.” American Economic Review (forthcoming).
Horner, D, and A Kooy. 1980. “Conflict on South African mines, 1972-1979.” SALDRU
Working Paper, no. 29:1972–1979.
Hund, John, and D. Lesmond. 2008. “Liquidity and credit risk in emerging debt markets.”
Traders.
Hunt, J. P. 2009. “What do subprime securitization contracts actually say about loan mod-
ification?” Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy working paper.
Iaryczower, M. 2009. “The Value of Information in the Court—Get it Right, Keep it Tight.”
American Economic Review 102 (1): 202–237.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 197
Immergluck, Dan, and G. Smith. 2006. “The external costs of foreclosure: The impact of
single-family mortgage foreclosures on property values.” Housing Policy Debate 17 (1):
57–80.
Johnson, J.M., and W.M. Crain. 2004. “Effects of term limits on fiscal performance: Evidence
from democratic nations.” Public Choice 119 (1): 73–90.
Katz, A. 2006. “Prime Suspect.” Mother Jones, no. September.
. 2009. “The Loan Ranger.” Slate: the Big Money 17 February.
Kaufmann, Daniel, A Kraay, and M Mastruzzi. 2010. “The worldwide governance indicators:
methodology and analytical issues.”
Keys, B., Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig. 2010. “Did Securitization Lead
to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
125 (1).
Kiel, Paul. 2012. “The American Foreclosure Story: The Struggle for Justice and a Place to
Call Home.” ProPublica (April).
Kim, Gloria M. 2004. Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+). Technical report De-
cember. JP Morgan.
Kling, JR. 2006. “Incarceration length, employment, and earnings.” American Economic
Review 96 (3): 863–876.
Kregel, J. 2008. “Changes in the U.S. Financial System and the Subprime Crisis.” Levy
Economics Institute Working Paper, no. April.
Kroszner, Randall S. 1998. “Is it Better to Forgive than to Receive? Repudiation of the Gold
Indexation Clause in Long-Term Debt During the Great Depression.” Graduate School
of Business, University of Chicago.
Krugman, P. 2005. “That hissing sound.” New York Times, no. August.
Lacey, Marian. 1981. Working for boroko: The origins of a coercive labour system in South
Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press (Pty) Limited.
Lemon, Anthony. 1984. “State Control over the Labor Market in South Africa.” International
Political Science Review 5 (2): 189–208.
Leonard, Tammy, and James C. Murdoch. 2009. “The neighborhood effects of foreclosure.”
Journal of Geographical Systems 11, no. 4 (May): 317–332.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 198
Levitin, Adam. 2008. “Written testimony of Adam J. Levitin.” Hearing on H.R. 200 and
H.R. 225 Hearing before H. Comm. on Judiciary, 110th Cong, 23 22 January.
. 2009a. “Helping homeowners: Modification of mortgages in bankruptcy.” Harvard
Law & Policy Review Online 3.
Levitin, Adam. 2009b. “Helping Homeowners: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy.”
3. Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. (online) Jan. 19.
. 2009c. “Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy.”
WISC. L. REV. 565.
. 2009d. “The Worsening Foreclosure Crisis: Is It Time to Reconsider Bankruptcy
Reform?” Written Testimony for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee
on Administrative Oversight and the Courts 23 July.
Levitin, Adam, and Tara Twomey. 2011. “Mortgage Servicing.” Yale J. on Reg. No. 11.
Lin, Zhenguo, Eric Rosenblatt, and Vincent W. Yao. 2007. “Spillover Effects of Foreclosures
on Neighborhood Property Values.” The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
38, no. 4 (November): 387–407.
List, J. A., and Daniel M. Sturm. 2006. “How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from
Environmental Policy.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 4 (November):
1249–1281.
Lombard, J.A., and J.J. Stadler. 1980. The Role of Mining in the South African Economy: A
Study prepared for the Chamber of Mines of South Africa. Bureau of Economic Policy /
Analysis, University of Pretoria.
Longstaff, F.A., J. Pan, L.H. Pedersen, and K.J. Singleton. 2007. How Sovereign is Sovereign
Credit Risk?
Lopez, Economic Journal. 2003. “Term limits: Causes and consequences.” Public Choice 114
(1): 1–56.
Lowenberg, Anton D. 1997. “Why South Africa’s Apartheid Economy Failed.” Contemporary
Economic Policy 15, no. 3 (July): 62–72.
Lowenstein, R. 2010. “Walk away from your Mortgage!” New York Times 7 January.
MacKenzie, D. 2009. “The Credit Crisis as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY 199
Maestas, Nicole, Kathleen Mullen, and Alexander Strand. 2013. “Does Disability Insurance
Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of
SSDI Receipt.” American Economic Review 103 (5): 1797–1829.
Magruder, JR. 2012. “High unemployment yet few small firms: The role of centralized bar-
gaining in South Africa.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4 (3): 138–
66.
Mariotti, M. 2010. “Estimating the elasticity of substitution in the South African manu-
facturing industry during Apartheid, 1950 — 1985.” Economic History of Developing
Regions 27 (2): 47–60.
Martell, R. 2007. “Understanding Common Factors in Domestic and International Bond
Spreads.” Review of Finance 12, no. 2 (March): 365–389.
Mauro, P., N. Sussman, and Y. Yafeh. 2002. “Emerging market spreads: then versus now.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2): 695.
Mayer, Christopher, Edward Morrison, Tomasz Piskorski, and Arpit Gupta. 2011. “Mortgage
Modification and Strategic Default: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Country-
wide.” NBER Working Papers Working Paper.
Mayer, Christopher, Karen Pence, and Shane Sherlund. 2009. “The Rise in Mortgage De-
faults.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 23 (1): 23–50.
McGuire, P., and M.A. Schrijvers. 2003. Common factors in emerging market spreads. Tech-
nical report December. Bank of International Settlements.
Mian, Atif, and Amir Sufi. 1999. “House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the
U.S. Household Leverage Crisis.” NBER Working Paper 15283.
. 2009. “The consequences of mortgage credit expansion: Evidence from the US mort-
gage default crisis.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4): 1449.
Mian, Atif, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi. 2009. “The Political Economy of the US Mort-
gage Default Crisis.” papers.ssrn.com, no. January.
. 2012. “Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy.” Chicago Booth Research
Paper, nos. 13-41.
Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in
the making of the modern world. Boston: Beacon Press.
Morrell, Robert. 1988. “The Disintegration of the Gold and Maize Alliance in South Africa
in the 1920s.” The International journal of African historical studies 21 (4): 619–635.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 200
Morris, Stephen. 2001. “Political Correctness.” Journal of Political Economy 109, no. 2
(April): 231–265.
Moser, Christoph. 2007. The Impact of Political Risk on Sovereign Bond Spreads. Evidence
from Latin America.
Moser, Christoph, and A. Dreher. 2010. “Do Markets Care About Central Bank Governor
Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
42 (8): 1589–1612.
Mueller-Smith, Michael. 2013. “Program Evaluation with Randomized Screeners: Estimating
Heterogenous Response Instrumental Variable (HRIV) Models.”
Naidu, S., S. Turban, and L. Wilse-Samson. 2014. “Labor Conflict and the Economic Inci-
dence of Institutional Change: Evidence from South Africa.”
Nohlen, Dieter. 1999. “Elections in Africa, A Data Handbook — South Africa”:1–54.
Nordhaus, W.D. 1975. “The political business cycle.” The Review of Economic Studies 42
(2): 169–190.
Norris, F. 2009. “Why Many Home Loan Modifications Fail.” New York Times 3 December.
O’Meara, Dan. 1996. Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National
Party, 1948-1994. Ravan Press.
Onselen, C Van. 1996. The seed is mine : the life of Kas Maine, a South African sharecropper,
1894-1985. New York: Hill / Wang.
Panel, Congressional Oversight. 2009. “The Foreclosure Crisis: Working Toward a Solution.”
Journal of Urban Economics.
Pemstein, D., S. a. Meserve, and J. Melton. 2010. “Democratic Compromise: A Latent Vari-
able Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type.” Political Analysis 18, no. 4 (August):
426–449.
Pence, Karen. 2006. “Foreclosing on opportunity: State laws and mortgage credit.” Review
of Economics and Statistics 88 (1): 177–182.
Pennington-Cross, A. 2006. “The value of foreclosed property.” Journal of Real Estate Re-
search 28 (2): 193–214.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Enrico Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Eco-
nomic Policy. 533. MIT Press.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 201
Pickles, J. 1988. “Recent changes in regional policy in South Africa.” Geography 73 (3):
233–239.
Poon, M. 2008. “From New Deal Institutions to Capital Markets: Commercial consumer risk
scores and the making of subprime mortgage finance.” Accounting, Organizations and
Society.
Price, TW. 1953. “The South African General Election, 1953.” Parliamentary Affairs 6 (3):
258.
Querubin, Pablo. 2011. “Political reform and elite persistence: Term limits and political
dynasties in the Philippines.” Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies.
Rajan, Uday, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig. 2010. “The Failure of Models that Predict Failure:
Distance, Incentives and Defaults.” Chicago GSB Research Paper No. 08-19.
Reed, W.R., D.E. Schansberg, James Wilbanks, and Z. Zhu. 1998. “The relationship between
congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits.” Public Choice
94 (1): 85–104.
Reiss, D.J. 2009. “Regulation of Subprime and Predatory Lending.” Brooklyn Law School
Legal Studies, Research Papers No.142.
Remolona, E., M. Scatigna, and Eliza Wu. 2007. Interpreting sovereign spreads. Technical
report March. Bureau of International Settlements.
Robinson, B. 2009. “An Overview of the Home Affordable Modification Program.” Philadel-
phia Fed Consumer Compliance Outlook, Third Quarter.
Romer, T, and Barry Weingast. 1992. “Political foundations of the thrift debacle.” in J.
Barth and D. Brumbaugh, Eds: The Reform of Federal Deposit Insurance 167-202.
Rooyen, Johann Van. 1994. Hard Right: The New White Power in South Africa. Cape Town:
David Phillip Publishers.
Sandler, DH, and Ryan Sandler. 2012. “Multiple Event Studies in Public Finance: A Simu-
lation Study with Applications.”
Savage, Michael. 1986. “The Imposition of Pass Laws on the African Population in South
Africa 1916-1984.” African Affairs 85 (339): 181–205.
Schirmer, Stefan. 2004. “Motives for mechanisation in South African agriculture, 1940—
1980.” African Studies 63, no. 1 (July): 3–28.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 202
Schoeman, B.M. 1977. Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika 1910-1976. Pretoria: Aktuele
Publikasies.
Schuetz, Jenny, Vicki Been, and Ingrid Gould IG Ellen. 2008. “Neighboring Effects of Con-
centrated Mortgage Foreclosures.” Journal of Housing Economics, no. 212:–36.
Segal, I. 1999. “Contracting with Externalities.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (2):
337–388.
Shefter, M. 1977. “Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy.” Politics & Society
7, no. 4 (January): 403–451.
Shiller, R. 2008. The Subprime Solution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Siebert, WS. 1987. “Black trade unions and the wage gap in South Africa.” Managerial and
Decision Economics 8 (1): 55–65.
Skeel, D. 2001. Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Smart, Michael, and D. Sturm. 2006. “Term limits and electoral accountability.” May.
Smith, S., L. Perwien, and J. Ratcliffe. 2009. “Mortgage Servicer Response to Borrowers in
Crisis: A Report from the Front Lines.” Center for Community Capital, UNC, Working
Paper 14 September.
Sorkin, Andrew Ross. 2009. Too Big to Fail. London: Viking Penguin.
Spandau, A. 1980. “Mechanization and labour policies on South African mines.” South
African Journal of Economics 40 (1): 110–120.
Steinfeld, Robert J. 2001. Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor in the Nineteenth Cen- tury.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Strapparava, Carlo, and Rada Mihalcea. 2010. “Annotating and Identifying Emotions in
Text.” Intelligent Information Access:21–38.
Tabarrok, Alexander. 1994. “A Survey, Critque, and New Defense of Term Limits.” The Cato
Journal 14 (2).
Temple, R. 2009. “How to Underpin Tottering House Prices.” the American Securitization
Journal May.
Tett, G. 2009. Fool’s Gold. London: Little Brown.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 203
The Surplus People Project. 1983. Forced Removals in South Africa: Vols 1-5. Cape Town:
Surplus People Project.
Towe, Charles, and Chad Lawley. 2013. “The Contagion Effect of Neighboring Foreclosures.”
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (2): 313–335.
Tung, F. 2009. “The Great Bailout of 2008—09.” Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal
25 (2).
Uribe, M, and V Yue. 2006. “Country spreads and emerging countries: Who drives whom?”
Journal of International Economics 69, no. 1 (June): 6–36.
Westphalen, Michael. 2001. “The determinants of sovereign bond credit spreads changes.”
unpublished paper, Universite de Lausanne:1–27.
White, B. 2009. “Underwater and not walking away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Manage-
ment of the Housing Crisis.” Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No 09-35.
White, Michelle. 2009. “Talk at the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges.” Las Vegas,
October.
Wilcox, J. 2008. “House Price Dynamics.” Synopses of Selected Research on Housing, Mort-
gages and Foreclosures, Federal Reserve.
Wilson, F. 1972. Labour in the South African Gold Mines, 1911-1969.
Wooldridge, P, and Dietrich Domanski. 2003. Changing links between mature and emerging
financial markets. Technical report September. Bank of International Settlements.
Yang, Crystal S. 2012. “Free At Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Post
Booker Sentencing.” Working Paper.
Zhu, Haibin. 2006. “An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market





Appendix for Chapter 1
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Figure A.1: Open and closed districts (Source: Crush (1993).)
Notes: I georeferenced the map from Crush (1993) using Map Warper (http://mapwarper.net/). I
intersected it with the district map shapefile to obtain the set of open/closed/high potential districts. I
checked the resulting set of open districts against lists of recruiter licenses (issued under the 1911 Native
Labour Recruiting Act) I was able to locate in the TEBA archive at the University of Johannesburg as well
as the station level recruiting data available there. I checked the list of high potential districts against
TEBA’s 1977 memo “Recruiting in South Africa”.
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Figure A.2: Mining Recruits by Country
Notes: Data are drawn from the Annual Reports of the Chamber of Mines. Graphed are the series for the
4 major source countries. Not shown are Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and ‘others’.
208
Figure A.3: Median Mining Recruits at South African Recruiting Stations
Notes: Graph shows the median number of recruits from NRC regional offices in South Africa forwarded to
the mines. The data was compiled from the TEBA archive at the University of Johannesburg.
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Figure A.4: Adjustment Dynamics
Note: The coefficients are graphed according to estimating Equation 1.5. Confidence intervals correspond
to 5% bands. Outcomes are for black regular farm workers and are relative to 1972. Data are from the
Censuses of Agriculture 1963-1983.
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Table A.1: Difference open v closed, 1972
Panel A: Baseline comparison
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Farm size Wages per worker Farm workers Tractors Combines Ag incomes
Open -0.459∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗ -0.201 -0.656∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.109) (0.221) (0.143) (0.180) (0.0705)
Observations 255 250 256 240 240 294
R2 0.024 0.047 0.020 0.008 0.044 0.052
Panel B: Comparison including economic region fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Farm size Wages per worker Farm workers Tractors Combines Ag incomes
Open -0.0516 -0.0578 -0.127 0.0410 -0.0774 -0.141∗∗
(0.169) (0.0637) (0.226) (0.156) (0.254) (0.0676)
Observations 255 250 256 240 240 294
Robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: ‘Open’ is a dummy for whether the district was open to mine recruiting at 1970. The regressions
control for maize production in 1963 and year interactions, and weights for the 1960 black rural population.
The regression controls for economic region fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table A.2: Estimated differences in Wages and Workforce by Open status
Panel A: Wages and Workers
(1) (2) (3)
Per Cap Wage Black Employees Wage Bill
Post × Open 0.152∗∗ -0.0868∗ 0.0646
(0.0723) (0.0507) (0.0658)
Observations 1738 1749 1753
R2 0.924 0.973 0.979
Panel B: Combines and Tractors
(1) (2) (3)
Combines Power Combines All tractors
Post × Open 0.172∗ 0.137 0.0170
(0.0938) (0.131) (0.0264)
Observations 1487 1060 1708
R2 0.969 0.958 0.989
Note: Errors clustered at district level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions have log
outcomes. Outcomes for Panel A are for black regular employees on farms. Post × Open is a dummy for
whether the district was open to mine recruiting in 1970 interacted with the years 1976 to 1979. Each
regression includes district and economic region × year fixed effects, and year by maize production in 1963
interactions. Errors are clustered at the district level. Outcomes are relative to 1972.
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Table A.3: Estimated differences in Wages and Workforce by Open status, relative to 1972.
(1) (2) (3)
Per Cap Wage Black Employees Wage Bill
1963 × Open 0.0669 -0.0456 0.0263
(0.0547) (0.0662) (0.0844)
1974 × Open -0.102 0.0824 -0.0179
(0.124) (0.148) (0.0827)
1975 × Open -0.0680 0.0792 0.0162
(0.0832) (0.0815) (0.0648)
1976 × Open 0.217 -0.120 0.101
(0.142) (0.118) (0.111)
1978 × Open 0.114∗ -0.100∗∗ 0.0171
(0.0621) (0.0465) (0.0725)
1979 × Open 0.139 0.0512 0.190∗
(0.0965) (0.0617) (0.114)
1983 × Open 0.131 0.0344 0.168∗
(0.0916) (0.0575) (0.101)
Observations 1738 1749 1753
R2 0.925 0.973 0.979
Errors clustered at district level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: All regressions are log outcomes for black regular employees on farms. Open is a dummy for whether
the district was open to mine recruiting in 1970. Each regression includes district and economic region ×
year fixed effects, and year by maize production in 1963 interactions. Errors are clustered at the district
level. Outcomes are relative to 1972.
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Table A.4: Estimated differences in Combines and Tractors by Open status, relative to 1972
(1) (2) (3)
Combines Power Combines All tractors
1970 × Open 0.00320 0.00884
(0.130) (0.0407)
1974 × Open -0.0634 -0.143 -0.0133
(0.111) (0.139) (0.0280)
1975 × Open 0.0856 -0.0447 0.0159
(0.0877) (0.197) (0.0310)
1978 × Open 0.120 0.00442 -0.0142
(0.147) (0.170) (0.0447)
1979 × Open 0.263∗ 0.141 0.0740
(0.157) (0.232) (0.0520)
1980 × Open 0.0707 -0.00393
(0.150) (0.0519)
Observations 1487 1060 1708
R2 0.969 0.958 0.989
Errors clustered at district level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: All regressions are log outcomes. Open is a dummy for whether the district was open to mine
recruiting in 1970. Each regression includes district and economic region × year fixed effects, and year by
maize production in 1963 interactions. Errors are clustered at the district level. Outcomes are relative to
1972.
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Table A.5: Estimated differences in Wages by Open status: Robustness to alternative specifications
Panel A: Wages per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Tenancy end Ag incomes ex. TBVC
Post × Open 0.152∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.152∗∗
(0.0723) (0.0727) (0.0733) (0.0721)
Observations 1738 1738 1725 1718
R2 0.924 0.925 0.924 0.923
Panel B: Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Tenancy end Ag incomes ex. TBVC
Post × Open -0.0868∗ -0.0848∗ -0.0840 -0.0868∗
(0.0507) (0.0505) (0.0515) (0.0505)
Observations 1749 1749 1736 1729
R2 0.973 0.973 0.971 0.970
Panel C: Combines
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Tenancy end Ag incomes ex TBVC
Post × Open 0.172∗ 0.170∗ 0.170∗ 0.172∗
(0.0938) (0.0917) (0.0927) (0.0936)
Observations 1487 1487 1483 1482
R2 0.969 0.969 0.968 0.968
Note: Errors clustered at district level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions are log
outcomes for black regular employees on farms. The ‘treatment’, is an interaction of open status with the
years 1976 to 1979. Each regression includes district and economic region × year fixed effects. Column (1)
is our baseline specification. Column (2) includes year interactions with a dummy for tenancy ‘reform’ as
set out in appendix A.3. Column (3) for the level of white agricultural incomes in 1970 and year
interactions. Column (4) runs the baseline specification excluding districts within Transkei,
Bophutatswana, Venda or Ciskei. Errors are clustered at the district level. Outcomes are relative to 1972.
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Table A.6: Placebo: Estimated differences in Wages and Workforce by High potential status, relative to 1972.
Panel A: Wages and Workers
(1) (2) (3)
Per Cap Wage Black Employees Wage Bill
Post × highpot -0.0563 -0.00311 -0.0596
(0.0406) (0.0293) (0.0414)
Observations 1738 1749 1753
R2 0.923 0.972 0.979
Panel B: Combines and Tractors
(1) (2) (3)
Combines Power Combines Tractors
Post × highpot -0.0678 -0.105 -0.0197
(0.0562) (0.101) (0.0194)
Observations 1487 1060 1708
R2 0.968 0.958 0.989
Note: Errors clustered at district level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions are log
outcomes. The ‘treatment’, is an interaction of ‘high potential for recruiting’ status with the years 1976 to
1979. High potential status is as defined by the mine labor recruiter. Each regression includes district and
economic region × year fixed effects, maize suitability fixed effects, and weights by black rural population.
Errors are clustered at the district level. Outcomes are relative to 1972.
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Table A.7: Mine-level regressions.
(1) (2) (3)
Ore mined Number of Strikes # Injured or killed
Post ×MM67 -0.0128∗∗ 0.00639 0.197∗
(0.00628) (0.00520) (0.102)
Observations 450 416 416
R2 0.768 0.274 0.204
Note: Standard errors clustered at gold mine level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions
are log outcomes. The ‘treatment’, Post ×MM67, is the share of workers at that mine in 1967 originating
from Mozambique or Malawi interacted with a dummy for the years 1976–1979. The outcome in the first
column is the tons of ore mined (in 000s). The second column outcome is a count of the number of strikes
at that mine, the third is the total number injured or killed in strikes at that mine. Each regression
includes mine and year fixed effects. Outcomes are relative to 1973.
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Table A.8: Election outcomes.
Panel A: Open vs closed districts
(1) (2)
Right Share NP and left




Panel B: Mine districts vs all others
(1) (2)
Right Share NP and left
1966× minedistrict 0.252 -0.00160
(0.588) (0.0155)
1974 × minedistrict -0.267 0.0221
(0.186) (0.0156)
1977× minedistrict -0.198 0.0170
(0.162) (0.0138)
1981× minedistrict 0.318∗∗ -0.0298
(0.140) (0.0338)




Note: The ‘treatment’, Post × Open, is an interaction between open to recruiting status, and dummies for
the 1977 and 1981 election years. minedistrict is a dummy taking on 1 if the electoral division (magisterial
district) contained a gold mine. The outcome in the first column is the vote share of parties defined as
right of the National Party, the second is the vote share of the National party and parties to its left. Each
regression includes electoral division and year fixed effects. The regressions also control for maize
production in 1963 and year interactions, and weights for the 1960 black rural population. Errors are
clustered at the electoral division level. Outcomes are relative to 1970.
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A.1 Data Appendix
Table A.9: Summary of data sources.
Data Source Dates: Key Variables Geography
TEBA annual 1957- · recruiting numbers, regional
reports to board 1979 · remittances office
(T = 23)
Annual report 1964 - · Mine output mine
Chamber of Mines 1983 · Capex
(T = 14) · Profit
Censuses of 1963 - · Wages, Employees district
Agriculture 1983 · Output by Crop
(T = 11) · Machines
Stats SA 1904 - · population by urban- district
Pop Trends (T = 7) 1960 rural status by race
Gov Gazettes, 1961- ·vote share by electoral
Schoeman (1977) 1987 party division
(T = 7)
Horner(1980) 1972-79 · Strikes, Injuries mine
Map of open or 1970 · Open or closed district
closed districts · Closed with potential
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A.2 Notes on White Politics
A.2.1 Historical Background
I briefly outline some of the main cleavages in white politics while noting that undoubtedly
the most important aspect of South African politics before 1994 was that the majority of
the population was entirely disenfranchised.1
The Union of South Africa was formed in 1910 when the four British colonies (two of
which had been Boer republics before the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902) were joined. The
South African Party was in power from 1910 to 19242 until it was defeated by the National
Party - Labour Party ‘Pact’ government (Nohlen 1999, p. 818).3 The Pact governed until
1932 when Hertzog’s National Party and Smuts’ South African Party formed the ‘fusion
government’, which would form into the United Party. This lead the hardliner Nationalists
to break away as the ‘Purified’ National Party under D.F. Malan.4 South Africa entry into
WWII on the side of the British again led many Afrikaners to split from the United Party
in 1939, but Smuts became Prime Minister under a United Party-Dominion Party-South
African Labour Party coalition government from 1939-1948. The Purified National Party
members joined with refugees from the United Party to form the reunited NP from 1940.
1. South Africa at the turn of the 20th century was not unique in having a restricted franchise. Compare
reconstruction in the US South; that women were widely still denied the vote; and the various Colonial
empires throughout the world. There were some important (non-monotone) developments in suffrage over
this time period. White women could vote from 1930. All Cape ‘Europeans’ received equal, direct and secret
suffrage from 1931. Black voters in the Cape province were removed from the roll in 1936 and ‘coloureds’
in 1956 (the South Africa Act Amendment Act was passed in 1956 after the Supreme Court threw out the
first such act in 1951). The age of voting was reduced to 18 from 21 in 1958.
2. Though it was part of a minority government between 1920 and 1921.
3. The National Party was formed on the basis of Afrikaner opposition to South African support for the
British in WW1 (Nohlen 1999).
4. “Left-leaning” pro-British SAP members broke away to form the “Dominion Party”.
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It was this National Party which won power (in coalition with the Afrikaner Party) in 1948
and initiated the policy of “Apartheid”. The NP would govern until 1994. The United Party,
which received more votes than the National Party in 1948, but won fewer constituencies,
weakened over time and dissolved in 1977. Opposition to NP rule from further left came in
the shape of the Liberal Party (from 1953), which was succeeded by the Progressive Party
(from 1959), the Progressive Federal Party (from 1977) and the Democratic Party (from
1989). Opposition to NP rule from the right came in the shape of the Reformed National
party (HNP) (formed 1969) and the Conservative Party (CP) (formed in 1982). These parties
would split the right-wing vote in the 1980s. Davies et al. (1976) and O’Meara (1996) are
important references for an analysis of intrawhite political economy. Botha (1996) provides
a review of the party system.
A.2.2 Geography and gerrymandering.
Information on the delimitation of political boundaries is provided by Christopher (1983)
who provides a history of the work of the various Delimitation Commissions and reappor-
tionments to the four provinces based on census returns. Delimitation was based on the
number of white adults (white males, then white adults, white union nationals, and from
1952 number of registered white voters). Christopher (p.216) states that in the period in
which Black and ‘Coloured’ voters were on the roll in the Cape, they were ‘of limited influ-
ence [...] as they rarely formed more than one-fifth of the electorate of any constituency’.
Note that delimitation happened in two stages: first, apportionment to provinces. Second
constituency boundary drawing for each province. Christopher notes various delimitation
battles waged resulting in apportionments, ‘first to the benefit of Natal and the Transvaal,
and more recently to the benefit of the Cape Province. The implications of this state of
affairs are evident in the present struggles between the Transvaal and Cape wings of the
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National Party over the interpretation of party policy.’ Christopher (1983) (p. 210). Par-
ticularly noteworthy was the power of the Delimitation Commission to ‘load’ or ‘unload’ a
constituency by up to 15%, based on a set of factors, with a net effect of ‘favoring’ rural
constituencies.5 A particular concern was the “unloading” of rural Cape seats.6 Another
important consideration is that when Transkei, Bophutatswana and Venda received ‘indepen-
dence’ in 1977, constituency boundaries had to be redrawn (see the work of the Fourteenth
Delimitation Commission).
5. See also Price (1953)
6. Note, according to the Constitution Amendment Act of 1965, ‘special electoral divisions’ could receive
a 30% loading. Christopher (1983) (p.214) observes ‘the unloading of the rural constituency and the corre-
sponding loading of the urban constituency is a markedly persistent and vital factor in all delimitations since
Union.’ As he goes on to observe, while the 1961 Republic referendum returned 52.1% in favour of leaving
the Commonwealth and becoming a Republic, in constituency terms the results corresponded to 65.3% in
favor.
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A.3 Ending Labor Tenancy on Farms
White farmers were an important political constituency in Apartheid South Africa. Accord-
ing to Crush and Jeeves, “every South African government after Union taxed the gold mines
in order to subsidize farming”. It was not enough that the 1913 Land Act denied blacks the
rights to own land outside the reserves — an area comprising 7.5% of the country alone. A
constant refrain from white farmers throughout the first half of the 20th century was the
need for the South African government to provide them with more ‘cheap labor’.
Various institutional arrangements were created and elaborated towards this end. The
forms of tenure were still rooted in the paternalist relations inherited from the colonial era
— blacks on white farms were tenants and squatters, sharecroppers, or migrants (there was
no way ‘up the ladder’ (Alston and Kauffman 1997) since blacks could not own land).7
Frequently the compensation provided by the farmers was far inferior to that offered by
industry or mining, and farmers relied instead on the system of labor controls to sustain the
viability of their low proffered pay (hence many marginal farms were kept afloat). This was
particularly the case for farmers using labor-intensive techniques such as those operating the
sugar plantations in Zululand, and maize and potato farmers. Farmers would also tend to
favor the use of migrant labour where: production processes were labor intensive8; where
land was more valuable; and where migrant labour was accessible — that is, the borders
with (then) Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Mozambique.
Labor tenancy was an important institutional feature of many parts of the country. Notes
Atkinson (2007) (p.30), “[t]he system of labour tenancy did not take hold very extensively
in the Cape Province or the Free State, but it was a pre-eminent form of labour organisation
7. See Onselen (1996) for a description of the hardships black farmers endured during this time.
8. The maize fields of Eastern Transvaal, and the sugar plantations of Northern Natal.
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in northern Natal and most of the Transvaal. Labour tenancy involved workers residing on
white farms, with a period of service of up to 180 days per year on the farm. During the
rest of the year, the tenant was free to seek outside employment.”
As agriculture mechanized, aided by generous state assistance in the form of cheap credit,
and wage labor became more widespread, farmers began to not have use of large amounts of
“surplus labor”. The state’s drive for mechanization of agriculture starting from the 1960s
included the incremental (across districts) outlawing of the “labor tenant” relationship on
farms. Under the terms of section twenty-two of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act (Act No.
42 of 1964), Bantu Affairs Commissioners were authorized to choose to stop new tenancy
contracts, and/or outlaw tenancy altogether. The process for the ending of tenancy was
finally completed in 1979. These changes led to farm evictions, the elimination of ‘black
spots’ and the deepening of unemployment in the homelands. Once it was no longer possible
to be a labor tenant, the Illegal Squatters Act of 1951 and the Trespass Act of 1955 provided
for summary eviction from a farm. Between 1960 and 1983, more than 3.5m people were
forcibly moved into the Bantustans (The Surplus People Project 1983). As Atkinson (2007)
explains:
Official policy was aimed at tying much-needed workers to the farms; at the same time, the
National Party government endeavoured to remove ‘surplus’ people (typically, independent
black labour tenants and their families) to the homelands. There have been various estimates
of the scale of forced removals. It is possible that around 1.4 million labour tenants and
squatters were removed between 1960 and 1974 [...] Between 1964 and 1970, labour tenants
decreased from 163,000 to 27,585 [...] the changeover from squatting to labour tenancy, and
thereafter to wage labour, brought in each instance diminished access for black rural labourers
to subsistence production, whether in the traditional black farming areas or in the reserves,
and to grazing and cultivation rights on European farms.
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A.4 Protecting white labor
A bestiary of controls. The controls protecting white labor were numerous and wide-
ranging. Various authors date the start of the labor architecture to the white mining strike
of 1922 against proposals of the mining companies to increase the use of ‘non-white’ labor.
The strike was suppressed – by the military — and wages fell. In 1924 the incumbent
SAP party was defeated by a coalition ‘Pact’ government of the farmer-friendly NP and the
white-worker-protecting Labour Party. A corporatist labor structure was then introduced in
the Industrial Conciliation Act (1924). This Act introduced an architecture of bargaining
councils between employer associations and (white) trade unions. The IC Act became the
mechanism for the color bar (job reservation for whites) fixed on an industry by industry
basis between the relevant white employer and white union. Argues Mariotti (2010), “The
IC Act allowed for industries and trade unions to come together to negotiate on general work
conditions including the reservation of work for whites and on the relevant wage rate to be
paid.” Collective bargaining agreements negotiated between a representative trade union and
employer association were made binding on non-union members through application of the
ergo omnes principle.9 The Pact government also introduced the civilized labor policy which
entrenched affirmative action for whites in particular within government and parastatal jobs.
Later, the Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act (1941) required separate at-work
amenities for different racial groups (e.g. cafeteria, restrooms, entrances were all separated
by races). Mariotti (2010) argues that these added fixed costs dissuaded many small firms
from hiring multiracial workforces. She also notes that the The Apprenticeship Act of 1944
excluded blacks from artisanal careers. A linked (and crucial) component of discrimination
against blacks, coloureds and indians by the white state was the radically inferior provision
9. For estimates of the effects of this legislation (which persists today, but without the racial elements),
see for example Magruder (2012) who finds large and significant negative impacts on employment.
225
of public education relative to whites. This policy began to be reversed initially at the begin-
ning of the 1970s, but the largest changes only followed the Soweto Riots of 1976 (sparked
by the introduction of compulsory Afrikaans language instruction in black schools). The
number of black female school teachers increased between 1985-1990 from around 30,000 to
80,000 (and black male school teachers increased from about 20,000 to 50,000). All other
teacher series are flat (and, in fact white school teachers decline) (Crankshaw 1997). The
discussion in Case and Deaton (1999) is also highly informative.
Labor reform from the 1970s and the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions. The
end of Apartheid is overdetermined. Pressures on Apartheid spatial geography towards the
end of the 1970s included: local and domestic opposition to the homeland system; economic
deterioration within the homelands; pressures for migration emanating from ‘severe droughts
in the early 1980s’; increased urban black militancy; and stronger black trade unions (Pickles
1988). Lowenberg (1997) and Mariotti (2010) argue that white support for job discrimination
declined over the apartheid period as whites moved from semi-skilled to skilled work — they
suggest that increased education led Afrikaans whites into more skilled occupations, and
skilled workers supported allowing African workers into semi-skilled occupations. We note
though that a large number (as many as 40%) of Afrikaners in the labor force worked in
the state sector and likely may have opposed political change (on these grounds alone).
The Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions recommended in 1979 that government end job
reservation (companies were increasingly flouting these restrictions in the 1970s).
The Riekert commission’s mandate was to consider the institutional framework for man-
power utilization — excluding those aspects that would be dealt with under the terms of
reference of the Wiehahn Commission into labor legislation. An important outcome of the
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commission, as detailed by Pickles (1988), was the renewed push for industrial decentral-
ization through incentives organized according to the logic of ‘regional labour markets’.
Pickles (p.236) reports that to some extent the high incentives offered were ‘effective’ —
between 1978 and 1984 ‘the proportion of manufacturing industry located in decentralised
areas’ increased from 12.9 per cent to 19.3 per cent. Siebert (1987) documents how the real
black/white wage gap in mining and manufacturing narrowed after 1975.
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Table B.1: Daily abnormal returns, in percentage points, by event window size – A negative number x correspond to a window
between −x days and -1 day before the event, a positive number x is a window between the event day and x day after the
event.
Event window limit Extension Restrictions All events Event window limit Extension Restrictions All events
-10 -.07 .15 .07 0 .34 2.07*** .65***
(.12) (.2) (.1) (.3) (.29) (.16)
-9 -.05 .18 .11 1 .31* .95** .42***
(.13) (.21) (.11) (.19) (.48) (.17)
-8 -.06 .29* .12 2 -.07 .53 .02
(.14) (.2) (.11) (.2) (.42) (.17)
-7 .07 .16 .16* 3 -.14 .29 -.08
(.14) (.22) (.11) (.17) (.35) (.14)
-6 .03 .19 .13 4 -.1 .37 -.01
(.15) (.23) (.12) (.16) (.3) (.14)
-5 -.01 .23 .11 5 -.14 .42* -.06
(.17) (.24) (.13) (.16) (.28) (.14)
-4 .07 .22 .15 6 -.08 .52** .03
(.18) (.27) (.15) (.16) (.25) (.13)
-3 .11 .07 .17 7 -.08 .5** .03
(.2) (.3) (.16) (.15) (.23) (.12)
-2 -.03 .12 .09 8 -.01 .51*** .08
(.39) (.36) (.27) (.15) (.21) (.12)
-1 .7* .44* .58** 9 .05 .44** .13
(.47) (.32) (.27) (.15) (.2) (.12)
10 .11 .49*** .18**
(.14) (.2) (.11)
Coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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Table B.2: Value of $100 investment on both sides of the event. If the event window limit is negative, we considered the value
of an investment of $100 at the day of the event, looking backwards until the corresponding day before the event. If the event
window limit is positive, we considered the value of an investment of $100 the day before the event, looking forwards until the
corresponding day after the event. The variance has been computed via the delta-method.
Event window limit Restrictions Extensions All
-10 98.6 100.7 99.26
-9 98.4 100.4 99.02
-8 97.7* 100.5 99.05
-7 98.9 99.5 98.87
-6 98.9 99.8 99.25
-5 98.9 100.1 99.47
-4 99.1 99.7 99.42
-3 99.8 99.7 99.48
-2 99.8 100.1 99.81
-1 99.6 99.3 99.42
0 102.1*** 100.3 100.65***
1 101.9** 100.6* 100.84***
2 101.6 99.8 100.05
3 101.2 99.4 99.68
4 101.9 99.5 99.94
5 102.6* 99.1 99.65
6 103.7** 99.5 100.2
7 104** 99.4 100.23
8 104.7*** 99.9 100.72
9 104.5** 100.5 101.26
10 105.5*** 101.2 102.02**
Coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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Table B.3: Daily abnormal returns depending on the source branch for the executive term limits change, in percentage points,
by event window – A negative number x correspond to a window between −x days and -1 day before the event, a positive
number x is a window between the event day and x day after the event.
Event window Executive Legislative Judiciary
limit Extensions Restrictions All Extensions Restrictions All Extensions Restrictions All
-10 -.17 1.19*** .04 .03 -.47 .01 -.05 -.17 .02
(.23) (.33) (.2) (.16) (.47) (.16) (.33) (.27) (.21)
-9 -.22 1.21*** .04 -.02 -.62 -.03 -.04 .07 .14
(.25) (.35) (.22) (.17) (.51) (.17) (.37) (.21) (.2)
-8 -.25 1.22*** .03 -.03 -.61 -.03 -.29 .12 .03
(.27) (.39) (.24) (.18) (.54) (.18) (.36) (.21) (.19)
-7 -.16 1.13*** .06 .02 -.79* -.05 -.02 .04 .1
(.29) (.44) (.26) (.19) (.58) (.18) (.4) (.22) (.2)
-6 -.16 .79* -.02 .07 -.36 .04 -.01 .17 .16
(.33) (.49) (.3) (.2) (.6) (.19) (.42) (.23) (.22)
-5 -.25 .11 -.24 .04 -.25 .08 .1 .33* .3*
(.37) (.45) (.33) (.23) (.65) (.22) (.44) (.23) (.23)
-4 -.47 -.01 -.4 .16 .05 .21 -.1 .35* .15
(.43) (.58) (.39) (.23) (.73) (.22) (.41) (.25) (.23)
-3 -.64 .45 -.4 .1 -.14 .11 .02 .12 .05
(.5) (.57) (.46) (.29) (.91) (.23) (.44) (.25) (.23)
-2 -.89* 1.03** -.56 .23 -.43 .24 -.33 -.11 -.23
(.66) (.6) (.6) (.81) (1.34) (.46) (.33) (.2) (.2)
-1 .55*** 2.4*** .83*** .93 .1 .33 .03 .03 .1
(.17) (.45) (.17) (1.15) (1.05) (.51) (.37) (.36) (.34)
0 .65*** 3.01*** .95*** 1.01* 1.25* .57** -.72** 1.78*** .57**
(.21) (.72) (.2) (.77) (.78) (.31) (.32) (.5) (.28)
1 1.2*** 1.18 1.14*** .05 .68 .02 -.29 1.84*** .91***
(.34) (1.01) (.3) (.22) (.6) (.17) (.38) (.43) (.36)
2 .58* 1.38* .59** -.09 .55 -.08 -.49 1.36*** .58**
(.38) (.84) (.34) (.2) (.66) (.21) (.4) (.33) (.3)
3 .32 1.27** .43* -.17 .34 -.16 -.02 .74** .43*
(.31) (.73) (.28) (.19) (.59) (.18) (.47) (.4) (.31)
4 .15 .94* .32 .01 .55 .01 -.1 .4 .23
(.28) (.67) (.25) (.21) (.51) (.19) (.4) (.4) (.28)
5 .37* 1.23** .51** -.1 .7* -.07 .01 .47* .31*
(.27) (.59) (.24) (.19) (.48) (.18) (.36) (.34) (.24)
6 .38* 1.34*** .54*** .12 .62* .06 -.16 .42* .25
(.26) (.53) (.23) (.21) (.45) (.17) (.37) (.32) (.24)
7 .32* 1.01** .45** .06 .61* .04 -.07 .46* .3*
(.24) (.5) (.21) (.19) (.42) (.16) (.35) (.28) (.22)
8 .59** 1.01** .67*** .02 .52* .03 -.18 .56** .34**
(.27) (.53) (.24) (.18) (.37) (.14) (.35) (.27) (.2)
9 .44* .87** .51** .05 .47* .05 -.17 .41* .25*
(.31) (.49) (.28) (.18) (.35) (.15) (.32) (.25) (.19)
10 .45* 1.26*** .58** .13 .52* .13 -.02 .47** .32**
(.28) (.53) (.25) (.17) (.34) (.14) (.32) (.25) (.19)
Coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Filing Date
Filings per Month Foreclosure Rate
Notes: Monthly count of new foreclosure filings in Cook County over time (left axis) and share of cases filed
in a given month that end in a completed foreclosure (right axis). Dashed vertical lines indicate Cook County
suspension of all new foreclosure filings starting April 16, 2009, except for so-called “consent foreclosures:”
foreclosure filings in which lender and borrower had already agreed to foreclosure prior to filing. This
“moratorium” was scheduled to end on September 1, 2009, although appears to have ended earlier, given
the spike in filings prior to Sept. 1.
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics: Pre-Treatment Characteristics
Mean P-Value
All D† F † (H0 : D = F )
Case Resolved 0.950 1.000 1.000 .
Ends in Foreclosure 0.612 0.000 1.000 .
Days to Decision 373.554 274.931 428.665 0.000
Prob Redefault 0.049 0.120 0.013 0.000
Single-Family Property 0.623 0.684 0.590 0.000
Conventional Mortgage 0.647 0.665 0.653 0.000
Loan Principal 237328.100 219520.200 237733.000 0.892
Complaint Amount 229621.000 211420.400 231905.600 0.449
Large Plaintiff 0.471 0.472 0.473 0.065
Large Attorney 0.685 0.682 0.687 0.032
Median Income (tract)†† 44859.720 46409.490 43748.260 0.000
Share White (tract)†† 0.449 0.468 0.433 0.000
Population (tract)†† 5434.558 5472.077 5411.712 0.000
N 148220 50140 90653
Notes: Data from matched court records and foreclosure filings (one obs per case) with baseline sample
restrictions as described in text.
†D = dissmissed cases, F = completed foreclosures.
††Data from 2000 Census (tract-level).
C.1 Data Appendix
Cleaning Court Records We collected all chancery court case records filed between
January 2004 and June 2010 (inclusive). We extract from each record the associated case
number and the case calendar to which the case is assigned. The records also contain a list
of case actions, the lawyer who initiated this action, the associated judge, and the date. We
extract this list of actions (simple text descriptions, e.g., “Amend complaint or petition -
allowed” or “Dismiss by stipulation or agreement”) and the corresponding dates.
We identify a case as ending in a dismissal if an action occurs containing one of the follow-
ing descriptions: ”mortgage foreclosure motion plaintiff dismissed”, ”mortgage foreclosure
voluntary dismissal, non-suit or dismiss by agreement”, ”mortgage foreclosure motion de-
fendant dismissed”, ”mortgage foreclosure dismissed for want of prosecution”, ”dismissed
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Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics: Outcomes
Means P-Value
All D† F † (H0 : D = F ) N
Neighboring Filings 2.423 2.161 2.596 0.000 475127
Any Neighboring Filing 0.734 0.702 0.755 0.000 475127
Neighboring Foreclosures 0.748 0.603 0.844 0.000 475127
Any Neighboring Foreclosure 0.365 0.326 0.390 0.000 475127
Neighboring Sales 3.038 2.962 3.099 0.006 133176
Mean Neighboring Sale Price 169326 184213 157182 0.000 81371
Mean Repeat-sale Adjusted Price122896 123240 122621 0.205 56306
Notes: Outcome variables (0.1 mile radius) measured annually for five years (two years for sales outcomes)
after case is decided (observation = one case-year).
†D = dissmissed cases, F = completed foreclosures.
for want of prosecution”, ”general chancery - dismissed for want of prosecution”, ”general
chancery - voluntary dismissal, non suit, dismiss by agreement”, ”mortgage foreclosure vol-
untary dismissal, non-suit or dismiss by agreement”, or ”mortgage foreclosure judgment
for defendant”; or an action containing any of the following: ”case dismissed”, ”voluntary
dismissal”, ”declaratory judgment voluntary dismissal”, ”dismiss entire cause” and not ”de-
nied”, or ”dismiss by stipulation or agreement” and not ”denied”. For dismissed cases, we
consider the end of the case to be the date of this “dismissal” action (in the case of multiple
such actions, we take the final).
Cleaning RIS Data Record Information Services, Inc. provided us with details of fore-
closure filings and foreclosure auctions for Cook County from 2002 through 2011. RIS is a
private data provision company that collects publicly available records on all foreclosure fil-
ings in the five counties of Chicago. RIS employees manually input data on each foreclosure
filing. From the foreclosure filings, we extract the associated chancery court case number,
unique loan ID, the filing date, details of the associated loan (origination date, principal at
origination, outstanding claim at time of foreclosure filing, a general indication of mortgage
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Notes: **Indicates significance at the 5% level. Standard errors are the max of the SE clustered on census
tract, clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. †Coefficient from regres-
sion of instrument (case-calendar-filing-month foreclosure rate) on given pre-treatment covariates, controlling
for filing month and property type fixed effects. P value in first column is from a joint significance test for the
given covariates. ††Given covariate (for that row) is regressed on full set of case calendar dummies (plus filing
month and property type fixed effects); p value for a joint significance test of the case calendar dummies.
†††In $10,000 of dollars. ††††Outcomes as defined in Section 4.4 measured the year before the case is filed.
Table C.4: Complier Characteristics: Ratio of Subgroup First Stage Estimate to Overall First Stage
Quartile of Income†
1 2 3 4
0.784 1.011 1.060 1.066
Loan Characteristics††
Large Lender
Conventional Positive Zip Code
Underwater
Mortgage Price Growth
1.002 0.896 0.795 0.907
Notes: †Income quartile is given by the tract-level quartile of median tract income from the 2000 Decennial
Census. ††Large lender is an indicator for the plaintiff being one of the six most prominent banks in the
sample, each representing ≥ 10% of filings. Zip-code-level annual price growth is taken from Zillow housing
price indices for Cook County. Underwater is a proxy for the outstanding balance of the mortgage being
greater than the estimated value of the home, as described in the text.
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Table C.5: Baseline Contagion Estimates: 2SLS Coefficient of Effect of Completed Foreclosure on Given
Outcome in Given Year
Years After End of Case (t): 0 1 2 3 4 5
Baseline Estimates
Yid(i)+t = Any Filing per Year
0.052* 0.012 0.082*** 0.090* 0.247** 0.140
(0.028) (0.027)(0.027) (0.053) (0.112) (0.133)
1st-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Yid(i)+t = Total Filings per Year
0.691* 0.670* 0.536*** 0.657** 1.551 0.538
(0.393) (0.368)(0.183) (0.319) (0.983) (0.987)
1st-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Cumulative Count of Filings
Yid(i)+t = Cumulative Filings
0.691* 1.395* 2.090*** 4.522*** 6.446** 5.610
(0.393) (0.732)(0.794) (1.169) (3.105) (4.610)
1st-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Yid(i)+t = Cumulative Filings 0.622 1.266* 1.594** 3.820*** 4.076 2.693
No Recent Foreclosures (0.380) (0.667)(0.703) (1.429) (2.918) (4.611)
1st-stage F 172.500 159.700 138 20.910 12.790 7.515
N 71925 66995 55105 43186 27395 14948
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates of the effect of
complected foreclosure on given outcome (measured within 0.1 miles of the property in the given year since
the case is decided), on an indicator for the case ending in foreclosure (instrumented by the leave-one-out
case-calendar-filing-month-specific foreclosure rate), filing month, property type, and year of observation
fixed effects, and case-level controls:share of tract that report race as white in 2000 decennial census, income
quartile from decennial census, whether plaintiff is a “large plaintiff” (six largest plaintiffs each representing
≥ 7000 filings) or attorney is a “large attorney” (three largest attorneys each representing ≥10,000 cases),
whether mortgage is adjustable rate, size of initial loan, and census tract population. Cumulative filings
respresent the total number of new filings since decision through the given year.
237
Table C.6: Constant Sample Contagion Estimates
Years After End of Case (t): 0 1 2 3 45
Constant Sample Observed for 3 Years after Case Decision (Decided in 2004–2008)
Yid(i)+t = Any Filing per Year
0.094** 0.059 0.168*** 0.090*
(0.048) (0.046) (0.061) (0.053)
1st-stage F 24.620 24.620 24.620 24.620
N 67379 67379 67379 67379
Yid(i)+t = Total Filings per Year
1.243** 1.567*** 1.056*** 0.657**
(0.552) (0.395) (0.391) (0.319)
1st-stage F 24.620 24.620 24.620 24.620
N 67379 67379 67379 67379
Cases Observed for 2 Years or Fewer after Decision (Decided in 2009–2011)
Yid(i)+t = Any Filing per Year
0.027 -0.018 0.026
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
1st-stage F 72.890 69.410 66.700
N 62820 51187 25764
Yid(i)+t = Total Filings per Year
0.239 0.099 0.202
(0.447) (0.515) (0.263)
1st-stage F 72.890 69.410 66.700
N 62820 51187 25764
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates of the effect of
complected foreclosure on given outcome (measured within 0.1 miles of the property in the given year since
the case is decided), on an indicator for the case ending in foreclosure (instrumented by the leave-one-out
case-calendar-filing-month-specific foreclosure rate), filing month, property type, and year of observation
fixed effects, and case-level controls:share of tract that report race as white in 2000 decennial census, income
quartile from decennial census, whether plaintiff is a “large plaintiff” (six largest plaintiffs each representing
≥ 7000 filings) or attorney is a “large attorney” (three largest attorneys each representing ≥10,000 cases),
whether mortgage is adjustable rate, size of initial loan, and census tract population. Constant sample
includes only cases for which we observe three years post decision.
238
Table C.7: Estimates in Years Before Filing




1st-stage F 400.000 400.000 400.100
N 140672 140672 140672
Total Filings per Year
0.020 0.084 0.214
(0.087) (0.122) (0.139)
1st-stage F 400.000 400.000 400.100




1st-stage F 159.400 182.100 164.300
N 140672 140672 140672
Total Completed -0.057* 0.075 0.110
Foreclosures per Year (0.033) (0.065) (0.071)
1st-stage F 159.400 182.100 164.300




1st-stage F 164.900 166.500 136.400
N 109123 102220 84126
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates as in Table
C.5, with outcomes measured in the given year prior to the case being filed.
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Table C.8: Contagion in Completed Foreclosures
Years After End of Case 0 1 2 3 4 5
Baseline Estimates
Any Completed Foreclosure
-0.048 0.002 0.045 0.138*** 0.033 0.174
(0.031) (0.030) (0.038) (0.051) (0.106)(0.144)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Completed Foreclosures
0.280* 0.435*** 0.312*** 0.558*** 0.243 0.063
(0.164) (0.160) (0.117) (0.185) (0.316)(0.334)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Contagion in Completed Foreclosures Filed Prior To Decision
Any Completed Foreclosure
-0.043 0.135*** 0.073*** 0.025 -0.010 0.003
(0.031) (0.028) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017)(0.015)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Completed Foreclosures
0.303* 0.609*** 0.111*** 0.031 -0.010 0.003
(0.164) (0.118) (0.028) (0.019) (0.017)(0.015)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure outcome are as in Table C.5.
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Table C.9: Baseline Housing Market Estimates





1st-stage F22.500 18.840 14.390




(repeat-sales) 1st-stage F11.130 6.314 7.355
p-value 0.107 0.030 0.763
N 30482 17916 7904
2SLS
0.220 6.562 9.964
Total Sales (0.914)(4.574) (9.255)
(Cumulative Over Years) 1st-stage F24.620 19.060 12.970
N 67379 41958 23831
2SLS
-0.031 -0.373 -0.186
log(price at last sale)† (0.116)(0.230) (0.323)
(repeat sample) 1st-stage F21.000 12.400 13.910
N 29620 17597 7852
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure outcome are as in Table C.5. Sales outcomes represent residential transactions within
the given radius and time period only (total sales represents the total count of sales since the decision year),
while price represents the mean sale price of these transactions. Repeat-sales adjusted prices are estimated
as outlined in the text; associated p-value is for the cross-equation test of equality between the repeat-sales
adjusted and unadjusted (first panel) price effects. †Price at previous sale (for repeat sales) adjusted for
annual price growth. Fewer observations here since sample is restricted to the latter of all repeat sales (need
to observe a previous sale).
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Table C.10: Contagion Among Loans with Lenders Implicated in Independent Foreclosure Review Settlement
Outcome Variable Any Filing Total Filings Log Filings
Baseline†
Effect of Completed Foreclosure
0.062*** 0.735** 0.094*
(0.022) (0.320) (0.050)
First-stage F 131.900 131.900 147.100
N 311116 311116 235325
Effect of Completed Foreclosure
0.039* 0.115 0.084*
Automating (0.022) (0.073) (0.049)
Lenders† First-stage F 131.900 131.900 138.000
N 311116 311116 86054
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS specification as in Table
C.5, although all five years post-decision are pooled and the effect of completed foreclosure is fixed.
†Outcomes are measured based on new foreclosure filings by lenders implicated in the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Independent Foreclo-
sure Review Settlement, while “Baseline” includes new foreclosure filings among all lenders. Both samples
are restricted to cases decided between 2007 and 2010 (during which automation of foreclosure filings is
thought to be most common).
type—conventional, adjustable rate, etc.), details of the associated property (latitude and
longitude, census tract, zip code, property type—condo, single family, etc.), and the parties
involved (defendant name, plaintiff—the lender or servicer—identity, plaintiff law firm).
We identify a case as ending in a completed foreclosure if there is an associated foreclosure
auction record in the RIS data. For completed foreclosures, we use the date of the foreclosure
auction as the end-date of the case. If there is both a dismissal action in the court records
and an associated foreclosure auction, we consider the case to have ended in a completed
foreclosure, although, our results are not sensitive to this decision. Relatedly, there is a
field in the RIS data that indicates the outcome of the auction, including if the auction is
canceled. Since this information is missing for half of the years and since it is not indicated
why a cancellation occurs, we do not code canceled auctions as dismissals in our analysis
sample. Again, however, our baseline results are not sensitive to coding canceled auctions
as dismissals. We consider a borrower to have redefaulted if a foreclosure filing is brought
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Table C.11: Contagion Estimates By Proxy for Borrower Equity
Outcome Variable Any Filing Total Filings Log Filings
Neighboring Filings from Underwater versus Non-Underwater Borrowers
Effect of Foreclosure on Filings of 0.066*** 0.696*** 0.096**
Non-Underwater Borrowers† (0.020) (0.230) (0.043)
Effect of Foreclosure on Filings of 0.023 -0.066 -0.003
Underwater Borrowers† (0.019) (0.062) (0.035)
First-stage F 84.220 84.220 86.940
p val for difference between groups 0.053 0.000 0.006
N 902490 902490 441734
Neighboring Filings from -10% – 10% Equity versus ¡ -10% or ¿ 10%
Effect of Foreclosure on Filings with 0.008 -0.159*** -0.035
Equity ¡ -10% or ¿ 10%†† (0.017) (0.054) (0.035)
Effect of Foreclosure on Filings with 0.063*** 0.789*** 0.107**
Equity between -10% and 10%†† (0.020) (0.245) (0.045)
First-stage F 84.220 84.220 89.350
p val for difference between groups 0.017 0.000 0.001
N 902490 902490 416141
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates as in Table
C.5, pooling observations for five years after the case is decided (fixing the effect of completed foreclosure to
be constant).
†Outcomes are for two separate counts of new foreclosure filings by either borrowers in negative equity or
borrowers in positive equity (as defined in the text). P-value tests the significance between the two responses
(positive vs. negative equity)—estimates are performed simultaneously (pooling both outcomes and allowing
for differing filing month and year of observation fixed effects).
††Outcomes are for two separate counts of new foreclosure filings by either borrowers where the difference
between outstanding debt and loan principal is within 10% of initial loan principal and all other borrowers
(see definition in the text). P-value tests the significance between the two responses—estimates are performed
simultaneously (pooling both outcomes and allowing for differing filing month and year of observation fixed
effects).
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Table C.12: Contagion Estimates By Lender Identity
Years Since Decision Any Filing Total Filings Log Filings
Filings from Different Lender†
0.061*** 0.770*** 0.085**
(0.022) (0.245) (0.041)
Filings from Same Lender†
0.006 -0.184*** 0.008
(0.015) (0.056) (0.045)
First-stage F 87.490 87.490 93.560
p val for difference between groups 0.052* 0.000*** 0.109
N 796112 796112 330880
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates as in Table
C.5, pooling observations for five years after the case is decided (fixing the effect of completed foreclosure to
be constant).
†Outcomes are for two separate counts of new foreclosure filings by either different lenders than that in the
observed case or the same lender. P-value tests the significance between the two responses (same lender vs.
other lender)—estimates are performed simultaneously (pooling both outcomes and allowing for differing
filing month and year of observation fixed effects).
against the same loan ID. Note that this will not count new filings at the same property
for different loans (e.g., if the home owner has filings against mortgage and a home equity
loan, we count these as distinct filings). However, if a second filing against the same loan
ID occurs within 180 days, we consider this to be the same case, taking the first date as the
true filing date (and merging info from the two filings). The descriptive statistics in Table
C.1 show a non-zero number of redefaults (1.3%) among loans that end in foreclosure. This
is likely due to miscoding in the RIS data—for example, a foreclosure auction is scheduled
and recorded by RIS, the case is dismissed before the auction takes place (and RIS misses
this) and the borrower subsequently redefaults on the loan. Our results are not sensitive to
discarding these observations.
We construct a unique ID for each plaintiff and attorney as follows. For plaintiffs and
attorneys who are on more than ∼100 cases, we manually checked the names for consistency
and constructed a unique ID number. We then identified “large plaintiffs” as those plaintiff-
IDs associated with greater than 7000 cases, and “large attorneys” as those attorney-IDs
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associated with greater than 10000 cases. We identify by name all plaintiffs implicated in
the Independent Foreclosure Review Settlement conducted by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
We match the RIS and chancery court records by case number. We discard non-matches,
which arise due to several factors: non-foreclosure chancery court cases (e.g., name changes,
mechanic’s liens) will not appear in the RIS foreclosure filings; differing date ranges be-
tween the two data sources (2004–2010 for court records, 2002–2011 for RIS); and differing
geographies (RIS data includes some cases in neighboring counties).
Cleaning Census Data We merge in the following census-tract-level data from the 2000
Decennial Census: median tract income, population, land area, and share of population
that identifies as each census-designated race. We construct tract-level income quartiles
(i.e., what quartile of median income does a given tract fall into), an indicator for being a
predominantly white tract (share white is greater than the median share), population density
(and associated quartiles), and a Herfindahl-Hirschman index for each race (i.e., the sum of
the squared share of each race in the tract). We merge the census tract data to the RIS data
using census tract FIPS codes.
Cleaning Deeds Records These data are collected from the county recorder for Cook
County, IL. The records were collected by an anonymous private firm and made available to
us by the Paul Milstein Center for Real Estate at the Columbia Graduate School of Business.
These data include the date of each sale property transaction, the type of property, the
address, the price of the sale, and an indicator for the property being residential. We drop
all transactions with sale price or address missing. We drop duplicate records—multiple sales
with identical sale prices that occur at the same property within 30 days of one another. We
keep only residential sales. We geocode these deeds records based on the property address
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using Yahoo! Placefinder.
Defining Outcomes Using the cleaned and matched RIS and court records, for each
foreclosure case we calculate the distance between the associated property and the properties
associated with all other foreclosure filings. We then count the number of new filings around
each property (i.e., within the given radius; 0.1 miles in the baseline) in each calendar year,
omitting from the count new filings at the same property or filings associated with the same
case—e.g., a given loan may be tied to multiple properties, which we do not want to include
in the count. If there are multiple foreclosure filings at a neighboring property, we include
each of these in the count (although we have found that our results are not sensitive to
treating these as a single new filing). For each calendar year, we then construct an indicator
for there being any new foreclosure filing. We then identify the year that the case is decided
and define our contagion outcomes relative to that year: number of filings and indicator
for any filing in the year the case ends, number and indicator one year after the case ends,
two years after, and so on. We follow the same procedure to get a count of new completed
foreclosures in each calendar year: calculate the distance between the property associated
with each case and each completed foreclosure (from the RIS auction data), and count the
auctions that occur within the given radius in the given calendar year (where this date is
based on the auction date).
We also construct several sub-counts of new foreclosure filings. Foreclosure filing records
in the RIS data have a field reporting additional lien holders that are listed on the foreclosure
claim (reporting additional lien holders is optional for plaintiffs). For each filing we create
an indicator for additional lien holders. We then construct the same contagion outcomes,
but only counting filings with multiple lien holders. Similarly, we construct our contagion
outcomes using the annual count of new filings from plaintiffs implicated in the Independent
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Foreclosure Review Settlement and, as described in the text, use this to investigate contagion
among lenders known for the bulk processing of delinquent loans into foreclosure filings.
Thirdly, we construct an indicator for the borrower being underwater on their loan: we
take the principal of the mortgage at origination, conservatively assume an 80% loan-to-
value ratio to back out the value of the property, adjust the value of the property using
Zillow monthly zip code housing price indices for the year of origination and the year of the
foreclosure filing, and compare the adjusted value of the property to the claim made against
the borrower by the plaintiff. If the claim is larger than the value of the property, then we
consider the borrower to be “underwater”. For each property associated with a foreclosure
filing, we then find the annual count of filings against underwater borrowers within the given
radius. We have experimented with other ways to construct this underwater indicator—claim
larger than loan principal at origination, claim larger than 110% of estimated value, and so
on—and find little difference in our results. Finally, we construct contagion outcomes for
filings from the same lender. We restrict our sample to the set of cases for which we cleaned
the plaintiff name (i.e., filings with plaintiffs who appear on approximately more than 100
filings). For each case within this subsample, we identify all filings within the given radius
and create an indicator for the neighboring filing having the same plaintiff. We then find
the annual count of new filings from the same plaintiff and new filings from other plaintiffs.
We construct our housing market outcomes in a very similar way. For each foreclosure
filing, we calculate the distance between the associated property and all residential sales in
the deeds records. As with the filings, we want to exclude sales at the property associated
with the completed foreclosure. However, in this case (and unlike the filings) we do not have
a perfect match of address—we cannot precisely identify a sale associated with the property
going through foreclosure. Instead, we drop sales within 0.01 miles. For each calendar year,
we take the mean sale price of all sales occurring within that year within the given radius
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(0.1 miles in the baseline) of the property associated with the foreclosure filing. We then
use as an outcome the log of this sale price. In the following section, we discuss how we
use repeat sales do adjust this average sale price for fixed property quality. We also use as
an outcome the count of residential sales that occur within the given radius in the given
calendar year and an indicator for any sale occurring.
C.2 Adjusting Price Data for Property Quality Using
Repeat Sales
In our deeds records, we first identify all repeat sales: of the 1,330,949 residential sales we
observe between 1995 and 2008, there are 585,756 (44.01%) properties that transact more
than once, which leaves us with 216,068 transactions during the relevant period of 2004 –
2008 (43.56% of the 496,055 residential transactions in this period). For each property, k,
we assume that the sale price in year t, Pkt, is a function of the property’s time-invariant
characteristics, δk, the year of sale, and whether or not there is a recent foreclosure nearby,
Fi(k)t:
log (Pkt) = α0 + αδk + Ψt + αFFi(k)t + εkt = α0 + αδk + Ψt + ekt (C.1)
where Ψt is a year-specific fixed effect and we denote for convenience ekt ≡ αFFk(i)t + εkt =
log (Pkt) − α0 − αXk − Ψt. We want a measure of the sale price, P ∗kt, that removes the
influence of property characteristics, but allows price to vary with foreclosure:
log (P ∗kt) = β0 + φt + ekt
To achieve this, we estimate a simple price regression that controls for property and year of
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sale for all repeat sales in our sample: log (Pkt) = β0 + θk + Ψt + ekt , where θk is a vector of
property fixed effects and Ψt is a vector of year-of-sale fixed effects. Property fixed effects ab-
sorb the influence of the (time-invariant) property characteristics. Using the OLS parameter
estimates and residuals from this model, we then estimate P ∗kt = exp
(
β̂0 + Ψ̂t + êkt
)
. Using
these quality-adjusted sales prices, we then construct a quality-adjusted measure of sale price
for each property i going through the foreclosure courts by taking the log of the average of
all P ∗kt that transact within x miles of property i in the relevant year of observation.
C.3 Monotonicity of Instrument
A failure of monotonicity occurs if a higher value of the instrument means a higher probability
of foreclosure for some cases, but a lower probability for others. As discussed in the main
text, a failure of monotonicity may arise if judges treat different types of borrowers and
lenders differently.
We examine this possibility by relating foreclosure rates for each case calendar for dif-
ferent subgroups to the overall value of the instrument for that case calendar. We want to
check that a higher value of the instrument for the case calendar is associated with a higher
foreclosure rate for the sub-groups. We first calculate the overall foreclosure rate by case
calendar and filing year, and de-mean these estimates by filing year.1 We then take a given
covariate (e.g., the borrower is from a predominantly white neighborhood) and calculate the
foreclosure rate by case calendar, filing year, and the value of the covariate (e.g., foreclosure
rate by case calendar, filing year, and whether predominantly white neighborhood), and
1. Recall that our estimates all include filing date fixed effects, so the relevant comparison is within
filing date, although the figures are similar if we do not de-mean. We use filing year for this exercise to
decrease noise in the foreclosure rate estimates; the story does not change if we use filing month, although
the associated figures are noisier.
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again de-mean by filing year. We plot the de-meaned group-specific foreclosure rates against
the de-meaned general case-calendar-filing-year foreclosure rate and display these plots in
Figures C.2, C.3, and C.4. A failure of monotonicity as we described above suggests that for
certain subgroups a higher general case-calendar foreclosure rate is associated with a higher
group-specific foreclosure rate, while for other subgroups a higher general case-calendar fore-
closure rate is associated with a lower group-specific foreclosure rate. We construct six such
plots: i) comparing foreclosure rates between properties in census tracts where the share of
white residents is greater than the median to those below the median, ii) comparing prop-
erties in each quartile of median tract-level income, iii) comparing foreclosure rates among
conventional (fixed-rate) mortgages vs. unconventional mortgages (adjustable rate, interest
only, etc.), iv) comparing foreclosure rates by property type, v) comparing cases where the
plaintiff is a large lender to those with smaller lenders, and vi) comparing foreclosure rates
among cases where the lender’s attorney is a large vs. smaller attorney (as previously de-
fined). Figures C.2, C.3, and C.4 shows that there is no evidence of a failure of monotonicity.
In all cases, there is a clear positive relationship between the overall case-calendar-filing-year
foreclosure rate and the group-specific case-calendar-filing-year foreclosure rate—a higher
value of the instrument is associated with a higher foreclosure rate in each subgroup. Thus,
in terms of observables—property type, loan type, whether the plaintiff is a large bank
or employs a large attorney, and census tract demographics—the monotonicity assumption
appears valid.
C.4 Nonlinearities in Foreclosure Contagion
Our regressions are all at the foreclosure-case level, which raises two issues. Firstly, the treat-
ment is imperfectly assigned since neighborhoods around two (or more) delinquent properties
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may overlap. Secondly, and relatedly, it is difficult to investigate non-linearities in the effect
of a completed foreclosure. To explore nonlinearities and work with a cleaner (albeit limited)
treatment, we look at the effect of the lagged foreclosures in a small neighborhood on the
new filings.
We define small neighborhoods by partitioning Cook County into squares and examining
foreclosure behavior within. We assign each property associated with our foreclosure cases
to a 0.0625-square-mile square (0.25x0.25). Within each square, i, denote by Nit the count
of new filings that occur in each year, t. Similarly, we count the total number of completed
foreclosures in each year, Fit. We discard squares that have no foreclosure activity (i.e., no
filings) over the period 2004–2010.
Our goal is to relate the lagged number of completed foreclosures in square i to the
number of new filings in a given year. We include fixed effects for the number of ongoing
foreclosure cases for properties in square i as of year t (ηit)
2 and for the year of observation
(ψt):
Nit = β0 + β1Fit−1 + β2Fit−2 + ηit−1 + ηit−2 + ψt + βXi + eit (C.2)
where Xi is a vector of square-specific controls (census-tract demographics).
3 We instru-
ment the lagged number of completed foreclosures using the expected number of completed
foreclosures in square i in year t − 1 or t − 2 (conditional on the number of ongoing cases,
ηi,t−j), where we take the probability of a filing ending in completed foreclosure to be the
leave-one-out case-calendar/filing-month probability of foreclosure as described in Section
2. Since our data only covers filings from 2004 through 2010, we only consider cases filed in this period.
3. We have also experimented with additional lags, although these are rarely significant and require a
further reduction in sample size.
251
4.4.4 In this way, we are comparing neighborhoods with the same initial foreclosure filing
activity, but with different completed foreclosure outcomes owing to random assignment of
these filings to different case calendars.
Aggregating in this way helps address the two issues listed above. Firstly, neighborhoods
here are well defined entities that do not overlap, and so there is no mis-assignment of
the treatment as defined (while this is a contained definition of the treatment, completed
foreclosures on the edges of these neighborhoods may nonetheless have spillover effects to
neighboring squares that we are not accounting for). Secondly, by aggregating counts of
foreclosures we can more readily explore non-linearities in the effect of filings.
The results from the 2SLS estimation of Equation C.2 are presented in Table C.34 and
show evidence of contagion consistent with our baseline estimates from Section 4.5.1. We
split the sample by pre-crash (2006–2008) and post-crash (2009–2010) observations to reflect
the differences seen for these samples in Section 4.5.1. Column 1 shows a strong positive
relationship between lagged completed foreclosures and new foreclosure filings—a completed
foreclosure one year prior causes 0.281 new filings, while a foreclosure two-years prior causes
0.913 new filings. Off of a mean of 2.54 filings per year for this sample, this represents an
increase of 11.1% to 35.9%, which is on par with the baseline estimates in Section 4.5.1. At
the same time, the linear estimates for 2009–2010, in Column 4, are substantially smaller:
0.115 and 0.481 (5.2% and 21.8% relative to the mean of 2.21 filings for this sample). Columns
2 and 5 show estimates allowing for a quadratic relationship between lagged foreclosures and
new filings. Interestingly, the quadratic relationship is significant—as the lagged number
of foreclosures grows, the marginal effect of a completed foreclosure in the neighborhood
4. We treat each case filed within square i as of the given period as an independent random draw that
may or may not foreclose in the given year. We construct the probability of foreclosure in the given year for
each case as the leave-one-out share of cases filed in the same month and assigned to the same calendar that
foreclose in the given year. Then the expected number of foreclosures in square i in a given year is the sum
over these probabilities.
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diminishes. Again, this is consistent with the findings in Sections 4.5.1 that split the sample
by pre-crisis and crisis—exposure to more foreclosure activity diminishes the contagion effect,
perhaps because the marginal foreclosure conveys less information (about house prices or the
foreclosure process itself).
Finally, in Columns 3 and 6 we allow for a more flexible relationship between lagged
foreclosures and new filings by regressing new filings on a set of indicators for the lagged
number of foreclosures. We instrument the lagged foreclosure indicators by the probability
of observing that number of foreclosures in that year, conditional on the number of ongoing
foreclosure cases.5 These estimates seem to suggest that the contagion effect is strongest for
the first two completed foreclosures. However, we do not put too much stock in these results
as the first-stage F statistic for these regressions suggests that the instrument here is weak.
C.5 Lender Response to a Completed Foreclosure
For any given mortgage, divide the remaining life of the loan into three periods (t ∈ 0, 1, 2).
Consider a mortgage in which the borrower owes a payment of mt in each period, t and the
mortgage is fully paid back as of t = 2. Suppose the borrower misses their payment in the
current period (t = 0). With probability α1 the borrower will still be delinquent the following
period and the lender can foreclose on the property, in which case the lender recovers the value
of the home, P , less the costs of foreclosure, λ (e.g., legal fees). However, with probability
1 − α1, the borrower will recover in period 1 and will resume making payments. Then the
value of the unmodified loan to the lender is:
5. For example, if there are four ongoing foreclosure cases in a given year, then the instrument for the
indicator of one completed foreclosure is the sum of the probabilities that each of the four cases ends in
foreclosure, where these probabilities are given by the case-calendar-filing-month foreclosure rate in that
year. We restrict the sample to observations with no more than five ongoing cases in the lagged years, since
the calculation of these probabilities grows drastically with the number of outstanding cases.
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where R is the discount rate. The lender may instead choose to modify the loan, which
reduces subsequent loan payments to m′1 < m1 and m
′
2 < m2.
Lenders will be willing to modify a mortgage when modification is very effective in re-
ducing the probability of non-payment or when the necessary reduction in the value of the
loan is small. By lowering payments, modification reduces the probability of default to
α′1 < α1.
6Then the value of the modified loan is:
VM = α
′






Thus, the lender will choose modification when the value of the modified loan is larger than
the unmodified loan, or the difference between the two is positive:
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> 0, even if the probability
of re-default under modification is zero (i.e., even if α′1 = 0), modification is still not optimal
if the modified payments are too low. For example, lenders will never modify if the net-
of-foreclosure-cost value of the property is greater than the present value of the modified
mortgage payments (i.e., m′1 +
1
R
m′2 < (P − λ)). When the value of the modified payments
6. Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen 2009 allow home prices to change across periods, however, for the purpose
of this paper little generality is lost by assuming no price growth. Similarly, Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen 2009
operate under the assumption that modification guarantees payment in period 1 with a non-zero probability
of default in period 2. Again, this does not fundamentally change the implications of the framework.
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are high enough, lenders are more inclined to modify when it is very effective in reducing
the probability of redefault (i.e., the smaller is α′1).
Assuming that the default probabilities are constant (which shuts down the borrower
contagion channel), a neighboring completed home foreclosure—which lowers the value of
the property under consideration—discourages new foreclosure filings by lenders. Taking the
derivative of VM−Vu with respect to the value of the home, we see that ∂VM−Vu∂P = α
′
1−α1 < 0,
relying on the assumption that modification lowers the probability of future default. A drop
in the value of the home encourages mortgage modification—selling the property at auction
is relatively less appealing to the lender than the modified mortgage.
We derive similar conditions for modification by mortgage servicers. Mortgage servicers
are typically employed by lenders to collect mortgage payments and to manage mortgage
defaults. When a mortgage is current, servicers receive a share of the interest payments
that they collect. However, when a borrower is delinquent, servicers are required to forward
payments to the holder of the debt while they manage the default (either by modifying the
loan or seeking foreclosure). While managing a default, the servicer must incur all associated
costs (e.g. legal fees). If the default ends in foreclosure, the servicer is reimbursed for all
foreclosure-related expenses and fees. Thus, the value to the servicer of foreclosing on the
delinquent loan (as in the above framework) is:
V su = α1 · Π + (1− α1) ·
[





where Π is the total value of all foreclosure-related fees charged by the servicer and where
ρ is the share of the mortgage payment that is returned to the servicer. When the loan is
modified, the servicer is generally not reimbursed for any related expenses, and so the value
of the modified loan to the servicer is:
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V sM = α
′
1 · Π + (1− α′1)
[





where CM is the cost of modification (e.g., time/labor spent in negotiations). Notice that
if the modification is successful, the servicer receives a lower monthly payment for servicing
the mortgage. Then the servicer will prefer to modify when:




















The servicer’s incentives are similar to the lender’s incentives, although as pointed out by
Levitin and Twomey 2011, since servicers’ fees have seniority over all other claims against
a property, servicers are “indifferent to the amount of the [foreclosure] sale proceeds.” In
other words, since the payoff to a servicer of a completed foreclosure is the foreclosure fees,
the servicer does not care about the value of the property (as long as it is high enough to
cover their fees). Moreover, high costs of modification (which are not reimbursed) will push
the servicer in favor of foreclosure. Notice, then, that if the probabilities of foreclosure (α1
and α′1) are invariant to a neighboring completed foreclosure, the servicer will not experience
foreclosure contagion (∂ (V sM − V su ) /∂P = 0).
In summary, under the assumptions that a neighboring completed home foreclosure lowers
the housing value P and that borrowers are unresponsive to the neighboring foreclosure so
that α1 and α
′
1 are unchanged, we should observe “anti-contagion” in home foreclosures: if
only lenders and servicers are responding, a completed home foreclosure should discourage
neighboring foreclosure filings. Of course, if a neighboring completed foreclosure has no
influence on housing values and borrowers are unresponsive, then lenders and servicers should
not respond (we should see no contagion at all).
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C.6 Estimates by Proxies for Social Connectedness
We find little systematic relationship between the extent of foreclosure contagion and several
proxies for social connection. Our first attempt to proxy social connectedness is to stratify
by neighborhood diversity, operating under the assumption that neighbors with similar back-
ground maintain stronger social ties. For each census tract, we calculate a Herfindahl index
of neighborhood diversity using race-population shares from the 2000 Decennial Census. We
then estimate the baseline treatment effect for each diversity quartile to examine whether
contagion is stronger in less diverse (high-index) census tracts. We also estimate the baseline
specification and interact the treatment effect with an indicator for the foreclosure taking
place in a census tract where a single race makes up more than 75% of the population. Our
second set of proxies draw on the notion of social capital outlined by Glaeser and Sacerdote
2000, who argue that social connections are higher when residents live in close proximity to
one another. For example, studying survey data, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2000 find that there
are higher levels of civic participation among residents of large condo buildings than single-
family housing. We proxy neighbor proximity in two ways. First, we interact the foreclosure
treatment effect with an indicator that the home undergoing foreclosure (the unit of observa-
tion) is a condominium unit. Second, we stratify census tracts by population density (again
using data from the 2000 Decennial Census). In both of these cases, while we continue to
find evidence of contagion, there is no systematic relationship between foreclosure contagion
and our proxies for social connection. Our social-contagion estimates can be found in Table
C.31 and C.32, and Figures C.5 and C.6 of the Appendix.
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Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year














































Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
Notes: Filing-year foreclosure rates are calculated for each indicated sub-group by case calendar, demeaned
by filing-year, and plotted against overall foreclosure rates for the given calendar and filing year (again,
demeaned by filing year). A predominantly white census tract has an above-median share of white residents
as of the 2000 Decennial Census, and income quartiles are calculated at the census tract level using median
income from the 2000 Decennial Census.
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Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year






































Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year
condo not condo
Notes: Filing-year foreclosure rates are calculated for each indicated sub-group by case calendar, demeaned by
filing-year, and plotted against overall foreclosure rates for the given calendar and filing year (again, demeaned
by filing year). Conventional mortgage includes all standard fixed-rate mortgages (while unconventional
mortgages includes adjustable-rate mortgages, balloon-payment mortgages, reverse mortgages, and interest-
only mortgages; we exclude VA mortgages). Condo status is as reported in the court documents.
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Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year






































Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year
Large Attorney Not Large Attorney
Notes: Filing-year foreclosure rates are calculated for each indicated sub-group by case calendar, demeaned
by filing-year, and plotted against overall foreclosure rates for the given calendar and filing year (again,
demeaned by filing year). A large lender is a plaintiff who appears on more than 7000 of the foreclosure
cases filed in cook county, while a large attorney appears on greater than 10,000 cases.
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0 1 2 3
Years Since Decision
Income Q1 Income Q2



























0 1 2 3
Years Since Decision
Income Q1 Income Q2
Income Q3 Income Q4
Notes: 2SLS estimates (as described in Tables C.9 and C.5) performed separately for each value of the given
neighborhood quartile of income: income quartiles are calculated at the census tract level using median
income from the 2000 Decennial Census.
261






























0 1 2 3
Years Since Decision
HHI Q1 HHI Q2




























0 1 2 3
Years Since Decision
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0 1 2 3
Years Since Decision
Pop Density Q1 Pop Density Q2





























0 1 2 3
Years Since Decision
Pop Density Q1 Pop Density Q2
Pop Density Q3 Pop Density Q4
Notes: 2SLS estimates (as described in Tables C.9 and C.5) performed separately for each value of the
given quartile. Population density is calculated as census-tract population (as of 2000) over census-tract
area. Diversity is measured with a Herfindahl-Hirschman index over the shares of each 2000 Decennial
Census-designated race in the tract.
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Table C.13: First Stage Regression of Foreclosure on Propensity to Foreclose




1st-Stage F 150.000 147.400
N 140667 140667
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level. Reported standard errors (and corresponding F statistics)
are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract, clustered on filing
month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. First-stage regression of indicator for case ending
in foreclosure on leave-one-out case-calendar-filing-month foreclosure rate, and filing month and property
type fixed effects. †Unreported controls include share of tract that report race as white in 2000 decennial
census, income quartile from decennial census, whether plaintiff is a “large plaintiff” (six largest plaintiffs
each representing ≥ 7000 filings) or attorney is a “large attorney” (three largest attorneys each representing
≥10,000 cases), whether mortgage is adjustable rate, size of initial loan, and census tract population.
Table C.14: Contagion Estimates Measured Since Case Filing
Years Since Filing 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any Filing
2SLS
0.057*** 0.032 0.026 0.025 0.076 0.024
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.076)(0.087)
1st-stage F 388.100 388.100 399 255.500 30.450 22.310
N 140683 140683 121171 98032 59967 36685
Total Filings
2SLS
0.631* 0.867** 0.334 0.276* 0.023 0.456
(0.354) (0.343) (0.260) (0.152) (0.440)(0.728)
1st-stage F 388.100 388.100 399 255.500 30.450 22.310
N 140683 140683 121171 98032 59967 36685
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure outcome are as in Table C.5. Outcomes (and year-of-observation fixed effects) are
measured as of the year that the case is filed (rather than the year that the case is decided).
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Table C.15: Controlling for Length of Case
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any 0.049 -0.006 0.107** 0.125 0.357** 0.167
Filing (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.086) (0.177) (0.163)
First-stage F 149.500 133.900 114.600 24.810 10.740 8.804
N 129834 118201 92804 67076 41733 23666
Control for
Total Filings
0.728 0.782 0.669** 0.928* 2.308 0.627
Log Length (0.553) (0.562) (0.299) (0.511) (1.522) (1.196)
of Case First-stage F 149.500 133.900 114.600 24.810 10.740 8.804




First-stage F 19.320 7.391 12.570
N 42880 25890 12155
Any 0.058 0.008 0.105*** 0.124 0.401** 0.245
Filing (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.076) (0.196) (0.264)
First-stage F 175.100 163.900 163.200 27.100 14.840 4.805
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Control for
Total Filings
0.783 0.791 0.677*** 0.890** 2.497 0.883
Quadratic in (0.496) (0.501) (0.255) (0.451) (1.599) (1.895)
Length of Case First-stage F 175.100 163.900 163.200 27.100 14.840 4.805




First-stage F 21.270 6.922 7.338
N 43079 26047 12241
Any 0.053 0.001 0.106** 0.141 0.463** 0.214
Filing (0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.096) (0.226) (0.225)
First-stage F 127 123.400 104.800 24.880 14.800 8.341
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Control for
log(# of Filings)
0.808 0.842 0.672** 0.990* 2.819 0.803
Quarterly Length (0.567) (0.556) (0.288) (0.576) (1.956) (1.660)
Dummies First-stage F 127 123.400 104.800 24.880 14.800 8.341




First-stage F 19.450 9.194 12.400
N 43079 26047 12241
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure outcome are as in Table C.5, including the indicated controls for length of the case—
log of the total months, a quadratic in total months, or number-of-quarter fixed effects.
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Table C.16: Robustness of Contagion Estimates By Specification
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any 0.066** 0.029 0.096*** 0.113** 0.253** 0.160
Filing (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.052) (0.107) (0.130)
First-stage F242.600 225 212.400 25.470 20.900 14.130
No CovariatesN 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Filings
0.739* 0.741** 0.603*** 0.796** 1.616* 0.621
(0.388) (0.375) (0.196) (0.320) (0.954) (0.972)
First-stage F242.600 225 212.400 25.470 20.900 14.130
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Any 0.071** 0.029 0.095*** 0.096* 0.244** 0.150
Filing (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.053) (0.112) (0.133)
First-stage F232.700 220.200 201 24.080 18.910 13.190
No Property- N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Type FEs
Total Filings
1.190*** 1.065*** 0.876*** 0.868** 1.488 0.805
(0.453) (0.398) (0.197) (0.338) (0.939) (0.941)
First-stage F232.700 220.200 201 24.080 18.910 13.190
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Any 0.068** 0.018 0.104*** 0.089 0.171 0.085
Filing (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.058) (0.117) (0.137)
Drop Cases First-stage F179.200 168.800 162.300 25.500 19.180 14.600
Decided in N 105638 95487 75004 55342 34719 19464
Summer
Total Filings
0.914** 0.851** 0.633*** 0.563 1.126 0.100
(0.430) (0.406) (0.230) (0.354) (0.932) (1.078)
First-stage F179.200 168.800 162.300 25.500 19.180 14.600
N 105638 95487 75004 55342 34719 19464
Any 0.083 0.118** 0.026 -0.088 -0.130 -0.417
Filing (0.062) (0.057) (0.062) (0.109) (0.296) (0.662)
First-stage F 45.180 43.800 37.200 14.260 4.733 1.432
Monotonicity- N 127521 115977 90795 65515 40534 22821
Robust IV
Total Filings
3.471*** 2.067*** 1.041 -0.263 -1.259 -7.345
(1.113) (0.675) (0.674) (1.149) (3.539) (9.501)
First-stage F 45.180 43.800 37.200 14.260 4.733 1.432
N 127521 115977 90795 65515 40534 22821
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding F
statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract, clustered
on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given outcome are
as in Table C.5, with the following adjustments: “No covariates” omits the case-level controls as outlined in
Table C.5; “No Property-Type FEs” omits the property-type (condo/single-family/multi-family/apartment)
fixed effects; “Drop Summer Decisions” drops cases that are decided in June, July, or August (during which
the courts dismiss inactive cases); “Monotonicity-Robust IV” indicates that the instrument is constructed
by calendar/filing month/income quartile/large plaintiff/“white” census tract cells.
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Table C.17: Robustness of Estimates by Sample
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any 0.056** 0.009 0.083*** 0.093* 0.280** 0.160
Filing (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.054) (0.115) (0.137)
First-stage F188.700 179.600 202.400 24.060 18.630 12.440
N 140912 127802 94495 67749 42249 24048
Total Filings
0.649 0.649* 0.553*** 0.700** 1.757* 0.693
Include (0.399) (0.375) (0.184) (0.318) (1.019) (1.013)
Moratorium First-stage F188.700 179.600 202.400 24.060 18.630 12.440




First-stage F 21.490 18.220 14.660
N 43343 26236 12343
Any 0.078*** 0.064*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.035 0.017
Filing (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022)
First-stage F202.200 201.500 225.100 144.800 125 127.600
N 152559 139324 105628 77785 50704 31508
Total Filings
0.402** 0.363** 0.410*** 0.376** 0.360** 0.241
Full Sample (0.204) (0.177) (0.124) (0.163) (0.157) (0.204)
First-stage F202.200 201.500 225.100 144.800 125 127.600




First-stage F131.300 121.900 132.700
N 50879 32750 17952
Any 0.048* 0.008 0.081*** 0.089 0.251** 0.140
Filing (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.055) (0.115) (0.135)
First-stage F247.600 229.100 207.200 24.470 18.120 12.920
Filings ¡ 99thN 127046 116434 91674 66454 41416 23533
Percentile
Total Filings
0.144 0.234 0.395*** 0.318 0.887 0.231
(0.194) (0.174) (0.128) (0.225) (0.561) (0.568)
First-stage F247.600 229.100 207.200 24.470 18.120 12.920
N 127046 116434 91674 66454 41416 23533
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
outcome are as in Table C.5, with the following sample adjustments (recall that the baseline sample omits
cases filed during the foreclosure moratorium of 2009, omits filings against VA loans, and omits cases filed
during the first year of a case-calendar’s existence): “Include Moratorium” maintains the baseline sample,
but includes cases filed during the 2009 foreclosure moratorium; “Full Sample” relies on the set of all matched
foreclosure cases in Cook County for 2004–2010; “Filings ¡ 99th Percentile” drops observations where the
number of new foreclosure filings near a case in a given year is greater than the 99th percentile.
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Table C.18: Contagion in Any New Filing, Omitting Each Filing Year
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
No 2004
0.044 0.014 0.078*** 0.076 0.233* 0.167
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.054) (0.130) (0.174)
First-stage F 221.700 208.300 190.800 21.330 15.180 10.010
N 124342 112717 87309 61592 36265 18391
No 2005
0.046* 0.009 0.072** 0.109* 0.349** -0.735
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.063) (0.171) (1.183)
First-stage F 258.600 248 247.400 22.270 8.089 0.937
N 116682 105064 79676 54020 28854 11860
No 2006
0.053* 0.006 0.078*** 0.060 0.189* 0.233*
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.047) (0.103) (0.132)
First-stage F 267.700 255 249 28.580 26.780 13.700
N 112963 101380 76056 50592 26403 17411
No 2007
0.061** 0.015 0.073*** 0.072 0.316* 0.140
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.052) (0.185) (0.133)
First-stage F 176.900 167.300 172.700 21.770 8.266 12.970
N 107066 95565 70614 46462 34353 23831
No 2008
0.079 0.003 0.224*** 0.242* 0.247** 0.140
(0.073) (0.072) (0.081) (0.126) (0.112) (0.133)
First-stage F 62.950 55.030 34.530 16.530 19.060 12.970
N 93508 83050 62869 56850 41957 23831
No 2009
0.055* 0.018 0.078*** 0.090* 0.247** 0.140
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.053) (0.112) (0.133)
First-stage F 232.200 218 173.100 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 110228 101633 89191 67379 41958 23831
No 2010
0.043 0.012 0.082*** 0.090* 0.247** 0.140
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.053) (0.112) (0.133)
First-stage F 245.500 224.400 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 116405 111987 93143 67379 41958 23831
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for any new
neighboring filing are as in Table C.5, although omitting cases filed in the given year.
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Table C.19: Contagion in Total New Filings, Omitting Each Filing Year
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
No 2004
0.658 0.642* 0.462** 0.531* 1.464 -0.253
(0.403) (0.376) (0.182) (0.318) (1.181)(0.253)
First-stage F 221.700 208.300 190.800 21.330 15.180 20.300
N 124342 112717 87309 61592 36265 13557
No 2005
0.667 0.653* 0.531*** 0.840** 1.609 0.571
(0.407) (0.386) (0.189) (0.341) (1.157)(1.206)
First-stage F 258.600 248 247.400 22.270 8.089 1.423
N 116682 105064 79676 54020 28854 8716
No 2006
0.695* 0.650* 0.501*** 0.597** 1.524 -0.003
(0.396) (0.373) (0.175) (0.286) (0.946)(0.231)
First-stage F 267.700 255 249 28.580 26.780 24.660
N 112963 101380 76056 50592 26403 12983
No 2007
0.659 0.686* 0.528*** 0.529* 1.882 -0.062
(0.427) (0.405) (0.187) (0.314) (1.594)(0.217)
First-stage F 176.900 167.300 172.700 21.770 8.266 24.500
N 107066 95565 70614 46462 34353 17628
No 2008
1.118* 0.635 1.192** 1.178 1.551 -0.062
(0.654) (0.517) (0.573) (1.012) (0.983)(0.217)
First-stage F 62.950 55.030 34.530 16.530 19.060 24.500
N 93508 83050 62869 56850 41957 17628
No 2009
0.749* 0.768** 0.524*** 0.657** 1.551 -0.062
(0.394) (0.378) (0.199) (0.319) (0.983)(0.217)
First-stage F 232.200 218 173.100 24.620 19.060 24.500
N 110228 101633 89191 67379 41958 17628
No 2010
0.627* 0.667* 0.536*** 0.657** 1.551 -0.062
(0.375) (0.367) (0.183) (0.319) (0.983)(0.217)
First-stage F 245.500 224.400 205 24.620 19.060 24.500
N 116405 111987 93143 67379 41958 17628
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for count of
filings per year are as in Table C.5, although omitting cases filed in the given year.
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Table C.20: Baseline Estimates for 0.25 Mile Radius
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any Filing per Year
2SLS
0.017 -0.003 0.016 0.026 0.032 -0.064
(0.012) (0.011 ) (0.011) (0.016)(0.041)(0.052)
1st-stage F238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Filings per Year
2SLS
2.187***2.358 ***1.693 ***1.219 2.665 0.762
(0.777) (0.785 ) (0.520) (0.764)(1.792)(2.217)
1st-stage F238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
log(price)
2SLS
-0.161** -0.269 * -0.410 *
(0.067) (0.144 ) (0.220)
1st-stage F 24.760 17.870 16.860
N 63639 39508 21860
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for any new
neighboring filing are as in Table C.5, although defining outcomes using a 0.25 mile radius around delinquent
property.
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Table C.21: Estimates for Loans with Multiple Claimants
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any Filing
0.076* 0.007 0.087** 0.071 0.112 0.058
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.075)(0.143)(0.164)
First-stage F 210.100 213.600 175.800 23.360 16.810 12.410
N 65366 59917 48271 34865 21252 11377
95% CI Lower Bound 0.154 0.081 0.163 0.217 0.392 0.379
Total Filings per Year
0.820 0.669 0.454 0.470 2.026 0.707
(0.575) (0.511) (0.286) (0.495)(1.634)(1.267)
First-stage F 210.100 213.600 175.800 23.360 16.810 12.410
N 65366 59917 48271 34865 21252 11377




First-stage F 19.580 24.230 18.530
N 22348 13423 6071
95% CI Upper Bound -0.254 -0.625 -0.876
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for any new
neighboring filing are as in Table C.5. Sample is restricted to cases where multiple lien holders are listed in
the foreclosure filing.
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Table C.22: Contagion in Completed Foreclosures/Dismissals Filed After Decision
Years After End of Case 0 1 2 3 4 5
Contagion in Completed Foreclosures Filed After Decision
Any Completed Foreclosure
-0.015 -0.150*** 0.054 0.186*** -0.023 0.119
(0.011) (0.032) (0.035) (0.055) (0.115)(0.154)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Completed Foreclosures
-0.028* -0.285** 0.323** 0.705*** -0.044 0.180
(0.014) (0.129) (0.160) (0.211) (0.389)(0.539)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Contagion in Dismissals Filed After Decision
Any Dismissal
-0.018** -0.029 -0.011 0.034 0.047 0.077
(0.008) (0.023) (0.017) (0.030) (0.072)(0.095)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Dismissals
-0.026** -0.050 -0.026 0.049 0.003 0.216
(0.011) (0.036) (0.028) (0.059) (0.127)(0.176)
First-stage F 232.700 234.500 172.700 25.030 15.020 8.676
N 94866 84906 66291 46383 28310 15230
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure or dismissal outcome are as in Table C.5. Dismissal outcomes are counted in the same
way as foreclosure outcomes: number of dismissals or indicator for any dismissal (among cases filed after
observation case is decided).
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Table C.23: Robustness of Price Estimates By Specification





First-stage F23.290 20.600 15.210





First-stage F22.140 19.140 14.580





First-stage F22.860 18.330 9.793





First-stage F12.080 5.523 3.730
N 41593 24902 11517
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and
corresponding F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat)
clustered on the census tract, clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract
and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given outcome are as in Table C.5, with the follow-
ing adjustments: “No covariates” omits the case-level controls as outlined in Table C.5; “No
Property-Type FEs” omits the property-type (condo/single-family/multi-family/apartment)
fixed effects; “Drop Summer Decisions” drops cases that are decided in June, July, or Au-
gust (during which the courts dismiss inactive cases); “Monotonicity-Robust IV” indicates
that the instrument is constructed by calendar/filing month/income quartile/large plain-
tiff/“white” census tract cells.
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Table C.24: Price Effects, Omitting Each Filing Year




First-stage F 17.390 12.490 12.150




First-stage F 15.530 5.944 1.824




First-stage F 28.770 29.790 13.780




First-stage F 17.230 9.746 14.390




First-stage F 13.530 18.830 14.390
N 39009 26046 12241
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for log of
neighboring residential real estate sale prices are as in Table C.5, although omitting cases filed in the given
year.
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Table C.25: Sub-Sample Price Effects





1st-stage F 22.070 11.470 13.980





1st-stage F 24.040 16.870 9.938
N 30522 17925 8143
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure or dismissal outcome are as in Table C.5, although using the given sample. “Repeat










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.33: Contagion Among Borrowers with the Same Lender
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any Filing (Different Lender)
0.062** 0.037 0.073*** 0.092* 0.287** 0.070
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.054) (0.119) (0.163)
Any Filing (Same Lender)
0.001 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.048 0.029
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.029) (0.074) (0.094)
First-stage F 124.700 112.400 112.700 13.060 8.506 4.524
p val for diff. = same 0.104 0.488 0.126 0.146 0.040 0.794
N 231920 211018 164628 117636 70910 38210
Total Filings (Different)
0.816** 0.887*** 0.683*** 0.742** 1.112 -0.081
(0.362) (0.343) (0.182) (0.347) (0.700) (1.108)
Total Filings (Same)
-0.194*** -0.185*** -0.160*** -0.116 0.024 0.063
(0.061) (0.062) (0.050) (0.083) (0.190) (0.254)
First-stage F 124.700 112.400 112.700 13.060 8.506 4.524
p val for diff. = same 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.018 0.860
N 231920 211018 164628 117636 70910 38210
log(# of Filings) (Different)
0.023 0.127** 0.121** 0.182** 0.145 -0.053
(0.067) (0.054) (0.053) (0.090) (0.226) (0.246)
log(# of Filings) (Same)
0.046 0.001 0.033 -0.154 -0.425 0.952
(0.087) (0.080) (0.072) (0.103) (0.394) (3.326)
First-stage F 55.050 107.600 41.270 15.800 5.857 0.056
p val for diff. = same 0.838 0.162 0.157 0.000 0.121 0.750
N 98694 88191 67543 47654 28798 15282
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates as in Table
C.5. Outcomes are for two separate counts of new foreclosure filings by either different lenders than that in
the observed case or the same lender. P-value tests the significance between the two responses (same lender
vs. other lender)—estimates are performed simultaneously (pooling both outcomes and allowing for differing
filing month and year of observation fixed effects).
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Table C.34: Neighborhood-Level Aggregate Contagion Regressions
2006–2008 2009–2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fit−1
0.281** -0.051 0.115 0.725***





0.913*** 1.177*** 0.481*** 0.742***




























N 30291 30291 25317 19807 19807 12967
First-Stage F Stat351.578 205.429 0.060 244.386 145.119 0.071
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates as in Table
C.5. Outcomes are for two separate counts of new foreclosure filings by either different lenders than that in
the observed case or the same lender. P-value tests the significance between the two responses (same lender
vs. other lender)—estimates are performed simultaneously (pooling both outcomes and allowing for differing
filing month and year of observation fixed effects).
